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Abstract 
 
Knowledge is an essential source of competitive advantage in modern society and is 
particularly important in the current on-line environment due to increased business 
interactions throughout the world. Knowledge sharing initiatives taken by organisations 
to improve technicalities to tackle cyber threat have been extensively investigated. A 
particular focus of this study was on the security professionals sharing their learning 
experience in order to help address and mitigate identity theft. Multiple case studies were 
employed to interpret the triangulated data collected. ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, TeleCo, 
and NetworkingCo participated in this investigation. Semi structured interviews were 
scheduled and conducted in conjunction to company reports, personal communication, 
presentation slides and related materials was gathered to ensure trustworthiness and 
authenticity. Pattern matching analysis was employed to draw conclusions by evaluating 
30 transcripts and 11 internal documents.  
 
The major theoretical contribution of this study was the proposal of a conceptual 
framework that adapts for private sector organisations knowledge sharing elements in the 
security profession. Lack of knowledge of the manager’s role is addressed. Current 
knowledge sharing and corporate communication practices are synthesised. Formal and 
informal communication, social forums and networking events are evaluated. Thus, 
improving the current understanding of identity theft. 
 
This empirical study contributes to an improved understanding of inter-organisational 
knowledge sharing practice within three retailers and an official networking forum. 
Because of this evaluation, an extended framework is proposed and components 
synthesised into a new framework. Recommendations are drawn based on an evaluation 
of what is working and what does not seem to be providing benefits with regard to 
knowledge that address and mitigate identity theft. The framework suggested that the key 
to improved knowledge sharing was to persuade a range of security officials working for 
different private sector organisations to share their knowledge of identity theft prevention. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter describes the research background, aim and objectives of the study and key 
research questions. The rationale behind work is discussed followed by the contribution 
of the project to knowledge sharing practice and concludes with thesis structure. 
 
1.1 Research Background 
Identity theft is a global problem (Roberts, 2012). The United Kingdom (UK), like many 
of the developed countries spends considerable amount of money and human resource on 
trying to enhance cyber security, and find ways to prevent crimes related to identity theft 
(Khan, 2015). For instance, Cross-sector Safety and Security Communication (CSSC) is 
a charitable hub in the UK that aims to help businesses remain safe and secure, regardless 
whether an organisation belongs to the public or private sector. CSSC covers over thirty 
sectors in the UK including accountancy, hotel, media, post office, travel, banking, 
information technology, telecommunications, London Boroughs and Resilience, tourism, 
insurance, law, food and supply chain, pharmaceutical, transport, security, construction, 
retail and wholesale (See http://www.vocal.co.uk/cssc/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/Industry-Diagram.png). Cifas no abbreviation (Previously 
CIFAS – stands for Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System) is a leader in fraud 
prevention in the UK to support a number of organisations in these sectors by providing 
intelligence-sharing systems. In spite of these collective efforts, however, the extent of 
identity frauds is continuing to increase. A recent report produced by Cifas to measure 
fraud incidences recorded in 2014 (Cifas, 2015a) indicates a 25% increase in frauds from 
2013. Trustwave’s 2013 Global Security Report shows retailing as the most compromised 
industry with 45% of the incidents (Trustwave, 2013, p. 9). The report also indicated that 
the UK is the fourth most victimised country after United States, Australia, and Canada 
(p. 7). Online frauds against UK retailers is estimated £105.5 million in the year 2013 
which is increased by 4% from previous year (Khan, 2015, p. 16).   
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Retailing is “the business of selling goods and/or services directly to consumers” 
(Church, 2014, p. 89). However, it is difficult to use single definition of retailing because 
it involves a vast array of entities (Laudon and Traver, 2013; Rabolt and Miler, 2009). 
For instance, there are business-to-consumer (B2C), business-to-business (B2B), 
consumer-to-consumer (C2C), and social, mobile and local retailing outlets (Laudon and 
Traver, 2013). These outlets use various channels such as departmental stores, grocery, 
mail order and online retail (Marciniak and Bruce, 2004). This study concentrates on the 
online retail, because it is the most prone channel to identity theft. Nearly, 82% of frauds 
are committed online (Cifas, 2015c).  
 
Over the past decade, most retailers in the UK were reluctant to use Internet technologies 
to run business and have been using the traditional style of “bricks and mortar” outlet 
(Marciniak and Bruce, 2004, p. 368). However, this conventional method still exists; 
online retailing is growing rapidly as an easier means of supporting business activities 
(MarketLine, 2015). For instance, businesses are now merging and eliminating non-
profitable units to utilise Information Technology (IT) as the key driver incorporating 
services of delivery companies to bring shopping to the doorsteps of customers (Rabolt 
and Miler, 2009). Doherty and Hart (1999) predicted that the use of technology such as 
the Internet might replace the high street stores. eBay and Amazon are bringing their 
prediction to fruition. Conventional retailers, such as, Debenhams, Next Plc, Sainsbury’s 
Grocery and Tesco, are also using online mechanisms to supplement their traditional 
ways of trading.  
 
Shifting of the businesses activities from onsite to online not only reduces retailers’ cost, 
but also improves staff productivity, and is more convenient for the customers (Aerohive 
Networks, 2013; Liefeld, 2013). Online retailers expand their reach (Choo, 2011), and 
attract consumers’ attention to the new pricing offers because of the reduced cost 
(MarketLine, 2015; Doherty, Ellis-Chadwick and Hart, 1999). Therefore, online retailers 
are contributing significantly to the UK’s economy, are being more widely appreciated 
by the society (Rudrabasavaj, 2010). 
 
However, the use of these technologies as a vehicle in business not only assists business 
and consumers’ interaction but also malicious actors’ (Xu, 2012; Geeta, 2011). Abuse of 
identity information is a common problem which increases with the use of advanced 
technology and devices such as laptops, smart phones and tablets (Bose and Leung, 2013). 
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For instance, Internet technologies can completely transform business with the use of 
digital transactions and information control systems (Laudon and Traver, 2013, 51; 
Domaleski, 2000, p. 2). This information system is composed of personally identifiable 
information of business employees, customers and partners (Geeta, 2011). Virtual 
communication between businesses and consumers enables potential criminals to steal 
consumers’ and even business information as noted in the theory of criminology 
(Prabowo, 2011). Crime occurs when motivated offenders are able to access targets in the 
absence of guardians who can intervene (Cohen and Felson, 1979). These elements are 
associated with online retailing which is incapable of “seeing” likely offenders due to the 
virtual interaction with customers. This communication provides fraudsters with the 
opportunity to attack business information systems by hacking, phishing and scamming 
to steal customers’ details (Geeta, 2011; Prabowo, 2011). Criminals either use the same 
information or modify slightly to perpetuate their online criminal activities (Cifas, 2014b; 
Cifas, 2015b). 
 
In response to cybercriminals, a holistic information security management approach has 
advised to take into account human elements (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014). 
Therefore, prevention, detection, analysis and prosecution are commonly considered in 
organisations to ensure information security (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014; Wilhelm, 
2004). Identity theft or frauds have risen because of extensive use of technology. 
Literature therefore pays less attention to knowledge sharing as a strategic practice to 
enhance security officials’ technical abilities (Easterby‐Smith and Prieto, 2008; Easterby-
Smith and Lyles, 2011; Tsoukas, 2011). Identity theft prevention knowledge is not widely 
shared amongst security professional (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; 
Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013). Intelligence sharing reports indicate that fraud knowledge 
is being communicated among the companies (Cifas, 2014b; Cifas, 2015b). However, 
little literature is available in academic journals that focus information security 
knowledge sharing practice very broadly (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Feledi, 
Fenz and Lechner, 2013; Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 2011). The limited research in 
knowledge sharing may be attributed to technicalities associated with identity theft 
prevention.  
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Therefore, to extend knowledge in information security knowledge sharing literature, this 
study focused on establishing how security professionals can enhance fraud prevention 
knowledge through sharing learning experiences. Security officials need to be ‘proactive’ 
to reduce ‘wheel-reinvention’ in order to decrease the adverse impact of identity theft 
(Lopez and Esteves, 2013, p. 99). A knowledge sharing practice may be helpful to 
companies to produce better solutions in a timely and cost-effective manner (Nonaka et 
al., 2014). These challenges posed in the current literature regarding these issues are 
examined in this thesis. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
Aims  
The aims of this study is: 
 
To evaluate inter-organisational knowledge sharing surrounding identity theft prevention 
and to propose a holistic knowledge-sharing framework in this profession.  
 
The aims further broken down into the following objectives to investigate the study 
adequately. 
 
Objectives 
 To investigate various identity fraud prevention practices by reviewing the 
literature and published reports. (OBJ1) 
 
 To investigate existing knowledge sharing within companies across a broad 
spectrum of business presented in the open literature. (OBJ2) 
 
 To select a suitable business to investigate based on the knowledge and 
understanding obtained from rigorous literature review and analysis. (OBJ3) 
 
 To assess how different organisations share identity fraud prevention knowledge 
with each other by investigating knowledge sharing practices within three 
organisations in the retail industry and with a networking forum. (OBJ4) 
 
 To propose an extended knowledge sharing framework within the security 
profession. (OBJ5) 
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1.3 Research Questions 
Limited literature in information security knowledge sharing practice (Flores, Antonsen 
and Ekstedt, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 2011; 
Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014), and intelligence sharing reports (Trustwave, 2013; Cifas, 
2015b; Cifas, 2016) suggest that the businesses have ample opportunities to share fraud 
prevention knowledge. Cifas members are provided with a number of offline 
opportunities to collaborate several times a year nationally and locally (Cifas, 2014a) and 
National Fraud Database (NFD) is shared centrally. Various online forums exist focusing 
on information security profession such as Information Security Forum (ISF) and 
Information Technology – Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (IT-ISAC) where 
security officials collaborate with one another. Despite these collective efforts, however, 
several questions remain unanswered including: Why is there growing concern in the 
increase on identity frauds (Trustwave, 2013; Cifas, 2015b)? What obstructs security 
professionals from improving their technicalities through sharing learning experiences to 
address and mitigate identity theft? These challenges, prompted several research 
questions including the following:  
1. What is working in the retail sector and what does not seem to be 
providing benefit with regard to knowledge sharing to address and 
mitigate identity theft? (RQ1) 
 
2. To what extent are companies willing to share fraud prevention knowledge 
with each other and under which condition(s)? (RQ2) 
 
3. Why do some individual either not take part or have little active 
participation in information security knowledge sharing? (RQ3) 
 
RQ1 and RQ2 are designed based on gaps in the literature discussed (Section 2.5) and 
RQ3 is adopted from Tamjidyamcholo et al. (2014, p. 31) who discovered that some 
professional either do not participate or have less interest to contribute their knowledge 
in the online professional communities such as LinkedIn. RQ1 concentrates on 
effectiveness and efficiency of communication tools and techniques that security officials 
use to share security-related knowledge. These questions contain two components broken 
down as follows: 
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RQ1 (a): What is working for retailers with regards to knowledge sharing to 
address and mitigate identity theft? 
RQ1 (b): What does not seem to be providing benefit with regards to knowledge 
sharing to address and mitigate identity theft?  
RQ2 and RQ3 focus on security officials’ behavioural and relational factors and their 
reaction to the knowledge sharing processes based on trust and associated risk. Similar to 
RQ1, RQ2 has two components as follows:   
RQ2 (a): To what extent are companies willing to share fraud prevention 
knowledge with each other? 
RQ2 (b): Under which condition(s) are companies willing to share fraud 
prevention knowledge with each other? 
RQ3 can be broken down into two parts as: 
RQ3 (a) Why do some security officials not take part in information security 
knowledge sharing? 
RQ3 (b) Why do some security officials have small active participation in 
information security knowledge sharing? 
 
The literature review conducted as part of this thesis suggests several shortcomings in the 
domain of information security knowledge sharing surrounding identity fraud. For 
instance, Tamjidyamcholo et al. (2013, p. 223) pointed out that: “Despite the importance 
of information security, little research based on knowledge sharing has focused on the 
security profession”. Therefore, these authors investigated an Information Security 
Virtual Community (ISVC) to explore intentions and attitudes associated with members 
of the community with respect to trust, self-efficacy, and reciprocity and shared language. 
However, these predictors are not all inclusive for generalising information security 
professionals’ knowledge sharing activities. More work is required to consider social 
interactions, personal outcome expectations, altruism and shared vision 
(Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013, p. 231). Knowledge sharing between organisations is not 
a simple phenomenon (Yang and Maxwell, 2011; Bigdeli, Kamal and Cesare, 2013) as 
this involves multifaceted nature of boundaries, processes, cultures, confidentiality, 
leakage, communication skills, tools, institutionalised routines and social capital (Styhre, 
2011; Szulanski, 1996; Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). This phenomenon 
requires an understanding of inter-organisational knowledge sharing practice and the 
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associated components affecting the knowledge sharing process. This understanding can 
improve knowledge sharing capabilities of online businesses (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang, 2008). Therefore, a framework of all-inclusive components may assist in this 
understanding (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013). Motivated by these challenges the 
following research question was designed: 
  
4. Which is the suitable knowledge sharing framework in the security 
profession in retail that facilitates an understanding of inter-
organisational identity theft prevention knowledge sharing practice? 
(RQ4) 
 
RQ4 covers a framework of all-inclusive components that affect information security 
knowledge sharing. This study chose a framework of factors influencing inter-
organisational knowledge transfer to evaluate how retail sector address and mitigate 
identity theft via sharing learning experiences from peers (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang, 2008). Details of this framework such as its selection, suitability, applicability, 
reliability and comparison with other frameworks are explained in Chapter 3. This thesis 
proposes that corporate communication requires a knowledge that is flowing fluidly and 
an interactive environment to facilitate security professionals to learn from each other's 
experiences.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
Most studies in the security profession evaluated knowledge sharing practice through 
surveys (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; 
Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014). A general limitation of this method is that constructs 
associated with behavioural information security governance to establish security 
knowledge sharing initiatives may not be effectively measured with the use of surveys 
(Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014, p. 106). For instance, Pérez‐Nordtvedt et al. (2008, 
p. 738) discovered that “A survey-based approach to measurement cannot fully capture 
the richness and social complexity of knowledge transfer process”. An investigation of 
inter-organisational knowledge sharing process requires qualitative case studies 
(Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). Carefully designed multiple case studies 
appear to be a logical step in advancing this line of inquiry (Pérez‐Nordtvedt et al., 2008). 
To overcome methodological limitations, this study employs qualitative case studies 
incorporating literature review analysis and semi-structured interviews.  
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Yin’s (2009) case study methodology is employed to collect and analyse the data. Inter-
organisational knowledge sharing practice by definition involves minimum of two 
organisations (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008, p. 679); therefore, a multiple case 
study design approach is designed to understand knowledge sharing between the online 
retailers. Purposive sampling criterion was used to explore relevant insights. In doing so, 
security officials in the retail sector were contacted due to their front line experiential 
knowledge of identity theft related problems (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014). They 
have provided appropriate information to dictate their learning experiences to address and 
mitigate identity theft. The online businesses were chosen in retail due to the fact that 
online is the most widely used channel for committing identity fraud (Cifas, 2015c). 
Therefore, security officials in these organisations found more knowledgeable in 
addressing the research questions posed. Cifas (2015b) fraudscape supports this 
assumption that online retailers are more prone to identity theft. 
 
From the title of this study, it is clear that it requires face-to-face interactions with security 
professionals to gain insights in the real setting. Therefore, one-to-one interviews with 
knowledge holders were conducted. Semi-structured interviews, informal meetings, field 
notes, non-participant observation, industry’s internal briefings and documented data 
were collected during the field visits. Thematic coding technique was used to organise 
large volume of the data. Themes presented were based on the components of the 
framework synthesised in Chapter 2 and 3. The analysis is reported based on research 
questions (Chapter 5). Employing pattern matching extends the framework (Chapter 6).    
 
1.5 Focus of the Study 
This study chose to investigate identity theft and fraud associated with consumers’ 
identity details. Business information systems consist of various invaluable assets such 
as intellectual property, competitive assets (specialised knowledge), client confidential 
information, and internal private information such as payroll and salary (Ahmad, 
Maynard and Park, 2014, p. 366). Since there is limited literature available to prevent 
identity theft (Okeke, 2015), this is a useful research domain for further investigation. 
The studies conducted to evaluate how to secure business information system may 
explicitly contribute to secure identity information. However, very few studies focused 
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online businesses (Roberts, 2012; Finch, 2011; Finch, 2007). Therefore this thesis 
considers knowledge sharing practice between in online retail as a novel contribution 
(Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Tamjidyamcholo et 
al., 2014).  
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study contributes to the literature in following ways. Firstly, this is an original work 
based on real cases. Insights are gained from real actor working in the security profession. 
Secondly, it links a number of research areas together such as information security, 
knowledge management and corporate communication. It provides new insights on how 
these three broader areas can complement one another to mitigate identity theft. However, 
its contribution is not limited to identity theft prevention. Knowledge sharing practices 
identified in this thesis and the anecdotes from the respondents are valuable contributions 
to the literature in online information security. Knowledge management practitioners and 
communication theorists may find it useful.  
 
The main contribution of this thesis is a holistic model of underlying practices that prevent 
identity theft (Figure 5-1). In particular, a framework of the factors influencing inter-
organisational knowledge sharing practice (Figure 3-3) is applied, evaluated and extended 
as new model in the security profession (Figure 6-1). Such an extension is a novel 
contribution to existing body of knowledge and improves managerial and organisational 
practices with regards to sharing fraud prevention knowledge to advance professionals’ 
abilities in the online retail.  
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1.7 Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature focused on identity theft, knowledge management and 
corporate communications. The definitions of identity theft and current understanding of 
these concepts are evaluated. Next, knowledge management and its role in addressing and 
mitigating identity fraud are considered. Discussion of corporate communication 
practices support inter-organisational knowledge sharing activities. Research gap is 
identified with the discussion of the key research questions. The chapter concludes by 
proposing a need of the framework that helps understand online retailers’ knowledge 
sharing practice. 
Chapter 3 further extends the theories discussed in chapter 2. This chapter begins with an 
exploration of an appropriate theoretical framework useful to evaluate inter-
organisational knowledge sharing process. Three frameworks are compared and 
contrasted and the components of the framework are synthesised. An extension of the 
framework in the security profession is proposed due to lack of empirical investigation in 
the online retail.  
Chapter 4 concentrates on the methods applied. The philosophical underpinning of the 
research area and its theoretical stance is considered. This is followed by the design of 
case study, interview protocol, research instruments and the sampling strategy. The 
chapter concludes the field visits. 
Chapter 5 presents the data obtained from various cases. It discusses background of the 
companies and their relevance to the study. Data from various cases is summarised and 
cross-case comparison is generated.  
Chapter 6 discusses framework evaluation and extension. Answer to various key research 
questions is evaluated and summarised with key findings.   
Chapter 7 concludes by discussing theoretical contribution. Key implications and 
recommendation are drawn. Challenges faced during this study are discussed to suggest 
future researchers about the promising research areas. The chapter concluded at the 
reflection.  
 
Figure 1-1 illustrates structure and roadmap of the study.  
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Figure 1-1 Organisational structure of key compoenents in knowledge sharing in relation to the thesis 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews relevant literature involved in identity theft, knowledge 
management and corporate communication. The main aim is to evaluate inconsistencies, 
shortcomings, and contradictions in these broader research areas. The origin of the 
concepts and current understandings within the context of online retail is considered. 
Issue of identity theft prevention is discussed by arguing that knowledge management as 
a practice has received little attention to improve technicalities in security profession. 
Role of knowledge management to address and mitigate identity theft has been discussed. 
Next corporate communication methods that are commonly used to support inter-
organisational knowledge sharing processes are addressed. The current knowledge 
sharing practices in the retail are evaluated. Research gap is addressed with design of the 
key research questions. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key findings.  
 
2.2 Identity Theft – origins and current understanding 
Identity theft is not a new crime, rather an evolution of an older crime enhanced with 
Internet (Newman and McNally, 2005). The first case of identity theft was discovered in 
the United States (US) when a mail theft in the late seventeenth century caused abuse of 
identity information of a member of the public (Jamieson et al., 2012).  
 
The question is what an identity is and how one steals it. An identity is not straightforward 
to define, because the concept is in infancy to take legal conceptual stance (Sullivan, 
2009). It is rather complex and multifaceted in nature (Finch, 2003), and an integral to 
conceptualise a person within the society (Roberts, 2012). Identity was initially associated 
with regard to understand ‘who are we’ from a life history (Schwartz, Luyckx and 
Vignoles, 2011, p. 2), ‘what are we’ from biology (Newman and McNally, 2005, p. 39) 
and ‘how are we’ from sociology (Lawler, 2008, p. 2). The first question considers how 
humans came into existence such as from Adam and Eve or the theory of evolution 
(Deane-Drummond, 2011). The second question reflects on their physical characteristics 
such as gender or race (Roberts, 2012). The third question focuses on social 
representation of the self to address how one relates to or is different from others (Finch, 
2007; Lawler, 2008; Newman, 2004). Without digging deep into the first and second 
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aspect of identity, this study evaluates how one relates to or is different from others, as 
this is associated with identity theft (Roberts, 2012; Finch, 2003).  
 
Roots of an identity can be found in the late sixteenth century from Latin word ‘Idem’ 
which centres in the paradoxical meaning of ‘sameness and uniqueness’ (Lewis, 1890). 
To clarify this contradiction, sociological and psychological constructs is applied 
(Newman and McNally, 2005; Lawler, 2008). From a psychological perspective, 
Newman and McNally (2005, p. 39) define that when an individual refers to him or her, 
a “person” constitutes the same, when others refer to him or her constitutes a unique 
identity. From a sociological perspective, Lawler (2008, p. 2) defines that humans are 
identical, “the same”, in all circumstances of life from birth to death, because they share 
common identities such as gender, authenticity, and nationality. However, uniqueness is 
considered as no one has the same lifestyle, not even the siblings or identical twins share 
all aspects of their life (Lawler, 2008). Thus, an identity provides an individual with a 
sense of self within society and a way of distinguishing themselves from others (Roberts, 
2012). 
 
A pertinent question is how an identity is stolen if it is associated with psychological or 
sociological constructs to understand someone’s existence. Both represent intangible 
elements to perceive an individual. A misunderstanding of this terminology needs to be 
explored, as (Finch, 2007, p. 29) have noticed that “the widespread acceptance of an 
imperfect understanding of the problem is potentially dangerous as it leaves individuals 
ill-equipped to protect themselves against victimisation”. Table 2-1 contains various 
identity theft definition as follows: 
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Table 2-1: Identity theft definitions 
Definitions Authors 
“Knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, any name 
or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other 
information, to identify a specific individual with the intent to 
commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitute a 
violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any 
applicable state or local law”. 
Newman and 
McNally, 2005, p. 1. 
 
“Identity theft is the unlawful obtaining of identity documentation 
details (including personal identifying information used in customer 
not present situations or when customers interface with machines to 
authenticate, for instance personal identification numbers (PINs), 
passwords, key tokens or biometrics)”. 
Jamieson et al., 2012, 
p. 383. 
 
“Identity theft involves the theft of legal identity, manifest in identity 
tokens such as SSNs, documents or knowledge of information that 
identifies an individual”. 
Roberts, 2012, p. 22. 
 
 
 
To clarify what is stolen when an identity is stolen, Finch (2007) has divided a person’s 
identity into personal, social, and legal characters. A personal character is an internalised 
sense of self which constitutes how an individual perceives him or her in the past, present 
and future. Social identity is however opposite. Others perceive an individual in the social 
realm such as jolly, lively, arrogant, humble, hardworking and interactive. The third 
character of an identity is more important, because it legally differentiates an individual 
from others. Finch defines the legal identity as documentary accumulation identifier such 
as birth certificates, insurance numbers and credit reports (Finch, 2007, p. 30). Personal 
and social characters are intangible which self and others may perceive. However, legal 
character legally differentiates an individual from others. Therefore, an identity theft 
involves the theft of a legal identity (Finch, 2003). 
 
Similar to Finch (2007), Roberts (2012) also has divided an individual’s identity into 
three elements with a clearer perspective. Firstly, a biometric identity constitutes 
fingerprint and DNA profile. Biometric information might not be valuable to a fraudster, 
as they cannot use it to commit financial crimes; however, to an individual it is their 
identity. Secondly, an attributive identity is given to a baby at birth such as a ‘name’. The 
third is biographical element refers to documentary accumulation that builds an individual 
over lifetime such as Social Security Numbers (SSNs) in the United States and National 
Insurance (NI) contributions in the United Kingdom. Biographical identities favour the 
fraudsters. An attributive identity is easy to assume, however, stealing biometric and 
biographical identities require obtaining identity tokens such as email addresses and 
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passwords (Roberts, 2012, p. 22). The combination of email address and password help 
fraudsters to access into computer systems to collect key pieces of information that 
represent an individual. 
 
Among the three definitions discussed (Table 2-1), Newman and MacNally’s definition 
is useful as it shows what is stolen, what happens to an identity theft such as name or 
number that represents an individual are taken from them without their knowledge. This 
definition also suggests that criminals either use the same information or modify with 
other details slightly to perpetuate their online criminal activities. This theory, however, 
does not fully explain how identity theft is facilitated. The medium involved in supporting 
identity theft is considered in Jamieson et al.’s (2012) definition which suggests that an 
identity information is stolen when customers are not physically present at the time of 
shopping (i.e. online shopping), or when the customers interact with machines to 
download free online software or withdraw cash at cash machines.  
 
This thesis is looking at the retailers who sell products and services through online 
channels. Therefore, the definition provided by Jamieson et al. (2012) is appropriate. It 
is specific to an online domain where the online transactional environment is involved. 
This definition brings into light many new elements such as PINs, passwords key token 
and biometrics. Are these identity details? Stealing email addresses incorporating user 
names and passwords is not actually an identity theft however, it lead to it. Roberts (2012) 
refers to these details as identity tokens. Some people misunderstand that identity theft is 
associated with the theft of card details such as numbers and codes used in online 
shopping. Card details are important, because it is like giving your wallet to someone 
when giving your card. However, Newman and MacNally (2005) argues that when a card 
detail is stolen is not same when stolen identity information. If the card is lost, a victim 
immediately can inform card-issuing authority to ‘cease’ usage and its misuse can 
immediately be observed through checking transactional information such as online 
statement. However, it is not the same with the loss of driving licence, social security 
number or health insurance number. These are the basic elements whereby an individual 
can be identified (Finch, 2003). Home address or birth date cannot be replicated and thus 
are unique. A house number belongs to an individual who owns or rents it. The same 
house number cannot be issued to a different person, unless it is a shared dwelling. 
Consequently, it may take a significant period to inform victims where these details were 
used fraudulently, until they receive correspondence from the company. Therefore, a 
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financial loss is not actually the major loss as the personal details. An identity detail is 
thus valuable to an individual because it is not replicable (see Skjelsbaek, 2006). 
 
Similar to identity detail fraudsters also favour Chip and PIN information. Chip and PIN 
are used to do shopping at the physical terminals such as point-of-sale (POS) system 
(Souvignet et al., 2014), or withdrawing the cash using an Automatic Teller Machine. In 
POS transaction, one may need no personal information. However, placing an order 
online requires inserting card details such as card number, expiry date and Credit 
Verification Value (CVV) code. Placing an online order also requires customer’s personal 
details including who are they and where do they live. Skimmers favour Chip and PIN 
information on the magnetic stripes, because it contains payment information (Souvignet 
et al., 2014). However, the researchers failed to suggest reasons why do they favour data 
contained in the magnetic stripes and the PIN than identity information.  
 
Khan (2015, p. 17) highlights another identity related fraud known as ‘chargeback’. A 
chargeback fraud occurs when a consumers place an online order using their own card 
details. However, they request a refund from the issuing bank after receiving the goods. 
Merchants are accountable to refund regardless of steps taken to verify the transaction 
(Khan, 2015). This can be associated with first party fraud perpetrated by individuals 
using ‘stealing’ their own details (Cifas, 2015b, p. 7). This act is more associated with 
identity deception rather than identity theft. Identity theft is not same as identity 
deception. Figure 2-1 illustrates various terminologies used in identity theft and related 
crimes as follows:  
 
 Chapter 2: Literature review 17 
 
Figure 2-1: Conceptualisation of identity theft 
Adapted from Jamieson et al. (2012) 
 
Figure 2-1 shows that identity theft and identity deception are precursors of the identity 
fraud. Following definition modelled around identity fraud also clarifies this difference 
as follows:  
“Identity fraud is the deliberate use of identity theft or identity 
deception details, for a financial gain or avoidance of loss to seek 
anonymity.” (Jamieson et al., 2012, p. 383) 
 
Researchers believe (Newman and McNally, 2005; Jamieson et al., 2012; Sproule and 
Archer, 2007) that identity fraud is a generic term used interchangeably for identity theft 
and related crimes. Identity frauds are committed using stolen details or new fake 
identities. Stolen identities are associated with identity theft whereas creating fake 
identities are associated with identity deception. The former is related to abuse of a real 
person’s identity, and the latter is associated with an alteration of the information through 
misrepresenting false or fake identities (Jamieson et al., 2012; Sproule and Archer, 2007). 
More broadly, identity theft supports identity crimes and identity related crimes such as 
money laundering, terrorism and trafficking.  
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2.2.1 Identity Theft Channels 
Two commonly used channels to support identity theft are physical and online. The 
criminals to steal identities in person at the site use physical channel. Cybercriminals use 
online channel to steal identities virtually.  
 
Physical Channels 
Physical is an easily approachable medium which does not involve any technological 
devices. However, this channel is risky, because perpetrator risk their presence (Fraud 
Advisory Panel, 2007). Paper mail, credit cards, and dumpster diving are the primary 
targets whereby identity details are commonly available (Roberts, 2012, p. 23). The first 
case of identity fraud caused due to a mail theft (Jamieson et al., 2012). Financially 
motivated offenders go through the bins that contain financial letters (Newman, 2004; 
FTC, 2013). Opportunistic offenders take an advantage of lost wallets to victimise 
member of the public (Ruquet, 2012).  
 
Shared accommodation and dwellings are common physical places whereby people stay 
together and share mailboxes. Opportunist fraudsters living in same occupied properties 
use this opportunity to access mailboxes (FTC, 2013). However, organised criminals 
target victims’ bin in commercial and residential areas to obtain financial letter and other 
documents such as bank statements that identify a person (FTC, 2013). These methods 
are commonly known as dumpster diving and may involve colluding with a postal 
employee to assist in accessing financial information (Newman, 2004).  
 
Although physical mediums are easily approachable, however are risky. Therefore, 
majority of the identity fraud are committed online channels (Cifas, 2015a) as explained 
below.  
 
Online Channels 
Online channels are ‘playgrounds’ of the fraudsters (Roberts, 2012, p. 21; Van Vlasselaer 
et al., 2015, p. 38). Chapter 1 mentioned that technology plays a crucial role to facilitate 
identity thieves due to lesser chances of the person being caught (Ji et al., 2007; Oluwu, 
2009). Virtual communication facilitates perpetrator hide behind the computers. Cifas has 
reported approximately 82 per cent of identity frauds happened in the UK with online 
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channels (Cifas, 2015a). Cybercriminals take an advantage of two common errors made 
by users and the businesses as follows. 
 
Users' errors 
Members of the public access online information inappropriately. Free online software 
applications such as online games and music attract common people. Accessing these 
applications is however dangerous. These applications automatically download malicious 
software that damage users’ computer systems. Cifas (2014c) define malware as: 
“Malware is malicious software that infects a victim’s computer. It can 
capture private information that is stored on an individual’s computer 
and send it to the fraudsters, who can use that information to 
impersonate the individual and commit fraud.”  
 
User click bogus sites shared with either email attachments or click online application 
that infects computer. Cifas (2015a) provides its example of accessing JavaScript to 
support video players.  
 
Users are also phished online to reveal their private information (Xu, 2012). Phishing is 
also a soft technique whereby fraudsters take advantage of human psychological 
weaknesses and tendencies of being unaware of the value of their information. It is rapidly 
growing threat to deceive an individual (Xu, 2012; Geeta, 2011). A fake website is 
designed that appears from a legitimate source such as users’ financial institute, bank or 
insurance (FTC, 2013). Perpetrators also use phone excuses to deceive individuals to 
disclose their information (FTC, 2013). The fake advertisers use techniques such as fake 
group trips and airline reservations to reveal travellers’ identity information (Travel 
Association, 2013). Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) reported a worth 
million cases of suspecting travellers. The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) 
runs under the umbrellas of the City of London Police. NFIB has estimated approximately 
1000 scams in the Britain which incurred £1.5 million only to holidaymakers (City of 
London Police, 2016). 
 
Another common users’ error is to submit online application that consists identity 
information. Thousands of job seekers submit resumes and curriculum vitae online that 
consists of substantial personal information (Sweeney, 2006).  
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Business errors 
Businesses transform their functions from onsite to online (Turville, Yearwood and 
Miller, 2010; Lai, Li and Hsieh, 2012). This transformation supports staffs’ mobility 
(Hunter, 2013); thus, employees can work from homes. As a result, day-to-day business 
activities are undertaken by accessing online information systems (Liefeld, 2013). 
Gartner reported more than 75 per cent of business applications and 50 per cent of critical 
operational data are accessed from the cloud. More than 2000, Chief Information Officers 
(CIO) worldwide participated in the Gartner’s survey (Hunter, 2013). On one hand, 
advanced technology and Internet facilitated smooth business operations. On the other 
hand, however, it provides weak link to expose business information systems to a 
motivated criminal. Most of the businesses that has online presence collects and stores 
personally identifiable information from its customers, employees and collaborators 
(Geeta, 2011). There is on-going trend in business automation. Online business 
transaction has led to a large number of identity theft incidents (Lai, Li and Hsieh, 2012). 
 
2.2.2 Identity Theft Consequences 
Home Office Steering Committee calculated £1.7 billion cost incurred on the UK 
economy due to identity theft (Home Office, 2012). A similar impact found in the US 
which indicated $50 billion annual loss from identity frauds (Bindra, Shrivastava and 
Seth, 2012). A single identity fraud case victimises two parties. The first is an individual 
whose identity is stolen. The second is the organisation whose services are stolen 
(Newman and McNally, 2005; Newman, 2004). An individual whose identity is stolen 
may not bear financial loss (e.g. McKelvey, 2000; LoPucki, 2003). An individual 
however faces criminal investigation and bad credit ratings. Financial institutes bear the 
loss (e.g. McKelvey, 2000; LoPucki, 2003). Society however pays identity loss implicitly. 
Lai, Li and Hsieh (2012) have discovered that online businesses spend a considerable cost 
on intelligence to prevent identity frauds. Consequently, they increase prices on products 
and services (Wilhelm, 2004).  
 
A company, however, loses a considerable amount if its reputation is damaged due to 
fraud news spread on the social media (Geeta, 2011). IBM’s research group noticed that 
online businesses considered IT system failure as a major problem (IBM Global 
Technology Services, 2012). The companies now invest efforts on the reputation, because 
it is the key success driver regardless whether business involves physical or virtual 
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transaction (Geeta, 2011). News of business frauds spread in public may cause 
reputational loss (Geeta, 2011). If the company were trustworthy, customers would like 
to buy its products and recommend them to others. Investors and potential employees 
want to be a part of it and communities will welcome its operations (IBM Global 
Technology Services, 2012). Consequently, businesses deal with identity frauds privately 
through using in-house intelligence systems. This is evident from Professional Security 
fraud report published on 17th February 2015, which states that: 
“Companies are increasingly assessing the reputational cost to their 
brands of a public case against the cost of pursuing the perpetrators of 
the fraud through the courts. This is leading large numbers of cases 
being dealt with privately in-house and through alternative remedies.” 
(Professional Security, 2015)  
 
2.2.3 Identity Theft Prevention Practices 
To combat with online identity theft, corporations implement various countermeasures. 
These countermeasures may be divided into technical and strategic. The technical 
measures focus on enhancing technological practices such as dynamic password 
generators, SMS based one-time passwords, personal digital certification and electronic 
signature (Bose and Leung, 2013). Strategic measures involved human analytics to 
identify fraudulent cases (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014; Wilhelm, 2004; Elyas et al., 
2015). This also involves attitude, norms, beliefs, behaviour, leadership and awareness 
(Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014).  
Technical measures are however considered as primary response, because the problem of 
identity theft is increased with the use of Internet and technology (Bose and Leung, 2013; 
Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014). This led to a number of technological developments 
including chip-and-PIN card system (Finch, 2011), the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
encryption for online transactions (Geeta, 2011), intrusion detection programs (Vrakas 
and Lambrinoudakis, 2013), and antivirus, firewall and data encryption systems (Roberts, 
2012; VeriSign, 2012). However, identity thieves sneer at the security measures 
implements the companies. Regarding technical measures, Kevin Mitnick, a well-known 
American hacker states that:  
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“Companies spend millions of dollars on firewalls, encryption and 
secure access devices, and its money wasted, because none of these 
measures address the weakest link in the security chain.” (The 
Economist, 2002) 
Criminals evolve to learn sophisticated attacks (Xu, 2012; Geeta, 2011). Retailers also 
need to evolve their technical abilities (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Roberts, 2008). 
Strategic evaluation of security measures may help retailers in improving technicalities 
(Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo 
et al., 2013; Elyas et al., 2015; Kyoung-Joo, 2011), because strategy is: 
 “An art of deciding how to best utilise what appropriate defensive 
information security technologies and measures, and of deploying and 
applying them in a coordinated way to defence organisation’s 
information infrastructure(s) against internal and external threats by 
offering confidentiality, integrity and availability at the expense of least 
efforts and costs while to be effective.” (Park and Ruighaver, 2008, p. 
27) 
This definition suggests that strategy provides a comprehensive evaluation on the security 
measures that help decision makers to decide which construct is useful to prevent an 
attack. However, rather than focusing comprehensive evaluation, most researcher carried 
strategy by evaluating single construct. For instance, Glancy and Yadav (2011) have 
developed a computational model to help detect frauds; Knapp et al., (2009) developed a 
framework that considers organisational policy only to help prevent online threats; 
Bhattacharyya et al., (2011) considered data mining strategy only to overcome credit card 
frauds. Though there is limited empirical work on these measures, few studies are 
comprehensive (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014; Wilhelm, 2004; Elyas et al., 2015). 
These comprehensive studies are summarised in (Table 2-2).  
 
In Wilhelm (2004), introduced fraud management lifecycle with eight stages to reduce an 
adverse impact of financial fraud experienced the businesses in the UK. These stages 
involve deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation and 
prosecution. He tested his model in the industries such as retail, banking, credit or debit 
card issuing authorities, insurance companies and mortgages.  
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Table 2-2: Comprehensive frameworks in information security 
Components Authors 
Deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, 
investigation and prosecution 
Wilhelm, 2004, p. 15. 
 
Prevention, deterrence, surveillance, detection, response, 
deception, perimeter defence, and compartmentalization  
Ahmad, Maynard and 
Park, 2014, p. 364. 
 
Organisational factors (governance, top management, culture), 
strategic factors (forensic policy, non-forensic stakeholders, 
forensic stakeholders and forensic training), infrastructure 
(technology and architecture), and forensic objectives 
(regulatory compliance, legal evidence management, forensic 
response, and business objectives) 
Elyas et al., 2015, p. 
89. 
 
 
Ahmad, Maynard and Park (2014) conducted a study a decade later with Korean 
organisations. They used nine controls such as prevention, deterrence, surveillance, 
detection, response, deception, perimeter defence, compartmentalisation and layering. 
These researchers empirically examined the businesses in software development, system 
integration, manufacturing, security consultancy and IT solutions. This third model 
mentioned was tested in the Australian organisations with law enforcement, consultancy, 
business and education (Elyas et al., 2015). This model categorised factors of the 
framework into organisational, strategic and infrastructure to evaluate forensic readiness 
of the companies. Deterrence, prevention, policy are the common constructs mentioned 
in Table 2-2. Table 3-2 defines these constructs.  
 
Deterrence is the first stage in fraud prevention life cycle which prevents fraud from its 
occurrence (Wilhelm, 2004). Offenders are informed about consequences for breaching 
company rules (Prabowo, 2011; Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014; Da Veiga and Eloff, 
2010). A policy document is designed to define legal fines and actions for the staffs that 
fails to follow company rules such as sanction and certainty. For instance, Ahmad, 
Maynard & Park (2014, p. 360) have suggested that: “One of the main foci of deterrence 
is in the security policy where deterrence has been used to specify the punishment of 
employees that fail to adhere to policy statement”. Doing so assists organisations to 
control employee behaviour (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010).  
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Table 2-3: Strategic measures undertaken in information security 
Components Purpose and example of activity Literature 
Policy A written set of general rules designed to 
guide the insider behaviour in the 
organisation through limiting the discretion 
of subordinates 
Wilhelm, 2004; Knapp et al., 
2009; Knoppen, Christiaanse 
and Huysman, 2010; Elyas et 
al., 2014 
Deterrence Inhibiting certainty for non-compliance of 
the policy in the organisation through card 
activation programs and fears of sanction 
such legal fines or prosecution 
Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 
2014; Wilhelm, 2004 
 
Compartment
alisation 
Dividing intended areas of attack into zones Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 
2014; Ahmad, Bosua and 
Scheepers, 2014 
Surveillance  Systematic monitoring of security 
environment such as the use of Closed 
Circuit Television (CCTV) in the 
organisations 
Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 
2014; Elyas et al., 2014; 
Marshall and Tompsett, 2005 
 
Awareness or 
Trainings  
Educating staff on their specific roles and 
responsibilities with respect to information 
security 
Elyas et al., 2014 
 
Security 
culture 
Design and implementation of shared 
beliefs and practices to guide the security 
culture among the staff 
Elyas et al., 2014 
 
Regulatory 
compliance 
Ability of an organisation to demonstrate 
adherence to law  
Knoppen, Christiaanse and 
Huysman, 2010; Elyas et al., 
2014 
Detection Operation to uncover presence of fraud 
using statistical monitoring program 
Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 
2014; Wilhelm, 2004; Van 
Vlasselaer et al., 2015; Glancy 
and Yadav, 2011 
Analysis Finding root cause analysis of suspected 
cases. 
Wilhelm, 2004 
 
Investigation 
or Evidence 
management 
Operational strategy used to collect 
evidence to support legal proceedings. 
Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 
2014; Wilhelm, 2004; Elyas et 
al., 2014 
Prosecution or 
Response 
Asset recovery and criminal restitution 
employing corrective actions against 
specific behaviour. 
Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 
2014; Wilhelm, 2004 
 
 
 
Despite considerable effort on designing the security policies, organisations failed in 
controlling employees’ harmful behaviour (Okeke, 2015; Vance, Siponen and Pahnila, 
2012). This is evident from Cifas Internal Fraud Database (IFD) reported 4.3% increase 
in internal frauds whereby members of the staffs fraudulently accessed and sold 
consumers identity information (Cifas, 2015b, p. 35). One of the major reasons for this 
failure may be that organisations are not efficient to dictate policy to staffs. This is evident 
from security officials working in the Australian organisations that “It should be made 
clear for employee what is appropriate and what is not. Also the consequences of 
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noncompliance should be made clear” (Elyas et al., 2015, p. 77). Otherwise, policy will 
remain a paper tiger with no teeth (Knapp et al., 2009, p. 500).  
 
Controlling an external behaviour through policy is still in infancy. Companies offer 
online applications guide users’ behaviour. For instance, Google recently has highlighted 
a privacy policy that covers information security. The policy states that Google will 
collect device identity, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, cookies and current locations of 
the users for security reasons. Data is collected for the purposes of improving protection 
against online frauds and information misuse (visit 
https://www.google.co.uk/intl/en/policies/privacy/?fg=1). 
 
Regulatory authorities such ass International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and 
Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) has designed a set of rules to help 
companies secure consumers’ information. Organisation need to be compliant with these 
rules. These abilities assist an organisation to generate and retain accurate audit records 
in a prescribed manner (Elyas et al., 2014).  
 
Businesses also deploy systematic monitoring of the security environment. This is called 
surveillance. Surveillance is employed to support the investigation process (Wilhelm, 
2004). Situational awareness of assets that adapt to rapidly changing circumstances is 
deployed (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014). Marshall and Tompsett (2005) suggest that 
the installation of CCTV cameras is useful in monitoring critical premises and hence 
surveillance. This contributes to the digital forensic readiness of an organisation (Elyas 
et al., 2014). Once a suspicious act is identified, legal evidences are collected to take 
corrective actions. This is called detection (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014, p. 310). 
Detection can be preventative or reactive process (Wilhelm, 2004). Detection as a 
preventative process is applied to resist an attack such as by dropping a connection or 
blocking an IP address which seem fraudulent (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014). 
Detection as reactive process supports to take legal actions against identity thieves 
(Wilhelm, 2004, p. 14). Suspects are either prosecuted or fined to recover the item lost 
(Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014, p. 360).   
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Compartmentalisation is another useful practice that divides information systems which 
is stored at different compartments. Researchers (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014, p. 
361) suggest that dividing an information system into several compartments may prevent 
an attacker’s access to entire information system. If an attacker were able to overcome 
the defence of one zone, he or she would not be able to access other zones automatically. 
 
Organisations arrange in-house security awareness programs that spread value of 
personal information among the staffs. This may help organisations from employee errors 
from business information system inappropriately (Roberts, 2012; Elyas et al., 2015; 
Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010). Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) evaluated 
organisational workshop that improves information security awareness and have 
discovered that organisations run mainstream awareness program in a top-down 
approach. They use of formal presentations, leaflets and posters to spread value of the 
identity information. A key problem with these mediums is that they focus on a general 
audience. Elyas et al. (2015) have discovered that a general awareness program would be 
useful if every member in an organisation attends data preservation programs. However, 
staffs involved in the data protection and forensic investigations need specialised training 
programs that show how investigation tools and techniques are used. This system may 
help organisations to create and spread security culture. 
 
The strategic and technical practices discussed provides compelling evidence of the 
continuous progress in the domain of information systems security. However, researchers 
have noticed that technical measures have progressed more effectively in robustness than 
the strategic (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014, p. 91). Ahmad, Maynard and Park 
(2014, p. 258) have reported that “there has been little field-work conducted to 
determine…how these strategies are deployed”. Even though there are a number of 
studies evaluating the strategic practices in online information security, very few focus 
on online identity theft prevention (Okeke, 2015). An integrated approach and a detailed 
implementation of security practices that help to address and mitigate identity theft is also 
lacking. Many constructs in these studies need a fuller explanation. Elyas et al. (2015) 
identified a role of internal and external stakeholder and their participants discussed a 
number of shareholders including Chief Information Officer (CIOs), risk management 
team and human resource. The study, however, failed to discuss how these actors support 
one another in the fraud prevention process. Therefore, requires a comprehensive study 
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to provide clarity of roles and responsibilities in the security profession. Wilhelm (2004, 
p.20) supports this view as:  
“Since the lifecycle stages were presented as part of a clear 
organisational challenge, they could be evaluated in detail as 
supporting element as organisational redesign”.  
Strategic practices discussed need more evaluation. One of the strategic aspects lacking 
an empirical investigation is the communication and knowledge sharing among various 
actors hired to ensure information security (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013). Coping with 
identity theft independently could be costly and difficult (Kumar, Kumar and Grosbois, 
2007). Organisation cannot prevent identity theft alone effectively (de Crespigny, 2012). 
They need to collaborate through sharing learning experiences. An inter-organisational 
knowledge sharing practice in the security profession may assist organisations in 
preventing online attacks. They can generate solutions of better quality through sharing 
their practices (Feledi and Fenz, 2012). This may also help them to avoid implementing 
same security wheel. However, little attention is placed on exploring knowledge sharing 
practice (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Feledi, Fenz 
and Lechner, 2013). Few studies consider this area discussed in Section 2.5.  
 
2.3 Knowledge Management  
What is knowledge; how security professionals can benefit from knowledge 
management? Management is a business function to organise and utilise business 
resources (Barney, 2000; Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). In the past natural 
resources such as labour, soil and capital were only considered key drivers of the business 
operations. Modern society is however known as a ‘knowledge society’, whereby people 
who can apprehend ideas to provide abstract thinking are playing central role in the 
economy (Styhre, 2011). Tsoukas (2011, p. 455) considered late modernity as “the age 
of theoria par excellence”. Therefore, success of organisations partially depend on how 
efficiently knowledge management activities are carried out (Jasimuddin, Connell and 
Klein, 2014). 
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A number of theories such as classical, human relations, critical, decision, work activity, 
competency and process are devised to help management function efficiently (Easterby‐
Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). These theories detail existing practices of companies, 
but also concentrates on what it needs to improve. These theories and key features are 
illustrated in Table 2-4. 
 
Table 2-4: Management perspectives  
Theory Dominancy Key Features Type 
Classical 1910-1950 Functional activities Normative 
Human Relations 1940-1970 Motivating people to 
change 
Normative 
Decision Theory 1950-1970 Optimising decision Analytic 
Work Activity 1970s Focusing on what 
managers’ do 
Descriptive 
Competencies Before 1970s Skills required for 
effective performance 
Normative 
Critical 1990s Social construction and 
politics 
Analytic 
Process 2000s Learning and 
strategizing 
Analytic and 
Normative 
(Adapted from Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012, p. 5) 
 
Research in these management perspectives mentioned in Table 2-4 are continue 
conducted regardless of the chronological order (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 
2012). A classic theory advised management how to perform business activities 
efficiently. The present thesis rather than only giving advice, also seeks to understand 
how management deals identity theft with the help of knowledge sharing practice. Critical 
theorists concentrate on the effects of society and technology on organisational 
development (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012, p. 30). The role of technology 
may help to understand learning experiences of the businesses. However, technology is 
not the only construct that this study seeks to understand. A human relational theory 
supports management to motivate employees by providing them with a complete 
information associated with business activities (Lopez and Esteves, 2013; Verčič, Verčič 
and Sriramesh, 2012). Process theory however leads to the idea of management as a 
process whereby learning is emphasised with the creation and management of 
organisational knowledge (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012; Nonaka, 1994; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Process theory not only concentrates on how managers 
should perform, but also assist them with analytic reasoning. Process theory also helps to 
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assess impact of some parts of the organisation (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 
2012, p. 5). Process theory is deemed evaluative to explore information security 
department in the whole retail business.   
 
Knowledge management history 
Knowledge and its study is as old as human history. Classical Greek period provides its 
roots in the study of philosophy and epistemology such as Plato and Aristotelian work 
(Tsoukas, 2011; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Davenport and Prusak, 1998). Initially 
knowledge was associated with finding the virtues of life, and was considered as self-
knowledge (Tsoukas, 2011). It recently gains new emphasis of ‘old-age’ subject in the 
management studies that explores how organisation process and/or create new knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka, Von Krogh and Voelpel, 2006). 
This new field gains academic popularity from middle of the 1990 (Easterby-Smith and 
Lyles, 2011; Tsoukas, 2011), and further seeks to extend knowledge and its subjectivity 
of humans who create and utilise it (Nonaka et al., 2014, p. 139).  
 
Knowledge management activities are necessary in an organisation due dynamic 
environment. Rapid changes allow employees to process and create new knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1994). Captured peers’ knowledge is helpful to other professionals (Styhre, 
2011). The deployment of rapidly evolving technology requires adoptable staffs to learn 
quickly to accomplish day-to-day organisational tasks (IBM Global Technology Services, 
2012). Officials depend on each other knowledge, as Davenport and Prusak (1998) 
highlighted that knowledge is driven from the mind at work. Capturing and disseminating 
of knowledge at work assists business operation smoothly (Hsiao, Tsai and Lee, 2012). 
Knowledge management can be viewed as structural organisational capital embedded in 
organisational routines and standard operating procedures (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). 
However, knowledge management is umbrella term that refers to managing knowledge-
intensive activities (Gottschalk, 2005). These activities therefore involve capturing, 
disseminating, storing and leveraging knowledge to enhance organisational performance 
(Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2011; Jasimuddin, Connell and Klein, 2014; Hayes, 2011). 
The study of knowledge management, therefore, broadly encompasses four major 
elements such as knowledge typology, knowledge creation, knowledge storage and 
retrieval and knowledge transfer.  
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Figure 2-2 navigation maps key themes and issues in knowledge management literature 
(Jasimuddin, Connell and Klein, 2014). These authors focused on intra-organisational 
knowledge transfer. They examined the high tech business organisation to determine the 
factors that influence knowledge dissemination in an organisation. This navigation map, 
however, is also useful in identifying research gap. The factors affecting inter-
organisational knowledge sharing have yet to be investigated. This thesis considers filling 
this gap by evaluating inter-organisational knowledge sharing in the security profession. 
Exploring what is working and what does not seem to be providing benefit to online 
retailer with regards to the knowledge sharing that help to address and mitigate identity 
theft may extend knowledge in the inter-organisational knowledge sharing practice. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Navigation map of knowledge management research 
Adapted from Jasimudin, Connel and Klein (2014) 
 
To explain various themes in a broad spectrum of the knowledge management literature, 
this study follows this navigation map described in the Figure 2-2. The diagram shows 
two major communication elements in the knowledge sharing process such as intra-
organisational and inter-organisational. Since the focus of this thesis is inter-
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organisational knowledge sharing, it therefore concentrates on the constructs that address 
how different organisations communicate to explore information security knowledge. 
Chapter 3 explores how different inter-organisational knowledge sharing components are 
associated with each other to support the knowledge sharing process. 
 
Knowledge management starts with strategic value in the knowledge. This then 
familiarises with the IT software such as databases and electronic conferencing to 
facilitate knowledge acquisition, sharing, storage, retrieval and utilisation (Easterby-
Smith and Lyles, 2011). Hardly any industry makes full use of theoretical knowledge due 
to lack of resources (Tsoukas, 2011, p. 455). IT plays a central role to facilitate knowledge 
management activities (Hayes, 2011; Alavi and Denford, 2011; Alavi and Leidner, 2001). 
Therefore, a large body of literature in knowledge management focused on the IT 
applications that assists knowledge management in a company (Easterby‐Smith, Crossan 
and Nicolini, 2000). However, there is ongoing debate whether knowledge management 
is achievable, because there is no clear distinction between information and knowledge 
(Wilson, 2002). Some researchers however use syntactic and semantic elements to clarify 
the differences (e.g. Nonaka, 1994; Alavi and Leidner, 2001). 
 
Wilson (2002, p. 2) claims that, “…what we know can never be managed”. The process 
of knowledge management only helps a mind to become manageable, thus the content of 
mind can be captured. He noted that people use data, information and knowledge 
synonymously: 
“…National Electronic Library for Health uses the term ‘Knowledge’ 
because in the NHS information=data and a different term was 
needed.” (Wilson, 2002, p. 13) 
There are various ways to express knowledge such as oral, written, graphic, gesture, and 
body language. However, these messages are not considered knowledge, but mere 
information, which a knowing mind can comprehend. As stated that knowledge is: 
“…the mental processes of comprehension, understanding and 
learning that go on in the mid and only in mind, however much they 
involve interaction with the world outside the mind, and interaction 
with others.” (Wilson, 2002, p. 2) 
Wilson’s definition regarding knowledge can better be understood by considering the 
historical evolution over the time. Tsoukas (2011, p. 454) suggests that it may be 
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necessary to participate and exercise the mind in a larger collective, however, so that is 
not occupied only in the values, but also in the abstraction, general principals and ability 
to obtain results. Similarly, Brandi and Elkjaer (2011) contend that learning is not 
restricted to take place inside an individual’s mind but also in a process of participation 
and interaction with others. Therefore, it is suggested that information is a flow of 
messages, however, when we anchor that very flow into actions then it becomes 
knowledge (Nonaka, 1994).  
 
Researchers including (Jasimuddin, Connell and Klein, 2014; Nonaka, 1994; Alavi and 
Leidner, 2001), stress that information is an important tool that supports knowledge 
creation. Information draws from the ‘raw data’. Data, information and knowledge are 
related but not same, as Davenport and Prusak (1998, p. 1) put that “we can understand 
knowledge best with reference to them [data and information]”. They provide an example 
using a transactional data that “when [a] customer goes to gas station and fills the tank 
of his car, that transaction can be partly described through the data such as when he 
purchases, how many gasolines he bought, how much he paid” (Davenport and Prusak, 
1998, p. 2). Similarly, a telephone bill is calculated using a time duration and distance 
rather than what has been spoken (Nonaka, 1994).  
 
Similar to data, information is also measured without considering meaning and value. 
This reflects Nonaka et al. (2014, p. 139) that “knowledge is information in context and 
once we add context we add tacitness”. These are semantic elements whereby individuals 
consider conveying meaning embedded in the contextual details to constitute the 
knowledge (Nonaka et al., 2014, p. 16). Distinguishing information from knowledge is 
often difficult and confusing when involves IT. Although IT strongly influences the 
message, however it is a medium, not the message (Davenport and Prusak, 1998, p. 2). 
The thing delivered is more important than the delivery vehicle. This view is similar to 
Nonaka (1994, p. 16) that information is an important tool that facilitates knowledge 
creation. They thus suggest that IT and information are the vehicles that help to develop 
and to organise the knowledge. 
 
To evaluate knowledge using traditional epistemology, Nonaka (1994) found that it was 
previously considered static and nonhuman. He believed that knowledge was part of 
aspiration of truth “justified true beliefs” (p.15). However, he prefers to value the 
believing nature of the knowledge than justified nature. The present research evaluates 
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knowledge from a communication perspective to assess how different organisations 
interact to share identity theft knowledge. Therefore, Nonaka’s definition may not be 
appropriate. Organisations may need some elements of justification rather than belief. 
When different organisations are involved, require reasons. Individuals’ belief probably 
natural and direct (Nonaka, Von Krogh and Voelpel, 2006, p. 1183), as Moran (2006) 
suggests that “getting told and being believed” (p.1). However, it is not easy for an 
individual to persuade someone by being told and believed (Simpson (2013a, p. 305). 
Within an organisation, this is the gist of synthesising new, practical, useful, valid and 
important knowledge added to existing knowledge base which makes justification hard 
(Nonaka, Von Krogh and Voelpel, 2006, p. 1183). From a Resource Based View (RBV) 
of the firm knowledge can be defined as: 
“Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual 
information and expert insight that provides a framework for 
evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It 
originates and is applied in the mind of the knower. In organization it 
is often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories, but 
also in organizational routines, processes, practices and norms.” 
(Davenport and Prusak, 1998: p. 5) 
Knowledge in this definition is viewed as non-simplistic that combines fluid actions. This 
also involves formally constructed elements such as documents and repositories. 
Therefore, it is hard to capture and share knowledge with others (Davenport and Prusak, 
1998). Capturing and sharing of domain specific knowledge may not require many 
efforts, because it engages similar patterns of work and standards for judgement (Hayes, 
2011, p. 86). Domain specific knowledge refers to knowledge acquired through a 
commonly enacted body of competence and expertise (Styhre, 2011, p. 30). This thesis 
specifically looks at domain specific knowledge in the domain of information security to 
assess how peers help address and mitigate identity theft through sharing learning 
experiences. Therefore, it would be useful to consider how shared sense and standard of 
judgement is used to understand similar patterns of work. This study therefore adopts the 
definition provided by Davenport and Prusak (1998) to explore how security knowledge 
is created and shared in the online retail sector. This definition brings into light two 
different types of knowledge such as fluid mixture of experiences and organisational 
repositories.  
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2.3.1 Knowledge Typology 
Organisational knowledge is a philosophical stance to understand, and conceptualise the 
nature of knowledge organisations holds in their possession (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 
2011). Researchers exploring knowledge typologies either distinguish between tacit or 
explicit (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2011; Jasimuddin, Connell and Klein, 2014; 
Jasimuddin, Connell and Klein, 2005). This understanding help to address value 
knowledge holds to benefit the business. 
 
Michael Polanyi, a philosophical figure, brought researchers attention to two types of 
knowledge. Firstly, knowledge is referred to as an objective entity, where a seeker relies 
on theories for an understanding (Polanyi, 2003, p. 4). This is known as theoretical 
knowledge. Secondly, knowledge is viewed as a personal quality which need immediate 
sensory experiences for comprehension (Polanyi, 2003, p. 4). This is referred to as a 
practical knowledge. These two types are widely known as explicit and tacit knowledge 
(Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Polanyi, 1966). Former is based 
on theoretical comprehension and the latter requires practicality. The former carries 
codified language, and is communicated readily via online mechanisms. However, the 
latter is embedded in practice, therefore, requires the knowledge holder to clarify what 
they do.  
 
Geography has influenced how researchers perceive knowledge scrutiny. The traditional 
western world viewed knowledge systematic and formal (Styhre, 2011). This knowledge 
is acquired through education and reading from books, newspapers, repositories and 
manuals (Awad and Ghaziri, 2007). The importance of this knowledge in the modern 
organisations is provided as follows:  
“The increasing decontextualisation of knowledge in the modern age 
has led to theoretical (or codified) knowledge acquiring a central place 
in functioning of modern (especially late modern) societies” (Tsoukas, 
2011, p. 454).  
However, few researchers omit the value gained from explicit knowledge as Sveiby 
(2009) states that:  
“I do not believe much in lectures as means of transferring knowledge; 
I prefer experiential learning”. 
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In the Eastern countries, researchers such as Nonaka and his associates bring tacit 
knowledge to substantial awareness (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Takeuchi and Shibata, 2006). Nonaka (1994, p. 16) states that knowledge expressed in 
words and numbers represent the “tip of iceberg”. Nonaka’s work is based on the 
statement of Michael Polanyi (1966, p. 4) that “…we can know more than we can tell”. 
Polanyi believed that most knowledge people acquire implicitly during schools, work and 
life experiences. People are even not fully aware of possession of this knowledge. This is 
knowledge is an important feature of organisation that underlies in skilful actions 
(Tsoukas, 2011). Therefore, sharing tacit requires it to be contextualised. It is also 
difficult for knowledge holder to clearly what they do (Polanyi, 1966). Then why 
researchers claim that IT – a virtual communication channel helps to share tacit 
knowledge (Alavi and Denford, 2011; Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 2013; Panahi, 
Watson and Partridge, 2015). May be, the synthesis of tacit and explicit knowledge such 
as phronesis (Figure 2-3) is able to communicate what officials do. Nonaka et al. (2014, 
p. 139) believe that phronesis drives through the interaction of tacit and explicit as 
illustrated in the triad model in Figure 2–3.   
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Spiral of knowledge types 
Adapted from Nonaka et al. (2014) 
 
Greek scholar Aristotle coined phronesis which means “practical wisdom”. Tsoukas 
(2011) recently used phronesis in his argumentative study to Nonaka’s knowledge 
conversion model discussed in the knowledge creation theory below.  
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2.3.2 Knowledge Creation Theory 
Nonaka, Von Krogh and Voelpel (2006, p. 1179) define organisational knowledge 
creation theory as:  
“The process of making available and amplifying knowledge created by 
individual as well as crystallising and connecting it with an 
organisation’s knowledge systems”.  
Whatever individuals acquire during a professional career can benefit their colleagues 
and the organisations. This is an important domain to assess how organisations collects 
and records knowledge from their employees (Nonaka et al., 2014; Styhre, 2011). An 
organisation’s knowledge creation theory encompasses epistemology and conversion. 
The former is associated with the act of knowing where special attention is given to the 
knowledge validity and limitations (Nonaka, 1994). The latter provides an insight to 
understand how official’s subjective knowledge is connected to, and synthesised with 
others knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Nonaka et al. (2014) believed that 
innovation emerges with spiralling continuity and conversion between two types of 
knowledge discussed in previous section. This is reflected as follows: 
“When an individual’s tacit knowledge is shared with another person it 
becomes explicit knowledge, and when this is merged with other explicit 
knowledge it becomes new explicit knowledge, which in turn can then 
be converted into the tacit knowledge of an (other or the same) 
individual and thus link with the subsequent conversion process.” 
(Nonaka et al., 2014, p. 139) 
The spiralling is extended from Nonaka’s (1994, p. 19) previous work which suggests 
SECI, a model that reflects an organisation’s knowledge creation. SECI stands for 
Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination and Internalisation. This model represents 
four modes of conversion to assist how organisational knowledge creation theory works 
in the workplace. This model is illustrated in figure 2-4.  
 
For many researchers (Nonaka et al., 2014; Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008) 
knowledge creation process is context dependant. The context is ‘Ba’ which stands for 
‘space of emerging relationships’ (Nonaka, Von Krogh and Voelpel, 2006, p. 1184). 
There are four emerging spaces of relationships such as originating, interacting, 
exercising and cyber. 
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Figure 2-4: SECI model of knowledge conversion 
Adapted from Nonaka (1994) 
 
Figure 2–4 shows that conversion from tacit to tacit is achieved using a socialisation 
where an originating Ba may be useful to provide a space for face-to-face interaction. 
Thus, a new knowledge is created with the help of language, observation, imitation and 
practice (Nonaka, Von Krogh and Voelpel, 2006). Online real-time meetings, 
synchronous communication, chat, online community of practice and social media are 
common digital mechanisms that support socialisation process (Panahi, Watson and 
Partridge, 2013). Offline mechanisms such as team meetings, interpersonal interaction, 
apprenticeship, participation and observation also supports socialisation (Panahi, Watson 
and Partridge, 2013).  
 
The next box at the top right in Figure 2-4 is useful to support knowledge exploitation 
whereby a newly gained external knowledge is converted into explicit to distribute with 
others. This process represents knowledge externalisation. Offline mechanisms such as 
dialog with teams, answering questions, storytelling, metaphors and analogies assist 
externalisation (Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 2013). The digital mechanisms involve 
blog, wikis, discussion forums and video conferencing (Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 
2013). 
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The bottom-left box represents internalisation whereby an explicit knowledge is 
converted into tacit. A training activity is an example of this conversion. However, a 
trainer can be an instructor or colleague within the organisation. Commonly used offline 
mechanisms that support internalisation are learning by doing, learning from books, 
reports, presentations and lectures, whereas online mechanisms used are visualisation, 
video/audio presentations, online learning, email and web page (Panahi, Watson and 
Partridge, 2013). 
 
The box in bottom-right is a combination process that represents conversions from 
explicit to explicit. Offline mechanisms that support this combination include books, 
papers, reports, presentations and indexes (Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 2013). Online 
mechanisms include various types of technologies such as text searches, documents, 
categories, blogs, wikis, and Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds. In a cyber relationship a 
virtual space is created where thousands of professional can interact using medium such 
as Information and Communication Technology (ICT) (Nonaka, Von Krogh and Voelpel, 
2006). Wikipedia is an example where users are provided an option to edit and add 
knowledge stored previously.  
 
Organisational knowledge creation theory using SECI model has been debated in the 
research for many years. This is evidenced as follows: 
“Aspects of tacit knowledge may be articulated, which, however, is not 
the same as converted or translate” (Tsoukas, 2011, p. 456); “…their 
potential lies in the tacit knowledge brought to their use by both their 
producers and their users” (Ribeiro and Collins, 2007, p. 1430).  
Accessing tacit knowledge requires both actions and retrospect. Therefore, seeing this 
knowledge in the conversion model is misleading. Even though explicit seems to be the 
easiest form of knowledge to articulate, it also underlies certain tacit elements which 
cannot be transformed completely. For instance, the transformation of manuals and books 
carry meaning that is provided by the author (Ribeiro and Collins, 2007, p. 1430). Collins 
(2001) accepts that a formalised theory based on pure mathematics cannot completely 
transform, as this requires application and development based on the skills of 
mathematicians. Therefore, seeing tacit on the conversion model may be argumentative.  
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These authors may be correct, because organisational knowledge creation theory was 
developed on the experiments from bread making machine. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
reflected on transferring Master backer’s tacit knowledge into explicit, to transform a 
bread-making process. Ribeiro and Collins (2007) replicated the study to test theory in 
the European context. They have explored bread-making process particularly from tacit 
to explicit conversion. However, their results produced contradictions, because machine 
failed to learn completely the skills from a Master Baker. They have found that machine 
was useful to reduce human efforts in the backing process. However, the analytical 
measures including the choice of flour and amount of yeast required human skills. 
Therefore, they conclude that Nonaka and Tackeuchi selection of the case was wrong to 
evaluate knowledge creation theory (Ribeiro and Collins, 2007, p. 1418). 
 
Tsoukas (2011), Ribeiro and Collins (2007) and Styhre (2004) noticed that tacit 
knowledge may lose its value, unless the organisation which holds it, replicates it into 
explicit. Therefore, they argue that tacit knowledge has either been widely 
“misunderstood”, “not yet articulated” or “a weak form of explicit knowledge”, (Tsoukas, 
2011, p. 455; Styhre, 2004, p. 186; Tsoukas, 2005, p. 154). Tacit knowledge occupies 
intellectual and corporeal capabilities that individuals cannot ‘fully’ articulate or codify 
(Styhre, 2004, p. 178). 
 
In response to these arguments, Nonaka et al. (2014) recent study suggest that knowledge 
exploration and exploitation requires conversion. Because, although tacit and explicit are 
dissimilar, however, lie in the continuum. Arguably this is correct, because there will 
remain no value from exploring knowledge from other organisations if it is not exploited 
and/or used in the company (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). This requires 
converting tacit knowledge into explicit, because high elements of tacit are commonly 
found in knowledge exploration process whereas explicit in knowledge exploitation 
process (Nonaka et al., 2014, p. 140).  
 
Knowledge articulation may be weak when tacit knowledge is converted into explicit. 
However, the domain specific knowledge holders may not lose complete value in the 
knowledge conversion process, if they share similar patterns of work. People working in 
the same profession are able to share and understand what another peer do. Organisation, 
therefore, may consider enhancing skills rather than focusing on gaining complete value 
from tacit knowledge. Therefore, rather than arguing who to support with regards to 
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seeing tacit knowledge in the conversion model, this study focuses on how knowledge 
exploration and exploitation is achieved through the synthesis and conversion of tacit and 
explicit knowledge. This practice may help an organisation to understand extent to which 
knowledge exploration and exploitation works in the security profession to prevent 
identity theft. Michael Polanyi also supported this assumption by stating that: 
“…theory being paced like a screen between our senses and the things 
of which our sense otherwise would have gained a more immediate 
impression. We would rely increasingly on theoretical guidance for the 
interpretation of our experience, and would correspondingly reduce the 
status of our raw impression to that of dubious and possibly misleading 
appearances.” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 3)   
Polanyi’s statement suggests that knowledge of tacit and explicit are necessary for a 
clearer understanding. Explicit knowledge helps improved understanding of the tacit 
knowledge. This study pays attention to how knowledge exploration and exploitation 
helps knowledge integration and use. The triad model discussed previously (Figure 2–3) 
may help synthesis to a practical wisdom (Nonaka et al., 2014). This thesis concentrates 
on the security profession only, therefore may be no difficulty in articulating knowledge 
from the same domain. Synthesis of tacit and explicit may deemed appropriate for a fluid 
mix of knowledge.  
 
2.3.3 Knowledge Storage and Retrieval 
Almeida, Hohberger and Parada (2011, p. 383) discussed two steps to gain and use an 
external knowledge. Firstly, source knowledge from other organisations. Secondly, 
integrate knowledge with firm’s existing knowledge base. Former requires interacting 
with external sources through attending networking conferences or collaborating with 
past colleagues (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). Latter constitutes re-combining 
knowledge gained from several sources into an existing body of knowledge within the 
organisation (Nonaka et al., 2014). Both source and integration help improve 
organisational memory (Klein, Connell and Jasimuddin, 2007). Klein, Connel and 
Jasimuddin (2007) believed that there is a strong relationship between organisational 
learning and organisational memory, since one leads to the other.  
 
Knowledge storage helps combining new knowledge into company’s existing knowledge 
base. Almeida, Hohberger, and Parada (2011, p. 396) have found that company’s central 
system facilitates internal communication by locating knowledge at one place instead of 
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numerous distributed locations. A centrally located knowledge base helps other 
colleagues in knowledge utilisation. However, professional further require frequent 
interaction with each other across extended period of time to clarify what they share 
(Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011). Theories on internal communication that 
support knowledge integration are extended in (Section 3.3.2) to understand knowledge 
storage and use. The characteristics of officials who help knowledge exploration and 
integration process are further discussed in (Section 3.3.1). 
 
2.3.4 Knowledge Sharing 
Individuals hold ideas, creativity and innovative capacity. However, these ideas are not 
developed in isolation, but are always the result of collaborative efforts (Styhre, 2011). 
Nonaka (1994, p. 15) puts this view as “although ideas are formed in the mind of 
individuals, interaction between individuals typically plays a critical role in the 
developing such ideas”. Although, there appears to be a difference in opinion regarding 
the data, information and knowledge discussed previously (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Wilson, 2002), however, both researchers come to a common ground that an individual 
requires an interaction with the world to enhance the idea. People see the solutions of the 
problems differently. In the collaboration, they seek different aspects of the same problem 
(Tiwana, 2000). Thus, communication among the professionals not only supports to 
develop new knowledge but also enriches the older one, as Davenport and Prusak (1998: 
17) suggest that: “ideas breed new ideas and shared knowledge stays with the giver while 
it enriches the receiver”. Usoro and Majewski (2011) agree stating that knowledge tends 
to increase when shared and utilised. Success of knowledge management depends on 
knowledge sharing and collaborative efforts taken by the knowledge holders. Therefore, 
it is useful to distinguish various terminologies used in the knowledge management that 
refer to knowledge sharing practice.  
 
Researchers worldwide use knowledge transfer more often than knowledge sharing or 
exchange (Wang and Noe, 2010; Matthews and Shulman, 2000; Ghaznavi et al., 2013). 
Difference in these terminologies can be explained through using modes of 
communication, flow of information, reciprocity, knowledge application and use 
(Ghaznavi et al., 2013; see, Ghaznavi et al., 2011; Boyd, Ragdell and Oppenheim, 2007). 
These differences are illustrated in Figure 2–5. 
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Figure 2-5: The knowledge flows 
(Adapted from Boyd, Rogdell and Oppenheim, 2007) 
 
Figure 2–5 shows that knowledge transfer is a unidirectional process, whereby knowledge 
flows from a sender to the recipient(s). This is a non-reciprocal process with only one 
knowledge distributor to many knowledge seekers (Boyd, Ragdell and Oppenheim, 
2007). Training is its common example. Knowledge recipient not only gains new 
knowledge but also applies it to a different context (Wang and Noe, 2010). Knowledge 
transfer is different from knowledge sharing and exchange, because it pays attention on 
units, divisions and organisations rather than on individuals’ interaction (Wang and Noe, 
2010). This thesis aims to explore security officials’ interaction to learn from peers in 
other businesses; therefore, knowledge transfer process may not be useful in this context. 
However, an element that suggests how recipient apply new knowledge into a different 
context deemed useful to understand how gained knowledge is valued.  
 
Knowledge exchange is a reciprocal process, whereby an owner of the knowledge also 
wants knowledge of equal value (Ghaznavi et al., 2013). This process involves one sender 
and one recipient. This practice is normally found in formal contracts (Boyd, Ragdell and 
Oppenheim, 2007). Liu, Ji and Mookherjee’s (2011) study conducted in information 
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security domain evaluates contractual governance between two organisations. Since, the 
contractual governance is involved in knowledge exchange; communication may be 
limited to senior management only. However, senior management does not necessarily 
perform actual work to ensure information security (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014). 
They are mostly engaged in decision-making process for sound business decisions 
(Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013). Security professionals may improve their technicalities 
by sharing ‘practical knowledge’ (Tsoukas, 2011). Senior management may not provide 
practical wisdom. Knowledge exchange may be limited to access one type of knowledge 
(Sammarra and Biggiero, 2008, p. 811). Information security officials’ skills are diverse 
and may require access to multiple types of knowledge. Thus, it requires a wider channel 
to support access to different types of knowledge. 
 
Knowledge sharing is not limited to number of people. This practice may be reciprocal 
or non-reciprocal. Figure 2–5 shows that knowledge sharing is a multi-directional process 
that facilitates a number of individuals to interact with one another. An owner of the 
knowledge can also be a recipient (Boyd, Ragdell and Oppenheim, 2007). A networking 
activity such as conference may be a good example of this process. As stated: 
“Knowledge sharing is a social practice that is both contingent on local 
conditions and histories and shaped and influenced by professional 
ideologies and professional skills.” (Styhre, 2011: 52) 
Since, this thesis is looking at how different knowledge actors working in the security 
profession explores knowledge from each other, thus knowledge sharing practice is 
favoured than knowledge transfer or exchange. This thesis however also considers extent 
to which organisations are willing to share fraud related knowledge with one another. 
Therefore, some elements of knowledge exchange are also favoured to explore 
contractual governance used in the partnership.  
 
Knowledge sharing practice consists of many elements such as communication practices, 
instituted routines, human capital, technology and organisational relationships. 
Communication is prerequisite to knowledge sharing regardless whether it is printed or 
verbal, formal or informal, and face-to-face or digital (Jasimuddin, Connell and Klein, 
2014; Alavi and Denford, 2011). Choice of the communication strategy depends on need 
and the relationship among knowledge holders. Figure 2–2 have illustrated two 
communication processes used to share knowledge. The first concentrates on internal 
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communication where members of same organisation share knowledge with one another 
(intra-organisational knowledge sharing). The second considered how peers from 
different organisations communicate (inter-organisational knowledge sharing). The 
former facilitates knowledge exploitation within staffs and latter requires external 
communication to explore knowledge from other organisations. Since this thesis aims to 
explore how peers learn from other peers working in different organisations, therefore, 
theories that address how and why corporate employees communicate with one another 
is favoured.  
 
2.4 Corporate Communication 
Communication is an everyday activity; however, corporations are the hub where people 
communicate on a daily basis (Littlejohn and Foss, 2008; van Riel and Fombrun, 2007). 
Corporate communication is the basis for the survival in all business activities (van 
Woerkum and Aarts, 2008). Due to communication, organisations acquire primary 
resources such as capital, labour and raw material. These primary resources help to 
generate secondary resources such as legitimacy and reputation (van Riel and Fombrun, 
2007, p. 1). This in turn helps companies to earn. Many researchers state that knowledge 
sharing and communication are symbiotic, because one leads to the other (Nonaka et al., 
2014; Jasimuddin, Connell and Klein, 2014). Eventually, this seems true because the 
word corporate stems from the Latin word ‘corporare’ which means ‘forming into a 
body’. Communication came from ‘communicare’ which means ‘to share’. Both 
knowledge and networks thus are crucial to an organisation (van Wijk, van den Bosch 
and Volberda, 2011, p. 478). 
 
Littlejohn and Foss (2011, p. 5) while discussing communication theory have identified 
that communication theory was initially borrowed from information theory, social 
psychology theory and linguistics theory. Social psychologists have used communication 
theory to understand human behaviour, whereas sociologists concentrate to understand 
importance of the society. The communication theory gained attention after World War 
I. Organisational communication theory, however, developed more recently in the middle 
of the twentieth century. One definition that fits all types of communication would be 
misleading, as Littlejohn and Foss (2011, p. 5) have found that “different sorts of 
investigation require separate, even contradictory, definitions of communication”. A 
definition thus requires being specific enough to fit in the context being investigated. 
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Since this study considers communication among security officials in the online retail, 
theories that address how corporates communicate with one another are favoured and 
explained in Table (2-5). 
 
Table 2-5: Corporate communications theories 
Definitions Authors 
“Corporate communication is a management function that 
offers a framework for the effective coordination of all internal 
and external communication with the overall purpose of 
establishing and maintaining favourable reputation with 
stakeholder groups upon which the organisation is 
dependant.” 
Cornelissen, 2014, p. 5 
 
 
“We define an organisation’s communication system as the 
multiple tactical and strategic media it relies on to 
communicate with its stakeholders, as well as the message 
content it chooses to diffuse through that media” 
van Riel and Fombrun, 
2007, p. 2 
 
 
 
Cornelissen’s definition (Table 2-5) has two shortcomings. It is generic and such an 
element suggests that the ‘overall purpose’ of communication is to maintain reputation 
and image. Reputation and image are essential elements for any type of business, because 
it helps to attract consumers, obtain licence from government authorities, and to find 
potential investors (van Woerkum and Aarts, 2008). Although corporate communication 
influences its participants and observers about company and its operation, however, not 
all communications in an organisation are work related; neither is relevant to fulfilling 
organisational objectives (van Riel and Fombrun, 2007). This thesis, however, considers 
reputation and image, because these elements support building positive relationships 
(Fieseler and Ranzini, 2015, p. 500-517; Simpson, 2011, p. 32). Creating an alignment 
with external groups requires an understanding of their beliefs about the organisation. 
Thus, requires better reputation and impression to explore external knowledge (van Riel, 
2013). 
 
Between the two definitions discussed (Table 2-5), van Riel and Fombrun’s definition is 
useful, because it also covers media that supports knowledge sharing, and concentrates 
on the content being communicated. The content aspect of the definition such as 
‘knowledge’ is discussed previously (Section 2.3). However, it is not the knowledge only 
that leads organisations to communicate. Following model shows clearly how its 
environment influences organisations. 
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Figure 2-6: An organisation and its environment 
Adapted from van Woerkum and Aarts (2008) 
In Figure 2–6, van Woerkum and Aarts have shown the basic needs of an organisation to 
communicate with others. They have believed that an internal group such as employees 
constitute an organisation. The employees are crucial stakeholders that require frequent 
communication to provide a complete knowledge to accomplish day-to-day specialised 
tasks (Cornelissen, 2014). Argenti (2013, p. viii) reports that officials often perform 
different activities at the time. A coherent communication keeps track of the knowledge 
acquired by thousands of employees. Internal communication is a constant activity that 
utilises several mechanisms such as informal chat and organised meetings (Welch and 
Jackson, 2007). To report importance of internal communication, Easterby-Smith, Lyles 
and Tsang (2008) suggest that exploring external knowledge is wastage, if management 
do not communicate with internal staff. If management keeps information from staff, they 
keep their ideas (Argenti, 2013). Internal communication practice thus requires effective 
tools. The theory on internal corporate communication is extended (Section 3.3.2) to 
evaluate the abilities of an organisation to support internal knowledge dissemination 
practice.  
 
Figure 2–6 shows five important external groups necessary for external communication. 
An enabling group represents government agencies that define rules and regulations for 
the company. An organisation needs to follow these rules. International Standardisations 
for Organisations (ISO) is the agency that sets rules for customers’ information storage 
and use. An organisation may need a licence from these agencies to function.  
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The second group is normative consists media, non-government organisations, political 
parties and religious communities (van Woerkum and Aarts, 2008; Otubanjo and Amujo, 
2012; Christensen, Morsing and Cheney, 2008). They promote the company’s reputation 
and image to the funders and public (Arturo Lowensberg, 2010). To support business 
activities funders are needed (van Riel and Fombrun, 2007; van Riel, 1995). This requires 
companies to approach normative group to advocate their opinion about the products and 
services. Communication with this group can be associated with ‘institutional theory’ 
which suggests that organisations appear to influence peers through rules, requirements 
and social norms (Barringer and Harrison, 2000).  
 
The third group is input that provides knowledge and other resources to help the business 
survive a fast-changing environment (Andersen, Kragh and Lettl, 2013). Communication 
with this group can be associated with ‘resource dependence theory’ which suggests that 
no organisation is self-sufficient (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Experienced staff, 
financial partners, and skilled workers are required (van Woerkum and Aarts, 2008). 
These people influence businesses to exchange resources through communicating with 
one another (Arturo Lowensberg, 2010). The Resource Based View (RBV) theory is 
extended in Section 3.3.1 to understand the importance of knowledge and the people who 
generate it.  
 
Services and products produced by an organisation are attractive to output groups such 
as customers and citizens (van Woerkum and Aarts, 2008). This is the fourth group and 
the one that buys these services. An output group is required to generate income. 
 
The fifth group (Figure 2-6) is the group with comparable goals. This group may be able 
to provide domain specific knowledge, because it is comprised of similar nature of the 
organisations. This study concentrates on how an organisation explores knowledge from 
like mind people working in a similar domain. Therefore, communication is easier with 
a group with similar goals, such as those with whom is competing or collaborating. Joint 
effort towards a common goal is desirable. Communication with this group represents a 
‘stakeholder theory’ which suggests that organisations form collaborations to reduce 
environmental uncertainties (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). To tackle identity thieves 
more efficiently, companies need to collaborate. 
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It is also important to consider how officials collaborate. Definitions discussed previously 
(Table 2-5) suggest multiple tactical and strategic media that facilitates organisational 
collaboration. Mechanism, media and channel often used interchangeably to refer to the 
mode of transmission of knowledge from a source to the destination. Shannon and 
Weaver (1949) consider media as a transmitted signal from one end to another. This 
suggest that media is “conduits for knowledge” (Jasimuddin, Connell and Klein, 2014, p. 
196; Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011, p. 394). Strategic media use an integrative 
approach to connect internal and external sources. Thus, it keeps track of difficult 
knowledge in a coherent way (Argenti, 2013). A centralised knowledge base discussed 
earlier (Section 2.3.3) is a good example. Members often perform many different 
functions at the same time by learning from various sources. An organisation requires 
coherent communication to keep track of the work done by thousands of employees 
situated at multiple locations. This thus help organisations to manage acquired knowledge 
from staffs. Tactical media such as in-house employee publications are shared internally 
amongst staffs to disseminate knowledge (Verčič, Verčič and Sriramesh, 2012, p. 225). 
Manager plays a mediator role between members and the management.  
 
It is also important to select correct media that conveys message accurately (Shannon, 
2001, p. 5). Dance (1970, p. 209) prescribed value from “normative judgement” is 
essential for clarity of the message. The media can generate noise. Therefore, requires 
appropriate mechanism for better understanding (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 
2008). A media selection thus is an important in the knowledge sharing practice. An 
irrelevant media can bring ambiguity and create complexity in the shared content 
(Littlejohn and Foss, 2008, p. 190). Two commonly used communication mechanisms 
include formal and informal interaction, each with different pros and cons. 
 
2.4.1 Formal Interaction  
Formal interaction is a systematic approach to pre-identified activities (Ghaznavi et al., 
2011). This interaction is achieved through board meetings, dialogue with teams and 
presentations. In inter-organisational relationships, a formal knowledge flows in strategic 
alliances formation (Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011). This thus requires a discrete 
mode of governance (van Wijk, van den Bosch and Volberda, 2011). Organisations work 
together to achieve one or more common goals (Arturo Lowensberg, 2010). Therefore, 
strategic alliances are formed between two or more companies with no joint ownership 
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(Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 2009). Strategic alliances are required for one of the 
following reasons such as to reduce cost, gain power and control, increase 
competitiveness, mitigate environmental uncertainties, gain knowledge and improve 
organisational learning (Arturo Lowensberg, 2010). Partners’ discrete modes of 
governance are regulated by an official document (Hadjielias and Poutziouris, 2015, p. 
869). The official contract is defined as: 
“A specification of the actions that named parties are supposed to take 
at various times, as a function of the conditions that then obtain” 
(Kaplow and Shavell, 2002, p. 29).  
Action in the definition above refers to how a partner would behave in knowledge sharing 
process. They expect either equal knowledge from contributors or avoid information 
misuse from partners through the contract. The conditions referred to in this definition 
include the past actions of partners and future uncertainties. Trust may facilitate the 
elimination of risk of information misuse (Simpson, 2013a; 2013b) as extends the 
discussion in Section 3.4.2. 
 
Mason and Leek (2008) discussed that networked relationships such as organised 
conferences and inter-firm reviews support knowledge articulation, because peers can 
meet face-to-face to share knowledge. Formal knowledge structures are found in the 
conferences whereby presenters and keynote speakers deliver lecture, leaflets and 
brochures (Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011). Cifas (2014a) argues that industry 
specific newsletters help improve knowledge on current issues in the security profession. 
These meetings also contain some elements of informal discussion during tea breaks.  
 
2.4.2 Informal Interaction 
Most knowledge is shared through informal interaction and is facilitated by informal 
social ties (Styhre, 2011). Social norms such as moral character, ethical behaviour and 
past records of accomplishment govern informal gatherings (Hadjielias and Poutziouris, 
2015). Interaction among peers is often achieved during meals, travels and coffee breaks 
(Ghaznavi et al., 2013; Standage, 2013). Informal knowledge networks among 
organisations take a number of forms (van Wijk, van den Bosch and Volberda, 2011, p. 
478-479). These include hiring experts from other organisations, social communities of 
practice, board-interlock, geographic and ethnic communities (Almeida, Hohberger and 
Parada, 2011). 
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Hiring experts from other organisations supports external knowledge sharing (Easterby‐
Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). Almeida, Hohberger and Parada (2011) state that hiring 
across organisations lead both firms into informal inter-firm relationships, because 
security officers join the new company with past ties that provide firms a bi-directional 
knowledge flow. The people who move to another company maintain important ties that 
help them with specialised tasks.  
 
Communities of practice also provide informal knowledge networks. A community of 
practice is comprised of a joint enterprise of mutual relationships to utilise shared 
repertoire of communal resources (Wenger, 1998). The concept was initially derived for 
beginners; it also pays attention on existing members of staffs (Almeida, Hohberger and 
Parada, 2011). Wenger (1998) suggests that members of a community are not only bound 
by what they do together but also by what they learn mutually. A community in the same 
region tends to provide a fluid mix of knowledge (Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011, 
p. 387). This is consistent with informal social ties whereby structural and relational 
characteristics brings together knowledge holders (van Wijk, van den Bosch and 
Volberda, 2011).  
 
2.5 Inter-Organisational Information Security Knowledge Sharing  
Wang, Yuan and Archer (2006) showed that preventing identity theft requires all 
associated parties including an identity owner (registered member of the public), identity 
issuer (the government or private organisations issues an identity certificate), identity 
checker (custom or traffic police officer) and identity protector (the government 
legislation authorities or law enforcement agencies). They developed a framework of 
association among the stakeholders that show an information flow. This collaboration 
was established to share information among these stakeholders rather than knowledge. 
Information is merely being aware of something, whereas knowledge implies application 
of information to produce tangible result (Sanchez, 2005). In their framework, a victim 
of the identity theft reports a case of identity fraud to an issuing authority such as a bank. 
The bank then forwards the case to the law enforcement agency to take legal action. Thus, 
information flows from one stakeholder to another. This study does not take into account 
collaboration of the like mind officials from similar organisations. These officials can 
provide domain specific and improved learning experiences. 
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Majchrzak and Jarvenpaa (2004) considered ways to control information overflow from 
employees of collaborating organisations. Peers could leak company’s private and 
confidential information during collaborations (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). 
Securing important information is a key challenge in the knowledge management 
literature (Ahmad, Bosua and Scheepers, 2014). These authors did not consider identity 
theft or the security profession. They focused on how to avoid knowledge leakage in a 
broader collaborative environment. Few studies address information security knowledge 
sharing among security officials and are summarised as follows (Table 2-6). 
 
Table 2-6: Information security knowledge sharing 
Structure Mechanism Relationship  Authors 
Web protégé Online  
Open source database 
(many government, 
military and 
commercial 
organisations) 
Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 
2013; Feledi and Fenz, 
2012; Mace, Parkin and 
van Moorsel, 2010; Stahl, 
Parkin and van Moorsel, 
2011. 
Complementary 
and standalone 
knowledge base 
Offline and 
online 
mechanisms 
Closed partnership 
(two to three 
commercial 
organisations) 
Flores, Antonsen and 
Ekstedt, 2014; Liu, Ji and 
Mookerjee, 2011. 
 
Forums - ISF,  
ITISAC, and  
Gartner Inc. 
Offline and 
online 
mechanisms 
Fraud forums – paid 
membership (many 
members from 
government and 
commercial 
organisations) 
https://www.securityforu
m.org, http://www.it-
isac.org, 
http://www.gartner.com/t
echnology/home.jsp, and 
https://www.cifas.org.uk 
LinkedIn groups -
Information 
Security Group, 
Anti-Fraud 
experts 
 Virtual communities 
– closed membership 
(wide range of 
individuals from 
similar domain of 
work) 
Tamjidyamcholo et al., 
2013; Tamjidyamcholo et 
al., 2014 
 also see 
https://www.linkedin.com
/groups/924757, and 
https://www.linkedin.com
/groups/83088 
 
 
Table 2–6 suggests four different types of relationships to gain knowledge from external 
organisations. The first is an open source relationship created by web protégé that assists 
various actors to add and edit their knowledge in a web-oriented community. In this 
relationship, officials may need no contractual governance. However, the second type of 
relationship such as partnership is based on an official agreement signed between two or 
more organisations. The partnership requires a closer collaboration and direct modes of 
communication. The contracts spell the explicit terms of knowledge exchange as 
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discussed earlier (Section 2.3.4). In the third and fourth relationships, security 
professionals may not have an official agreement or direct modes of communication with 
one another. However, they subscribe themselves with professional bodies by a 
membership scheme. Administration may have a pre-defined set of rules that guides 
members’ behaviour, thus gaining members’ trust (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2). 
 
2.5.1 Open Source Database 
Newcastle University’s technical report series (Mace, Parkin and van Moorsel, 2010; 
Stahl, Parkin and van Moorsel, 2011) concentrated on Chief Information Security 
Officers (CISOs) from various organisations to capture knowledge. A community 
knowledge base was developed and shared centrally among the network of officials 
(Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013). Stanford Centre for Biomedical Informatics (2016) 
defines a web protégé as:  
“A Web Protégé is an ontology development environment for the web that 
makes it easy to create, upload, modify and share ontologies for 
collaborating viewing and editing”.  
A web protégé is an open source software that provides tools to construct a web portal 
that captures domain specific knowledge in a community. This in turn help to avoid 
generating same security wheel implemented by the peers. Behavioural factors were 
measured to explore the reactions of the security officials. Even though the model was 
designed to help CISOs in policy-making decisions, it has several drawbacks. Firstly, 
there was little contribution from participants and incentives were needed to encourage 
members. Secondly, officials who were not adequately computer literate, found its use 
difficult. Thirdly, the model considered generic users from government, commercial and 
military organisations. The project maintenance and finance elements followed a public-
private partnership model. This caused a lack of trust due to diversity of people involved 
in the project (Krogh, 2011, p. 418). To the overcome lack of motivation and distrust, 
Feledi and Fenz (2012), and Feledi, Fenz and Lechner (2013) added a feature which 
rewarded the user for his or her contribution. Lastly, the web protégé was designed on 
pre-defined themes such as vulnerabilities, threats, controls and ISO 27001. 
Consequently, inserting knowledge based on new innovative ideas is hurdle in the use of 
open source database. 
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2.5.2 Partnership  
The partnership involves a signed agreement to secure complementary information 
system between two or three organisations (Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 2011). Few studies 
have evaluated one-to-one relationships in the security profession (Flores, Antonsen and 
Ekstedt, 2014; Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 2011). In the Liu, Ji and Mookerjee’s (2011) study, 
a decision was made by two companies to share information security knowledge. 
Theoretically, they have calculated investment by the firms of equal sizes, so that there is 
approximate contribution of the knowledge sharing from each. A complementary 
information system was found to bring a natural incentive to share knowledge. However, 
to secure stand-alone information system, each organisation prefers to lock-in knowledge 
within its boundary. These findings are applicable only to companies of similar size. 
 
Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt (2014) investigated behavioural information security 
governance to explore how officials react to information security knowledge sharing 
activities. American and Swedish organisations were investigated. Results show that 
organisational risk appetite and performance limitations of the partner’s knowledge 
hindered establishment of information security knowledge sharing. Performance 
limitation occurs due to insufficient knowledge from officials. The more risk tolerant 
companies found less incentive to learn from companies lacking in the ability to deal with 
identity thieves. These authors have further discovered that a centralised information 
security structure employs uniform firm level policies and a steering committee leading 
to sharing security knowledge. However, they failed to test company size and the industry 
in which firm operates. These characteristics may have helped to address impact of their 
decision to share knowledge. Even though official contracts were regulated, companies 
failed to help each other in to secure standalone information systems. 
 
2.5.3 Forums 
Many online forums and online virtual groups exist worldwide to secure organisations 
from cyber threats. Gartner, ISF, and IT-ISAC are the official bodies where security 
professionals can improve their technical skills by sharing learning experiences. Cifas is 
a dedicated forum devoted to online fraud in the UK. These forums are established to 
impart knowledge of information security officials to help detect and prevent identity 
theft. These forums promote best practice by reporting, sharing, gathering and analysing 
cross-sector information.  
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Information Technology – Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) 
IT-ISAC is a non-profit limited liability forum reputable to provide a network of 
relationships. It was established in 2000 however officially operated from 2001. The 
forum is running on membership fee in one of the categories such as Bronze ($3,000), 
Premium Silver ($8,000) and Foundation Gold ($25,000) (IT-ISAC, 2013a). It aimed to 
achieve situational awareness. Therefore, “information sharing is a tool that enables 
situational awareness and informs actions” (Algeier, 2015, p. 3). The forum serves IT 
companies from around the world (IT-ISAC, 2013b). Leading IT companies such as HP, 
Oracle and IBM are among its members. One of the online mechanism used by members 
to share identity frauds knowledge is “Operations Centre”. Operations centre is a real 
time point of contact whereby registered members gain immediate advice. Local 
members are connected through spatially clustered social networks (see 
http://www.internetsociety.org for the USA chapter and http://isoc-e.org for the UK 
chapter). The forum promotes trust through using non-disclosure agreement. 
 
Information Security Forum (ISF) 
The ISF is a not-for-profit information security forum established in 1989 in the UK. It 
aims to provide knowledge on cyber security, information security and risk management. 
It has a dedicated knowledge exchange section to provide officials’ interaction. These 
include, ISF live, annual world congress, chapter meetings, solution development 
workshops, special interest groups. Similar to the Operations Centre from IT-ISAC, ‘ISF 
Live’ is a global online mechanism. It connects experts on various topics to provide 
specific help and provides offline mechanisms such as annual global congress and chapter 
meetings whereby security officials collaborate in-person to gain practical advice on key 
security challenges. Chapter meetings are organised across 25 countries several times a 
year to facilitate interaction among members located in the same region. Chapter 
meetings are confidential peer-to-peer networks to exchange ideas with ISF analysts and 
industry experts. ISF was also founded based on membership whereby members pay 
£27,000 annual fee for full membership.   
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2.5.4 Virtual Communities 
A virtual community created for professionals with specialised knowledge to form an 
online community in an effort to exchange knowledge (Hsu et al., 2007). These 
communities are based on members with common activities (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 
2013; 2014), which brings natural incentive to use shared knowledge for betterment of 
performance. LinkedIn groups such as the Information Security Virtual Community and 
the Anti-Fraud Experts are common examples of these communities (Table 2-6). These 
groups are subscription free with worldwide members. The group members can interact 
without meeting face-to-face (Hsu et al., 2007). This provides an opportunity for 
worldwide collaboration without constrain of time and geographic barriers. A problem 
with this type of communication is that officials either have little or no active incentive 
to contribute (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; 2014). These groups are composed of people 
with different behaviours (Simpson, 2011). This means it requires a pre-defined set of 
rules to regulate members’ interaction. These forums and virtual communities may be 
beneficial. However, for a large group of people it is hard to contribute knowledge and 
expensive to wait for someone to post something (Krogh, 2011, p. 418). Thus, resulting 
in no posts. 
 
2.6 Development of the Research Questions  
The forums and online communities discussed in the previous section are lacking an 
empirical investigation to explore views from real actors. Can knowledge shared through 
online communities and virtual groups reduce risk (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014, p. 19)? 
There is urgent need for empirical studies to understand what is working in retail 
organisations and what does not seem to be providing benefit concerning knowledge to 
address and mitigate identity theft. Trust is also hard to find in online communities, 
because of large groups with members worldwide (Krogh, 2011, p. 418). For instance, 
the Anti-Fraud Experts group discussed comprised approximately 20,000 members 
(Table 2-6). Similarly, Gartner Inc. deals with 60,000 clients around the world. Many 
members consider shared information on online group either useless or fake. 
Consequently, some members either do not participate or have a small active role in 
sharing fraud prevention knowledge (Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013; Tamjidyamcholo 
et al., 2014). An incentive or reward system is needed to reinforce behavioural changes 
amongst security professionals (Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013; Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 
2011). These challenges identified in the limited literature of information security 
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knowledge sharing practice may help to address the following research questions: Firstly, 
the membership relationships in online fraud forum is lacking an empirical study to 
evaluate whether  knowledge obtained from the forums is of value to address and mitigate 
identity frauds. This gap motivated the design of RQ1:   
What is working for the retail sector organisations and what does not seem to be 
providing benefit with regard to knowledge sharing to address and mitigate 
identity theft?  
This question contains two components broken down as follows: 
RQ1 (a): What is working for retailers with regards to knowledge sharing to 
address and mitigate identity theft? 
RQ1 (b): What does not seem to be providing benefit with regards to knowledge 
sharing to address and mitigate identity theft?  
 
Secondly, in the virtual relationships such as professional communities, Tamjidyamcholo 
et al. (2014, p. 31) noticed the need for a study that explores: “Why some individual either 
do not take part or have less active participation in information security virtual 
community”. This study adapts this question into RQ3 as follows to explore behavioural 
aspect associated with individuals’ use of online groups. 
Why do some individual either not take part or have little active participation in 
information security knowledge sharing? 
This question also contains two components that measure security experts’ reaction, such 
as no participation and less participation. RQ3 can be broken down as follows: 
RQ3 (a) Why do some security officials not take part in information security 
knowledge sharing? 
RQ3 (b) Why do some security officials have small active participation in 
information security knowledge sharing? 
 
Thirdly, in the partnership relationship, members are reluctant to contribute their 
knowledge to help each other in securing stand-alone information systems (Flores, 
Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 2011). To explore this aspect, RQ2 
was designed as: 
To what extent are companies willing to share fraud prevention knowledge with 
each other and under which condition(s)?  
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Similar to previous questions, this new question also has two aspects to explore from 
security officials designed as follows: 
RQ2 (a) To what extent are companies willing to share fraud prevention 
knowledge with each other? 
RQ2 (b) Under which condition(s) are companies willing to share fraud 
prevention knowledge with each other? 
 
Many other questions in the domain of knowledge sharing in the information security 
remain unanswered. These studies neither focused on interactive dynamics between retail 
sector organisations nor the company size and characteristics to evaluate knowledge 
sharing practice (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014). These studies do not take into 
account the nature of knowledge being shared and the degree of tactitness, ambiguity, or 
complexity to help understand value in the knowledge (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 
2008). Tamjidyamcholo et al. (2013) measured intention and attitudes of members of an 
information security virtual community with respect to trust, self-efficacy, reciprocity, 
and shared language. Their quantitative analysis does not consider information security 
professionals from retail organisations nor do they examine the identity theft prevention 
knowledge sharing. Their predictors are not all-inclusive as stated by them that: 
“This study has tried to experimentally examine predictors of 
knowledge sharing intention and knowledge sharing attitude.  But these 
predictors and constructs are not all-inclusive dimensions of 
knowledge sharing intention and attitude in information security virtual 
communities.” (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013, p. 231) 
The need for a comprehensive study that explores individual and collective efforts 
towards external knowledge sharing practice is required in general (Krogh, 2011, p. 404) 
and in information security knowledge sharing practice in particular (Tamjidyamcholo et 
al., 2013, p. 231). A framework of associated components seems useful efforts to evaluate 
and understand inter-organisational identity theft knowledge sharing practice in the retail 
sector. This aspect is considered in RQ4 as follows:  
Which is the suitable knowledge sharing framework in security profession in retail 
that facilitates an understanding of an inter-organisational identity theft 
prevention knowledge sharing practice? 
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2.7 Summary 
Information security has hitherto considered a technical response as the main priority to 
address identity theft. Knowledge sharing as a strategic practice has attracted little 
attention. Several doubts exists whether information security knowledge shared on online 
forums (i.e. Gartner, Cifas, and ISF) is of value to prevent and mitigate identity theft. 
Researchers believe that technology supports the sharing of information rather than 
knowledge. An alternative view is that technology is an enabler of knowledge 
management activities. Concerning domain specific knowledge, this thesis argues that 
value gained from external knowledge cannot completely destroyed when shared using 
online forums. To investigate identified various assumptions require a framework of all-
inclusive components. The next chapter evaluates three frameworks from recent literature 
to find suitability and applicability in the security profession in retail.  
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CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the theories relevant to retail organisations that facilitates 
knowledge sharing. This thus addresses RQ4 which seeks a suitable framework in online 
security profession in retail to facilitate inter-organisational identity theft prevention 
knowledge sharing. Three frameworks from recent literature on inter-organisational 
knowledge sharing have been compared to determine their suitability in security 
profession and application in online retail sector. The components of these frameworks 
are evaluated and summarised to propose an extension of the existing theory. 
 
3.2 Framework 
Why is it necessary to understand all-inclusive components in the inter-organisational 
knowledge sharing process and how does a conceptual framework help to obtain a better 
understating? Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2015, p. 545) emphases importance of the 
conceptual framework by using a jigsaw puzzle analogy as:  
“Puzzle for which there is no picture are usually more challenging as 
we have no idea of the picture we are trying to create”.  
A conceptual framework is a map the intellectual territory being investigated (Miles, 
Huberman and Saldana, 2014). Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008) suggested that 
understanding of a firm’s inter-organisational knowledge sharing and associated 
components can enhance its capability. A theoretical framework represents certain 
phenomena relating one aspect to another (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013, p. 68). Knowledge 
sharing between organisations is a more complex process than knowledge sharing within 
an organisation (Yang and Maxwell, 2011; Bigdeli, Kamal and Cesare, 2013; Szulanski, 
1996). This involves multifaceted nature of boundaries, processes and cultures, 
confidentiality and leakage concerns, legal aspects, communication skills and tools, 
instituted routines and social capital (Bigdeli, Kamal and Cesare, 2013; Styhre, 2011; 
Szulanski, 1996; Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). To understand how this 
phenomenon influences inter-organisational knowledge sharing practice in security 
profession, recent theories need to be evaluated. A conceptual framework seems useful 
effort to evaluate various themes involved in the inter-organisational knowledge sharing 
 Chapter 3: Theoretical framework  60 
practice. Due to limited literature in information security knowledge sharing practice, 
selecting an appropriate framework to conduct this study is challenging. To assist the 
selection, three frameworks from recent literature are compared, contrasted and 
summarised in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Comparisons of theoretical frameworks 
Framework (1) Framework (2) Framework (3) 
Proposed factors of influencing 
electronic information sharing 
in local government authorities. 
The relationship of factors 
influencing inter-
organisational information 
sharing. 
Factors influencing inter-
organisational knowledge 
transfer. 
 
To investigate facilitators and 
barriers of information sharing at 
local government authorities. 
The framework served as 
decision-making tool to consider 
whether sharing of information 
using electronic mechanism is 
useful. 
To evaluate relationship among 
the factors associated with 
organisational information 
sharing activities. 
Providing an 
understanding of inter-
organisational knowledge 
transfer process and 
mapping current themes 
and future research areas. 
Electronic information sharing 
and collaborations considering 
the public sector organisations. 
Information sharing in the 
public sector organisations. 
Knowledge transfer 
between the organisations 
to increase 
innovativeness, survival 
and competition. 
Bigdeli, Kamal and Cesare, 2013 Yang and Maxwell, 2011 Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang, 2008 
 
3.2.1 Proposed Factors of Influencing Electronic Information Sharing 
Bigdeli, Kamal and Cesare (2013) developed a framework of electronic information 
sharing to assess knowledge sharing practice in local government. Previous research 
extensively focused on central and federal government organisations and disregarded 
local bodies. Therefore, they found a need to consider local organisations to investigate 
an inter-organisational knowledge sharing process. They used theoretical lenses to 
evaluate a systematic literature review and devised a new framework of components 
illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
 
The focus was on public sector local government organisations and the surrounding 
environment to assess impact of the decisions designed to share information using 
electronic systems. The authors viewed knowledge sharing as a central activity which 
surrounds external environment, inter-departmental environment, technological 
environment, characteristics of electronic information sharing, and capacity of 
organisation to absorb an external knowledge. 
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Figure 3-1: Proposed factors influencing electronic information sharing in Local Government 
Authorities 
Source: Bigdeli, Kamal and Cesare (2013) 
 
These authors examined public sector organisations; several components in this 
framework are not relevant to assess retail businesses. The external environmental factors 
such as political pressure might not necessarily influence decisions made by the retailers 
to share knowledge. Retail is mainly a private sector profit-oriented. Retailers may face 
pressure from community for unnecessarily disclosing customers’ private information to 
the partners. Components of the framework need to be tested and validated in practice. 
 
3.2.2 Relationships of Factors Influencing Inter-Organisational Information 
Sharing 
Yang and Maxwell (2011, p. 171) developed a framework of relationships and associated 
components that influence inter-organisational information sharing. This framework is 
useful in policy and legislation to help eliminate risk of leaking customers’ private 
information in the collaboration. The components of this framework were designed based 
on public sector organisations. The framework was also based on insights obtained from 
literature. Therefore, similar to previous framework, its components need to be 
empirically tested and evaluated. The components of this framework are illustrated in the 
following diagram. 
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Figure 3-2: Relationships of factors influencing inter-organisational information sharing 
Source: Yang and Maxwell (2011) 
 
 
In Figure 3-2, the factors such as political concern, external regulation and funding may 
not be key obstacles in retail business. Moreover, this framework focused extensively on 
explicit knowledge rather than tacit knowledge. The security professionals may contain 
practical wisdom synthesised from tacit and explicit (Section 2.3.1). Therefore, requires 
elements that also consider tacit knowledge sharing.  
 
3.2.3 Factors Influencing Inter-Organisational Knowledge Transfer 
Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008, p. 679) developed a framework of factors 
influencing inter-organisational knowledge transfer to help understand inter-
organisational knowledge sharing practice. This framework considered future prospects 
on how companies share knowledge. They also focused on knowledge dissemination 
within a firm’s boundaries. The reliability is devised based on six review papers published 
in the special issue on inter-organisational knowledge transfer in the Journal of 
Management Studies. These studies were conducted based on empirical examinations. 
The components of the framework have been evaluated through empirical investigation 
(Nylund and Raelin, 2015; Ho and Wang, 2015). The components of this framework are 
illustrated below. 
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Figure 3-3: Factors influencing inter-organisational knowledge transfer 
Source: Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008) 
 
Several components in these three frameworks overlap. Firms’ resources, capabilities, 
trust and risk are common in each framework. These are important factors to assess inter-
organisational knowledge sharing. A distinct difference in these frameworks is in 
suitability and applicability in practice. In the first framework (Figure 3-1) authors 
considered factors influencing electronic information sharing and focused on the 
electronic environment. They have neglected the value of face-to-face interactions. The 
flow of knowledge is fluid when involves offline social communication (Nonaka, Von 
Krogh and Voelpel, 2006; Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 2013).   
 
In the second framework (Figure 3-2), authors omitted value gained from tacit 
knowledge. Responding to identity theft may involve practical knowledge more than 
theoretical. Security officials’ practical wisdom exists in their use of tacit knowledge 
(Tsoukas, 2011; Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011). However, the frameworks in 
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 did not address how tacit components embedded in the security 
officials’ knowledge can be shared without ambiguity and complexity. However, some 
components from the first and second frameworks may be useful in the online retail 
sector. For instance, in the first framework the capacity of IT to share knowledge 
resources is useful. In the second framework concerns of losing autonomy of valuable 
knowledge going to competitors can be used. These factors may be useful to evaluate 
retailers’ inter-organisational knowledge sharing practice. 
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The third framework (Figure 3-3) incorporates nature of knowledge being shared with 
characteristics that support external knowledge sharing. Inclusions of these components 
improve knowledge sharing practice. The third framework has been selected to explore 
knowledge sharing activities in the security profession. Components of this framework 
may be divided into three major categories. The first category concentrates on 
characteristics of donor and the recipient firm such as resources and capabilities to absorb 
new knowledge (knowledge absorptive capacity), structures and mechanisms to share 
new knowledge within the organisational boundaries (intra-organisational knowledge 
transfer capability), and motivation to teach and learn. The second category evaluates 
knowledge characteristics embedded in tacit and complex knowledge. The third category 
concentrates on inter-organisational dynamics that either facilitate or hurdle 
collaborations collaboration (power relations, trust and risk, social ties and structure and 
mechanisms).  
 
3.3 Characteristics of Firms 
Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008) discussed three capabilities to evaluate whether 
the company is equipped to gain and integrate external knowledge with its existing 
internal knowledge. Firstly, the firm’s knowledge absorptive capacity underlies its staff 
abilities (experience, education, analytical skills). The security officials require relevant 
educational background to help prevent identity theft. Through frequent training 
programs, firms’ knowledge sharing is supported (Elyas et al., 2014). Secondly, how the 
company is providing the knowledge gained from external sources to its members in order 
to prevent identity theft. This is known as intra-organisational knowledge transfer 
capability which manifests itself in firm’s internal communication practices and shared 
databases. Thirdly, the company requires tactics to recognise and reward security officials 
to engage in learning experiences. This is known as motivating technique. These three 
abilities are inter-related.  
 
3.3.1 Knowledge Absorptive Capacity 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p. 128) define knowledge absorptive capacity as “The ability 
of a firm to recognise the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it 
to commercial ends”. The ‘ability’ referred is associated with security officials’ 
knowledge base including skills, educational background and competencies (Junni and 
Sarala, 2013, p. 420). Minbaeva (2007) discovered that knowledge absorptive capacity is 
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the dynamic capability within employees and is affected by specific skills possessed by 
individuals. This can be applicable to security teams working for different organisations. 
Organisations need to pay attention to its culture to enhance employees’ knowledge base. 
Elyas et al. (2014) recently prescribed that people working in security profession require 
frequent training programs related to their roles and responsibilities. Otherwise, 
organisations may consider hiring qualified professionals (Harryson, Dudkowski and 
Stern, 2008). Harryson, Dudkowski and Stern (2008) also discovered characteristics of 
the staff that helped to explore and integrate new external knowledge in the organisational 
knowledge base. Following characteristics were found in members of the organisation 
who lead knowledge exploration and integration.  
 
                
Figure 3-4: Characterises of staff that support knowledge exploration 
 
Category A (Figure 3–4) is made of members that have broader vision, strong ties and 
power to bring the network structure. Harryson, Dudkowski and Stern (2008) call these 
people ‘Spiderman’, because they are situated at centre of the web of social ties. This 
category may be situated at the senior management position and is able to connect internal 
and external security official for fluid mix of knowledge that prevent identity theft. 
 
Category B (Figure 3–4) is for staff with relevant and necessary work experience and 
insights. These people enjoy challenges, value innovative thinking, thrive in an 
independent environment and are part of something broader rather than doing their 
normal day-to-day activities. Information security analysts, identity theft specialists, IT-
security professionals are common people in this category. These people have strong past 
ties and credibility with their parent organisations (Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 
2011; Harryson, Dudkowski and Stern, 2008).  
 
Category A Category B
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In strategic management, an RBV theory is related to knowledge and the people who 
generate it. RBV theory explains how businesses exploit available resources such as 
processes, people, capital and knowledge to maximise efficiencies. Barney (2000; 1991) 
defines RBV as firm’s valuable non-substitutable and inimitable resource that leads to 
competitive advantages. The theory was initially designed to consider an internal 
resource. The theory now reflects on external resources such as knowledge (Sammarra 
and Biggiero, 2008, p. 802). Shaw, Park and Kim (2013) measured an RBV of a firm 
from human capital perspective by arguing that: 
“When human capital accumulations are high, a company is likely to 
profit from firm-specific skills, knowledge, and abilities to sustain 
competitive advantage.” (Shaw, Park and Kim, 2013, p. 574) 
They thus suggest that organisation can lose important knowledge when they are unable 
to retain their security officials. Exchanging skilled information security members with 
other retailers thus may be beneficial in informal ties (Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 
2011, p. 387). However, there is also a loss of competitive knowledge acquired during 
employment.   
 
Another mainstream that enhances knowledge absorptive capacity is holding prior 
relevant knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Jansen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda, 
2005). In other words, security officials working in the same field can acquire external 
knowledge quickly. They would be able to understand easily what their peers are doing. 
Thus, members’ acumen, creativity, memory and volition have a positive impact in 
absorption of new knowledge (Ringberg and Reihlen, 2008, p. 912). A firm also absorbs 
new knowledge quickly if it finds something valuable from its donors (Pérez‐Nordtvedt 
et al., 2008). The question is how knowledge coming from other security officials is 
valued and used to prevent identity theft. Pérez‐Nordtvedt et al., (2008, p. 714) used 
constructs such as knowledge rareness, non-substitutability and inimitability to evaluate 
value of the knowledge gained. These are the characteristics surrounded in tacit 
knowledge. Measuring value associated with tacit knowledge is challenging (Easterby‐
Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008, p. 681). Thus, this thesis chose to explore whether online 
retailers apply external knowledge to prevent identity theft or integrate with existing 
knowledge base of the firm rather than knowledge rareness, non-substitutability and 
inimitability.  
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3.3.2 Intra-Organisational Knowledge Transfer Capability 
Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008, p. 687) suggest that there is no benefit to explore 
external knowledge if it is not used by members. Thus, both intra-organisational and inter-
organisational communication are equally important in the knowledge management 
capacity. Internal communication practice helps knowledge exploitation and use. Thus, 
may lead security officials to apply new knowledge effectively. Easterby-Smith, Lyles 
and Tsang (2008, p. 679) believed that a firm which is good in absorbing new external 
knowledge, must also be well equipped to diffuse knowledge within its boundaries. This 
is also consistent with Nonaka et al. (2014, p. 139) that:  
“Separation between exploration and exploitation is merely artificial; 
and that does not exist in actual practice”.  
Intra transfer capability refers to equipment and ability of internal staff to communicate 
with each other and share their learning experiences (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 
2008). Cornelissen (2014) provides examples of internal communication medium by use 
of newsletters, promotion packages, corporate design and code of conduct. The role of 
centrally shared repositories and knowledge base is discussed (Section 2.3.3). An 
organisational memory assists knowledge exploitation where a new knowledge is 
integrated into existing knowledge base and can be retrieved by the security officials to 
put into practice (Klein, Connell and Jasimuddin, 2007). 
 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) mentioned that employee-oriented publications are used in 
disseminating knowledge among staffs. Internal publications or magazines lead to better 
internal knowledge sharing regardless of whether it is hardbound printed copy or an 
online attachment. In addition to television as traditional news outlets, Argenti (2013) has 
discovered that people also learn when they engage in visual mediums such YouTube 
videos and social media blogs. Company owned intranet also facilitates internal 
collaboration whereby management can easily approach employees, quickly and widely 
(Argenti, 2013, p. 183). 
 
Social media applications are useful for managers to disseminate important knowledge in 
the organisation (Fieseler and Ranzini, 2015; DiStaso, McCorkindale and Wright, 2011). 
Wright and Hinson’s (2010) longitudinal study investigated social media application such 
as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, blogs and YouTube videos. They have found that 
Facebook and LinkedIn groups are forefront in the workplace to disseminate knowledge. 
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Approximately 77% of staff used social media applications (Wright and Hinson, 2010). 
Email, blogs and social networking sites enable officials to become communication 
manager (Cornelissen, 2014, p. 164). Fieseler and Ranzini (2015) and Almeida, 
Hohberger and Parada (2011) considered these applications from a personnel image 
perspective. Profiles designed on LinkedIn are helpful to generate professional 
impression. Thus, it leads to online reputation and access to external knowledge. 
 
However, behavioural response to these applications could be threatening, because 
employees fail to control how other people will respond to the shared content (DiStaso, 
McCorkindale and Wright, 2011, p. 326). The use of social media applications at 
workplace can bring a number of challenges including criticism from management. Until 
now, few studies have considered severe impact of social media groups in information 
security knowledge sharing practice (Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013; Tamjidyamcholo 
et al., 2014). Therefore, behavioural responses need to be explored further with respect 
to how identity theft specialists use social media to enhance their learning abilities 
(Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Feledi, Fenz and 
Lechner, 2013), and whether do they need permission from management to share their 
knowledge through social media groups. 
 
3.3.3 Motivation to Teach and Learn 
IT security professionals in many organisations are fighting alone to tackle identity theft 
(de Crespigny, 2012). They are assumed to have a natural incentive and intrensic 
motivation to learn from each other’s experiences (Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 2011). 
However, official are sometime unwillingly contribute their knowledge in the knowledge 
sharing practice. Some members also find problem in collaborating with others (Wei, 
2010). The challenge involved is how to apply natural incentive if knowledge sharing is 
an invisible activity that cannot be easily monitored (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 
2008). Also incentives and reward systems needed to reinforce behavioural changes 
amongst security professionals (Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013; Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 
2011). Van Wijk, Jansen and Lyles (2008), Vaara et al., (2012), and Wei (2010) found 
that employees negatively react to knowledge sharing process if their knowledge is 
insufficient.   
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A relational view that supports manager to achieve employee motivation is their frequent 
communication (Verčič, Verčič and Sriramesh, 2012). Lopez and Esteves (2013) have 
investigated underlying characteristics of inter-wined network in knowledge acquisition 
process. They have explored internal and external networks and discovered that top 
managers are the champions to enhance knowledge sharing practice. Similarly, Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2012, p. 3) have evaluated human relational theory and found 
that a managers require an understanding of staff’s personal values. The knowledge of 
employees’ values helps managers to explore how their teams can be more effective. 
Thus, may help to overcome problems with knowledge holders’ lack of motivation 
(Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013; Fenz, Parkin and van Moorsel, 2011).  
 
3.4 Inter-organisational Dynamics 
Interactive dynamics such as power relations, trust and risk, structure and mechanisms 
and social ties between firms need to be understood to lead organisations in the inter-
organisational knowledge sharing process (Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). 
These dynamics are the capabilities of a firm that adapts internal and external resource 
configurations and processes by considering shifting needs and market condition in 
pursuit of competitive advantages (Verona and Zollo, 2011). Tece, Pisano and Shuen 
(1997) confirm that dynamic abilities help organisations to integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competencies. 
 
3.4.1 Power Relations  
Power is “a force that influences outcomes” (Hardy, 1994, p. 220). A leading organisation 
benefits from dependency relationships to get work done since they depend on shared 
knowledge (Lotia, 2004). Organisations often find themselves in learning races to gain 
competitive advantage (Barney and Hesterly, 2015, p. 74). However, a ‘win-win’ 
situation is challenged by the shared asymmetrical power (Eaterby-Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang, 2008) and pressure of serving personal interest. A quick learning sub-ordinate may 
become a competitor and may either eliminate cooperation or provide knowledge of lower 
quality (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). Consequently, competent organisations 
fear to lose knowledge of higher quality to partners (Yang and Maxwell, 2011). 
Therefore, mutual trust needs to be reinforced to tackle knowledge asymmetry (Dale Stoel 
and Muhanna, 2012), otherwise organisations may lock-in practices of identity theft 
prevention within their boundaries (Barney and Hesterly, 2015; Gaur et al., 2011). 
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3.4.2 Trust and Risk  
Trust is perception of partner’s behaviour and expectations (Simpson, 2013a; Gaur et al., 
2011). Trust is also a question whether one partner is willing to accept vulnerability from 
other’s actions (Becerra, Lunnan and Huemer, 2008). Trust is an invisible assumption 
(Simpson, 2012, p. 550); it depends on relationships of knowledge provider and the seeker 
(Simpson, 2013a; Gaur et al., 2011; Becerra, Lunnan and Huemer, 2008). Trust between 
firms is the relationship among the people and is built upon exchange of characteristics 
(Gaur et al., 2011, 1754). It is not a ‘free hanging’ element, nor does refer to the nature 
of a single phenomenon (Simpson, 2013a; 2013b). It has no deterministic rule to use. It 
is sustained through relational setting (Six and Sorge, 2008) whereby quality of a person 
of being trusted requires transparency, reliability, consistency and predictability (Becerra, 
Lunnan and Huemer, 2008, p. 692). These elements are sustained through someone’s past 
actions (Simpson, 2011) such as ethical behaviour, non-egocentric nature, professional 
fulfilment and emotional evaluation, (Becerra, Lunnan and Huemer, 2008; Simpson, 
2013b).  
 
Trust literature in inter-organisational relationships covers two aspects. The first, it 
involves peers’ trust to share important knowledge with each other (Becerra, Lunnan and 
Huemer, 2008). The second is whether shared knowledge is trustworthy and valuable 
(Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013). The first question involves knowledge holders’ 
characteristics such as integrity, moral responsibility and relational bonding (Simpson, 
2013a; Becerra, Lunnan and Huemer, 2008; McMyler, 2011; Faulkner, 2014). The 
second question however concentrates on knowledge characteristics than persons’ such 
as knowledge usefulness, value, rarity and non-substitutability (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 
2013; Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008; Pérez‐Nordtvedt et al., 2008).  
 
The dimensions of trust and distrust exist simultaneously due to possibility of risk and 
relational dependency (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008; Becerra, Lunnan and 
Huemer, 2008; Welch, 2006). It is hard to achieve trust in the security profession 
(Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013). It is even more complex in networked relationships 
(Simpson, 2011, p. 29), because “some people use the anonymity of the web to behave 
very badly indeed”. Confidentiality and leakage also compromise cooperation among the 
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organisations (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008; Ahmad, Bosua and Scheepers, 
2014).  
 
Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008, p. 680) suggest that, “Trust facilitates knowledge 
transfer by creating a sense of security that the knowledge in question will not be 
exploited beyond what is initially intended”. These characters help senders of knowledge 
to justify what they know. These characters also help receivers of the knowledge to ensure 
that it will not be used inappropriately. A competing firm often finds easy to influence 
others, because others depend on its knowledge (Gaur et al., 2011). In either situations, it 
requires contractual governance to demonstrate trust in the inter-organisational bonding 
(Gaur et al., 2011, p. 1775). 
 
Trust in offline environment is easy to achieve by observing partners. However, trust is 
hard to achieve in virtual relationships such as LinkedIn groups (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 
2014), as knowledge holders are unable to provide opinion about one another. Discussing 
eBay’s reputation, Simpson (2011) argues that customers’ track record of past 
trustworthiness provides evidence to future trustworthiness. This addresses B2C 
relationship which however is different than B2B relationships. In B2B relationships 
there are fears associated with losing competitive knowledge to the partner (Yang and 
Maxwell, 2011; Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). Virtual groups are able to gain 
reputation they handle their informants’ intention. This is echoed as follows: 
“So long as this group or network also expects trustworthiness of each 
member, and is prepared to sanction the untrustworthy by expulsion or 
other punishment, so the trustee’s interest in maintaining membership 
in good standing in groups provides incentive for trustworthiness” 
(Simpson, 2013b, p. 546) 
Information security groups created on LinkedIn lack members’ participation 
(Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014). An unattractive nature of 
the group is a possible reason (Simpson, 2013b). A member in the group finds no value 
from on-going membership. A reputed network is able to achieve trust easily, because 
“Trusting individual is often rational in virtue of trustworthiness of the groups which they 
are member of” (Simpson, 2013b, p. 549).  
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It is also wise to understand risk associated with membership to gain trust. Becerra, 
Lunnan and Huemer (2008) have found that companies fear when they share explicit 
knowledge. Sharing a document is riskier, because it can be reproduced. A receiver can 
replicate a copy of the document to use against the senders. Similarly, a receiver is 
concerned with the waste of time if knowledge they receive is of lower quality or 
inaccuracy. To overcome issues with leakage the role of confidentiality agreements and 
code of conducts are essential (Ahmad, Bosua and Scheepers, 2014; Luoma, Paasi and 
Valkokari, 2010). However, trust and risks have yet to be explored in the online retail to 
evaluate how knowledge of identity theft practices is shared among security officials.  
3.4.3 Structures and Mechanisms 
Knowledge structure in an organisation is different from the interactive dynamic 
structures between the organisations. The former focuses on content such as 
organisation’s cognitive templates, storage and transactive memory (Ahuja and Novelli, 
2011). The latter however focuses on the context in which knowledge sharing takes place 
(Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). This section focuses on the second.  
 
Structure is known as a context developed within a time and space that facilitates identity 
theft prevention specialists to interact (Nonaka et al., 2014). Easterby-Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang (2008) provide its two examples as strategic alliances whereby significant amount 
knowledge is shared among the organisations and the networks where security officials 
are members. Relationships between organisations are actually the structure among 
identity theft specialists in a dialectic process. Within a particular context an individual 
endowed with the practical power to transform the environment (Nonaka et al., 2014). 
Therefore, requires a particular mechanism to share knowledge (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles 
and Tsang, 2008, p. 680). Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008) suggest few common 
examples of knowledge sharing mechanism as, training members of the recipient firm, 
transferring experienced personnel, planned socialising activity and offering blueprint, 
hardware and document.  
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Specialised knowledge to resolve complicated identity theft cases at work can easily be 
shared using offline interaction (Ghaznavi et al., 2011), because it is not only mixing 
people but also the solutions created (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Marshal and Novic, 1995). Mixing security officials from across different retailer can be 
costly and time consuming. Digital mechanism can overcome this hurdle as explained. 
Kaufman (1966) was the first to initiate the idea of digital communication systems. He 
advised managers in business organisations to think beyond their organisational 
boundaries and developed a data processing system by connecting various actors 
together. These structures are widely known as inter-organisational systems referring to 
an automated information system shared by two or more companies to contribute 
productivity, flexibility and competitiveness (Cash and Konsynski, 1985). Kumar and 
Van Dissel (1996) and Hughes, Golden and Powell (2003) described an inter-
organisational system as a means of developing strategic alliances. These systems provide 
avenues for collaborative knowledge where shared repositories of knowledge are 
centrally shared with the members (Chi and Holsapple, 2005). This enhances learning 
skills through multiple relationships via electronic communication and integration of real-
time interrelated business processes (Strader, Lin and Shaw, 1998).  
 
An inter-organisational system offers quick communication. It extends reach, increases 
quality, decreases the cost and enables tight integration among firms (Walsham, 2001). 
Inter-organisational systems are collaborative models to improve bonding decrease 
behavioural uncertainties and provide collaborative opportunities (Chi and Holsapple, 
2005). Including centralised automated systems, an inter-organisational knowledge 
sharing also uses many other facets of technology such as instant messaging, group 
discussion boards and video chat (Hartley, 2013). These also utilise online virtual 
communities on LinkedIn (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Pinjani and Palvia, 2013). 
Online forums, blogs and social networks are used in the security profession 
(Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; 2014) and facilitate knowledge holders around the globe 
and dictates the context mentioned in the Cyber Ba (Nonaka, Von Krogh and Voelpel, 
2006) 
 
Many organisations have implemented inter-organisational systems (Rajaguru and 
Matanda, 2012). Common examples are university and business research collaboration 
(Kyoung-Joo, 2011), supply chain management collaboration (Knoppen, Christiaanse 
and Huysman, 2010; Shih et al., 2012; Du et al., 2012) and manufacturing (Fang et al., 
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2012). Online retail lacks this aspect from research to evaluate the kinds of mechanism 
used by the security officials in the online retail.  
 
3.4.4 Social Ties 
Since knowledge exploration is associated with tacit knowledge (Nonaka et al., 2014), 
therefore requires informal social ties (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). These 
informal social ties utilise structural and relational characteristics (van Wijk, van den 
Bosch and Volberda, 2011). 
 
3.5 Nature of Knowledge 
There is on-going debate on whether formal and informal interaction supports sharing of 
multiple types of knowledge (Sammarra and Biggiero, 2008). The role of ICT is discussed 
to explore complex elements embedded in the tacit knowledge to overcome time and 
geographic constraint among the peers.  The notion of degree of tacitness is important 
when examining the type of knowledge shared in a specific context (see Section 2.3.1). 
This will lead whether tacit knowledge can be understood when shared using computer 
mediated mechanisms (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008; Junni and Sarala, 2013) 
or requires closer face-to-face collaboration for further clarifications. Tacit knowledge is 
deeply structured in skilful actions, as a result official often find it hard put into words 
that “how they do what they do” (Tsoukas, 2011, p. 455). How do researchers claim that 
tacit knowledge shared through social media can be articulated (Panahi, Watson and 
Partridge, 2015)?  
 
Nonaka et al. (2014) notice that soft experiences such as IT skills commonly found in 
tacit knowledge. The knowledge that security officials hold may be comprised of 
synthesis of tacit and explicit knowledge (Figure 2-3). Tacit knowledge needs both sender 
and the receiver in person for its articulation. Tacit also needs interactive environment, 
sense of collegiality, shared language and intense communication (Nakano, Muniz and 
Batista, 2013). These constructs are commonly found in face-to-face interactions 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The ability of ICT applications that support tacit 
knowledge sharing needs to be explored without adding complexity and ambiguity 
(Tsoukas, 2011; Ribeiro and Collins, 2007; Styhre, 2004). Panahi, Watson and Partridge 
(2015, p. 8) have found that sharing of tacit requires documentation. This implicitly 
suggests that it needs to be converted into explicit (see Section 2.3.2). This supports 
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Nonaka’s conversion model (Figure 2–4) and eventually the spiralling model (Figure 2–
3). Panahi, Watson, and Partridge’s (2015) study focused on a single profession such as 
physicians. They have discovered that to keep updated information physicians subscribe 
medical blogs which post improved insights. Physicians who use knowledge shared at 
social media such twitter feed and RSS feed, are active in their role than others who use 
conventional methods.  
 
Social websites do not bring knowledge holders’ in person to clarify what they do, 
because shared tacit knowledge converted into explicit feeds articulation among the 
professionals. This can be evaluated from Tsoukas (2011, p. 453) “familiar patterns” 
which promote awareness of how their tasks are accomplished. Panahi, Watson, and 
Partridge (2013; 2015) conducted study in the domain specific whereby peers make use 
of familiar patterns in the work. Familiar pattern of knowledge in the security profession 
requires an investigation to explore whether security officials are able to articulate what 
their peers do. Online retail a study that explore these elements in the security profession. 
This aspect requires understanding whether identity theft specialists are able to 
understand knowledge shared by their peers. This study can apply this theory, as only 
security profession is involved than other group of people.  
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter focused on RQ4 to evaluate frameworks by identifying a model useful in the 
security profession in retail sector. Three frameworks in inter-organisational knowledge 
sharing practice were selected and components of the framework discussed to identity 
current themes. In particular, benefits from the knowledge sharing initiatives are 
addressed. Knowledge sharing is of significance in the security profession. However, the 
frameworks evaluated raised many concerns including whether domain specific 
knowledge holders are able to prevent identity theft. These aspects consider security 
officials’ nature of knowledge to evaluate whether retailers are able to understand 
practices used by other peers. This chapter has also pointed out whether online fraud 
forums are able to provide invaluable knowledge that prevents identity theft. Is there any 
benefit from knowledge gained from non-domain retailers that prevents identity theft? 
The frameworks discussed are useful and may be extended to evaluate these questions. 
To explore these issues, this thesis proposes an extension to the framework illustrated in 
Figure 3-3 by synthesising these components into a new framework. The frameworks 
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discussed in this chapter are generic in nature and broadly cover information than 
knowledge sharing. These frameworks can be applied to retail sector for the first time to 
evaluate information security knowledge sharing practice. The components discussed 
need to be empirically examined and synthesised in the workplace. The next chapter 
details out how this study is designed to investigate security professionals and the 
methods employed to collect and analyse data.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This study was conducted by collecting and analysing empirical data based on an 
understanding of the devised framework (Figure 3-3) to interpret the data. This chapter 
discusses how this study was conducted, and what methods were followed which in turn 
reflect on methodological literature. The chapter is set according to the research onion 
model (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2015, p. 124), and unfolds the research process 
by peeling away successive layers (Figure 4-1). 
 
 
Figure 4-1: The research ‘onion’ 
Adapted from Sounders, Lewis and Thornhill (2015). 
 
The chapter begins by discussing the philosophical underpinning of the current research 
by discussing positivist and constructivist approaches applied. This represents the first 
layer in the research onion. An abduction approach is adapted in this thesis and explained 
as the second layer. This study adapts a mono-method qualitative methodology by 
employing multiple case studies as the research strategy. This represents the third layer. 
The design of the case study is also explained followed by data collection methods. This 
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fourth layer considers design of an interview protocol and research ethics. Introduction 
of the research site is also given. The innermost layer explained data analysis procedures. 
Finally, the chapter is then summarised by discussing field visits.  
 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
The philosophical underpinning of the thesis concentrates on both what is researched and 
the researcher’s position. For instance, “whose story is it – the researcher or the 
researched” (Pillow, 2003, p. 176)? This understanding brings a number of benefits, and 
Pillow based the question on Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960). Gadamer is a German 
philosopher, known for his work on hermeneutics ‘Truth and Methods’. According to 
Gadamer, a researcher who belongs to a similar tradition may constitute more evaluative 
knowledge. This thesis, however, in contrast to Gadamer’s view, suggests that an inquirer 
from a different tradition is able to notice differences that an investigator from a similar 
tradition might have taken for granted. A researcher with a similar tradition would 
intrinsically understand more of the situation and would question fewer things.   
 
An understanding which shows the researcher’s position in the study, contributes to an 
exploration of the intellectual investigative rationale and nature of valid and proper 
method (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). The collective beliefs that guide a researcher to 
evaluate valid output are widely known as research philosophy, paradigm, pattern, model 
or frameworks (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012; Crotty, 1998; Kuhn, 1996; 
Silverman, 2013). An understanding of the philosophical underpinning of the thesis 
improves the quality and contributes to the creativity (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and 
Jackson, 2012). It helps in the extension of knowledge based on precision and reality 
(Kuhn, 1996). This understanding also helps to evaluate which research design is suitable 
to understand the nature of the topic, and enables a satisfactory outcome from the research 
process (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012).  
 
To explain the philosophical underpinning of the study and nature of the valid method, 
this thesis refers to the data highlighted in Table 4-1 (Column 3). The data highlighted 
suggests that this study is relativist that incorporates a constructivist approach. This study 
starts with the design of the key research questions (Chapter 1, Section 1.3 and Chapter 
2, Section 2.6) to seek appropriate answers from information security officials working 
in online retail. This study draws from four cases (ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, TeleCo and 
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NetworkingCo). These four organisations help to understand other similar organisations 
such as how they prevent identity theft through sharing learning experiences. 
Convergence of these four cases may help a better understanding of similar phenomena. 
This study also uses qualitative data consisting of words and numbers for triangulation 
and comparison of different cases. In short Table 4-1 (Column 3) reflects that this study 
requires grounded theory. However, unlike grounded theory that focuses on induced data 
only (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2015), this thesis in addition concentrated on 
phenomena discussed in the conceptual models (Chapter 3).  
 
Table 4-1: Methodological implications of different epistemologies  
Ontologies 
Realism 
(1) 
Internal 
Realism 
(2) 
Relativism 
(3) 
Nominalism 
(4) 
       Epistemology 
 
Methodology 
Strong 
Positivism 
 
Positivism Constructionism Strong 
Constructionism  
Aims Discovery Exposure Convergence Inversion 
Starting point Hypothesis Proposition Questions Critique 
Design Experiment Large 
surveys, 
multiple 
cases  
Cases and 
surveys 
Engagement and 
reflexivity 
Data types Numbers and 
facts 
Numbers and 
words 
Words and 
number 
Discourse and 
experiences 
Analysis/ 
interpretation 
Verification/ 
falsification 
Correlation 
and 
regression 
Triangulation 
and comparison 
Sense making and 
understating  
Outcomes Confirmation of 
theories 
Theory 
testing and 
generation 
Theory 
generation 
New insights and 
action 
Adapted from Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2012) 
 
4.2.1 Positivism 
Positivism is a belief that “the researcher should be objective, maintaining complete 
independence from the object of study” (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012, p. 
49). These authors however contradicted this positivist belief. They consider that 
measured knowledge properties require subjectively inferences such as sensations, 
reflection or intuition. These authors do not agree with positivists when an inquiry 
involves social realities. They also assert that positivist thinking can only be applicable 
in a context where a researcher investigates a phenomenon associated with the field of 
natural sciences. An experiment or a practice can be useful in reconstructing knowledge 
based on previous understanding in the natural sciences (Kuhn, 1962). However, a 
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researcher’s independence is hard to sustain in the social sciences. Ringberg and Reihlen 
(2008) support an argument that knowledge of an objective entity cannot be 
comprehended without engaging the cognitive mind. Positivism concentrates on the 
richness of communication channels and absorption capability rather than ability of mind 
and interpretability. This thesis represents an understanding which is socially constructed 
with investigators, and synthesising with previous theories. These activities requires 
mind, intuition and sensation, rather than relying on richness of media. As a result, 
positivist approach is considered as eliminated in this study. 
 
4.2.2 Constructivism  
Constructivists challenge the assumption that meaning can be embedded in texts apart 
from the perceiver (Ringberg and Reihlen, 2008, p. 915). They believe that, the truth is 
underlying in one’s perspective, and each individual constructs meaning differently based 
on his or her intuition (Crotty, 1998). Reihlen and Ringberg (2006) have examined the 
role of computer-mediated knowledge management systems in consultancy firms. They 
have found that people perceive knowledge artefacts differently depending on their 
understanding, interpretation and comprehension abilities. Everyone is different and 
knowledge comprehension of the world depends on individuals’ cognitivists, 
constructivism, and experientialism. Social and contextual models also affect this 
comprehension.  
 
Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2012, p. 23) argue that, “Reality is determined by 
the people rather than objective and external factors”. A knowing mind requires 
interaction with the world to understand reality (Nonaka, 1994; Wilson, 2002). The nature 
of this topic is explorative to understand how individuals in the security profession 
interact with external organisations to make sense of how other people produce solutions 
to prevent identity frauds. Therefore, constructivism is utilised whereby an understanding 
of the phenomena is achieved by continuous dialogue between previous theories (Chapter 
1 to Chapter 3) and continuously interacting with social actors. 
 
Constructivism is related to relativist and nominalist ontologies where there is no clear 
reality (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). Therefore illuminating truths via 
establishing claim supports the reality. There is a wide range of methodologies which can 
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fit in the constructivism paradigm (Table 4-1), and the most notable is the case study as 
addressed in.  
 
The starting point of constructivism paradigm is always the main research question(s) or 
the critique (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). This is similar in the context of 
the present study. This study starts by inquiring into the key research questions based on 
the gap found in previous literature. Methodological implications are associated with 
different epistemologies. Table 4-1 shows that the cases and surveys have a prominent 
link to relativism and constructivism. However, the ability of case studies is to investigate 
the context (Yin, 2009). Therefore, a case study methodology is selected to explore the 
research topic. 
 
4.3 Research Approach 
Abduction approach is used in this thesis. An abduction is one of the three form of the 
logical arguments used in the social science based inquiry. Social scientists use either 
deductive approach or inductive approach to inquire into a phenomenon, or they combine 
advantaged from the two called an abduction. Social scientists either test the theory or 
build a new one (Bryman and Bell, 2015, p. 20). Testing theory is associated with 
deductive reasoning, whereas theory generation is associated with inductive reasoning. 
In a deductive approach, theory guides a researcher, whereas in an inductive approach the 
theory is the outcome of the research process. The problem with deduction is that it relies 
on strict logic to support or reject a hypothesis. This approach eliminates the value of 
welcomed new surprises. However, an induction faces a criticism, whether the amount of 
empirical data is sufficient to develop a new theory. Abduction eliminates disadvantages 
of both approaches, as it considers help from previous theories, and helps to generate the 
new theory. An abductive approach allows thinking rationally whereby an understanding 
is developed through a continuous dialogue between the data and a pre-understanding. A 
pre-understanding supports performing the empirical scrutiny effectively (Yin, 2009). 
The existing theoretical framework helps with data analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
Figure 4-2 shows hoe the process combines both deductive and inductive elements. 
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Figure 4-2: An abductive approach 
Source: Bryman and Bell (2015) 
 
This thesis, following the abductive approach, begins with research a question where 
existing theory is less accounted to provide answers (Bryman and Bell, 2015, p. 27). The 
past literature could not provide sufficient evidences to evaluate what is working in the 
security profession and what does not seem to be providing benefit with respect to 
knowledge to address and mitigate identity theft. There are few studies which focused on 
the extent to which companies are willing to share fraud related knowledge (Flores, 
Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 
2013). It is also explored superficially whether knowledge shared through online forums 
is able to reduce risk of identity theft (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014). Behavioural 
reactions to the knowledge sharing process require further investigation. These 
phenomena are explained in Chapters 2 and 3 with respect to knowledge sharing practice 
in online retail. Therefore, abduction approach is applied to guide better understanding.  
 
4.4 Research Strategy 
Social scientists rely on either quantitative or qualitative methods or they combine them 
to conduct their studies depending on the nature of the topic (Bryman, 2012; Somekh and 
Lewin, 2005; Newman, 2005). The quantitative methods are useful to test the statistical 
model designed using existing theories. Qualitative methods seek to pay attention to 
contextual details wherein more limited but more intense work is carried out (Peng and 
Sutanto, 2012, p. 146). Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012, p. 159) noticed that, 
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“Qualitative research is [a] creative process which aims to understand the sense the 
respondents make of their world”. This is similar to Silverman’s (2005, p. 34) 
recommendation that “if you are concerned with exploring people’s life histories or every 
day behaviour then qualitative methods may be favoured”. An inter-organisational 
knowledge sharing process is deemed evaluative by employing qualitative methods 
(Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). Easterby-
Smith, Lyes and Tsang (2008) reviewed a special issue on Inter-organisational 
Knowledge Transfer in the Journal of Management Studies. They found that a qualitative 
research approach is useful where an inquiry involves investigating knowledge sharing 
processes. Knowledge sharing processes evolve over time with the use of efficient 
communication environment to better exchange knowledge and information among the 
knowledge holders.  
 
Quantitative methods such as surveys are not effective in exploring the richness of 
security officials’ knowledge sharing activities, because it involves behavioural factors 
(Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014). Pérez‐Nordtvedt et al. (2008, p. 738) suggest that, 
“A survey-based approach to measurement cannot fully capture the richness and social 
complexity of knowledge transfer process”. Based on these suggestions, this study 
employs qualitative methods to inquire into the topic. Qualitative techniques are primary 
means of conducting social science research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Gummesson, 
2000), which falls into narrative, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and 
case study (Creswell, 2013). These are explained below. 
 
4.4.1 Narrative Inquiry 
According to Paley and Eva (2005, p. 83-97) narrative inquiry relates to a sequence of 
events to create causal claims. These claims may be true or false and they can be tested. 
A narrative organises various events constituted in a way to elicit a particular effect. Such 
effect can distract attention away from new surprises and make implicit claims about 
causation. A narrative inquiry focuses on how “participants can best be accessed by 
collecting and analysing these as complete stories, rather than collecting them as bits of 
data that flow from specific interview questions” (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2015, 
p. 197). This study seeks to evaluate knowledge sharing processes in the online retail 
business to understand the wider context. Therefore, narratives inquiry may not provide 
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rich explanation of designed research questions, because it mainly focuses on one to two 
storytellers (Paley and Eva, 2005, p. 83-97).  
 
4.4.2 Phenomenology 
Phenomenologists believe that essential truth about reality is grounded in people’s 
experiences that can be uncovered through investigating subjective phenomena (Rolfe, 
2006). This is similar to the thinking of Nåden (2010, p. 80) based on Gadamer’s 
philosophy that “resonance of the meaning goes beyond what is said”. Phenomenology 
focuses to uncover meaning that is hidden in the text (Lewis-Beck, Bryman and Liao, 
2004, p. 454). The focus is placed to understand life from life. The phenomena that this 
study seeks to explore are not completely hidden or forgotten, but remain unexplored.  
 
4.4.3 Grounded Theory 
Initially grounded theory was designed to inquire in the medical field; however, since 
then it spread to other disciplines (Glaser and Strauss, 1968). The purpose of the grounded 
theory method is to produce theory induced from a set of data (Saunders, Thornhill and 
Lewis, 2015). Knowledge sharing is not a new phenomenon; the context in which this 
study takes place is new. Theory generation is not the only aim of this thesis because it 
also aims to synthesise the data collected in association with previous theories.  
 
4.4.4 Ethnography 
An ethnographer focuses on cultural endeavours to portray culture in a realistic and 
enriching fashion in order to convey to the reader the authentic flavour of that culture 
(Basit, 2003). Ethnography is a cultural description that allows researchers to explore how 
individuals structure their world, and it contributes to research using the methods such as 
observation in a real setting. This strategy contributes data that can easily be quantifiable 
via documenting and portraying every day experiences of an individual (Creswell, 2013). 
The inquirer with extensive access to a research site conducts this study. In the current 
research, it is not easy to approach companies on a regular basis to observe the 
phenomena. Although ethnography is a useful approach, it may not provide richness 
about of knowledge sharing behaviours due to accessibility constraints to online retail. 
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4.4.5 Case Study 
A case study is broadly known as “an intensive study of [a] single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). This study 
explores organisations that have parallels to other similar organisations. Yin (2009, p. 18) 
suggests that a case study unfolds two technical aspects. Firstly, contemporary 
phenomena can be investigated in-depth within the real context. They help to explore the 
details of a specific phenomenon since it provides a focus-based approach that supports 
consideration of a situation from many angles (Yin, 2009; Thomas, 2011). For instance, 
it provides a focus on a single instance whether it is a person, a group, a community or a 
profession to understand the wider population where it belongs (Basit, 2003). It supports 
an understanding of the research questions designed based on present time situations 
(Yin, 2009; 2012), thus it may support investigation into whether elements of knowledge 
and knowledge sharing employed by the security professionals in online retail advance 
their learning experience.  
 
Many researchers have employed case study methods in a similar context to explore 
knowledge sharing behaviour with real actors. Peng and Sutanto (2012) believe that case 
study design is useful to investigate contextual details within the knowledge sharing 
process. This allows functional and geographical boundaries. Lopez and Steves (2013) 
conduct their study on acquiring external knowledge sharing by using a case study design. 
A case study is a useful strategy for acquiring knowledge to understand an organisation 
and its working operation (Gummesson, 2000; Hartley, 2004; Stake, 2005). Motivated by 
these similar studies and the methodological implications of other methods such as 
surveys, the case study was deemed useful in this investigation. These assumptions are 
supported by Yin (2009) by explaining the question and its relevance to the case study. 
Yin (2009, p. 9) advocates two possibilities to use a case study when key research 
questions contain the ‘what’ keywords. The first possibility relates to the questions such 
as research question 1 (RQ1), which seeks to answer, “What is working for retail sector 
organisations and what does not seem to be providing benefit with regard to knowledge 
sharing to address and mitigate identity theft?” This question matches Yin’s criteria of 
exploratory investigation with a rationale.  
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Secondly, a type of question with the ‘what’ keyword is mentioned in research question 
(RQ2), which asks, “To what extent companies are willing to share fraud prevention 
knowledge with each other and under what the condition(s)?” This question advocates 
the situation when the line of inquiry addresses “how much”. This is more likely to 
involve surveys. In contrast, the situation comprised of questions such as, research 
question 3 (RQ3) whereby keyword ‘why’ is utilised “Why do some individuals either 
not take part or have less active participation in information security knowledge 
sharing?” This is more explanatory and is leaded by the use of case studies. Research 
question (RQ4) advocates a situation to explore the best knowledge- sharing framework 
in the security profession in online retail that facilitates inter-organisational knowledge 
sharing processes. Most of these investigations involve the use of case studies. 
 
Case studies concentrate on multiple sources of evidences to converge and triangulate 
(Yin, 2009, p. 18). These details are consistent with this line of inquiry (column 3 in Table 
4-1). A multiple case study approach supports understanding of different associated 
elements (Yin, 2009). Multiple cases assist in making a logical chain of evidence (Miles, 
Huberman and Saldana, 2014; Newman, 2005). It helps to “strengthen the precision, 
validity, stability and trustworthiness of the findings” (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 
2014, p. 33). Carefully designed multiple case studies are useful in this line of inquiry 
(Pérez‐Nordtvedt et al., 2008). The choice of multiple cases was also motivated by the 
nature of the topic. Evaluating the inter-organisational knowledge sharing process 
requires a minimum of two companies (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). 
Therefore, the multiple case study design is favoured to study inter-organisational 
knowledge sharing processes surrounding identity theft prevention and is explained as 
follows.  
 
4.5 Case Study Design and Data Collection 
The design of the cases was based on the following criteria: 
 Access to at least 3-4 online retailers, each with 10-12 interviews and internal 
documents 
 Companies should be UK based 
 The companies should be medium to large organisations working with 
information systems under their control 
 Be willing to participate by providing face-to-face interaction 
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Case study based research can bring many challenges including if the sample is large, the 
cases can be studied less intensively (Gerring, 2004), whereas if the sample is too small 
can make justification hard (Siggelkow, 2007). A balanced sample supports efficient 
illustration and motivation to more refined conceptualisation (Siggelkow, 2007). It also 
inspires an inductive theory. Therefore, this study designed on sample of four companies 
(anonymised as ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, TeleCo and NetworkingCo). Thirty 
participants interviewed and explored 11 internal documents. These four companies 
provided useful insights for efficient evaluation. The design of the cases in this study 
reflects the procedures identified by Yin (2009, p. 27). Similar to Yin’s criteria, secondary 
sources such as academic literature and published reports were synthesised to identify 
research gap. As a result of this evaluation, key research questions were designed 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.3). Further elements of design are explained below. 
 
4.5.1 Research Site 
The following criteria were designed to select respondents for this study. Firstly, 
participants must be working in the online retail sector. Secondly, they must be based in 
the UK. The UK is chosen to conduct the study for two main reasons. First, it is rich in 
providing online shopping, since the UK is the Europe’s leading online shopping 
economy (Khan, 2015). The second is that these companies were approachable because 
the researchers were based in the UK. Because the UK is fourth most prone country to 
identity theft (Trustwave, 2013, p. 9), officials working in these organisations deemed 
more engaged in day-to-day fraud prevention activities. Security officials seem 
knowledgeable to respond research questions adequately. This criterion is similar to 
purposive sampling followed by Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014) and Newman 
(2005) that qualitative samples tend to be purposive if an inquirer selects research site 
that best suits the nature of the topic. Purposive is a judgemental approach that help 
researcher to select field that fits the research inquiry (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 
2015, p. 284). This technique also supports researcher to seek out from the participants’ 
deliberately and is helpful if the nature of the sample is not clear (Lewis-Beck, Bryman 
and Liao, 2004, p. 884). 
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However, convincing participants was a major challenge due to involved organisational 
complex issues, managerial concerns and political matters. To overcome these 
challenges, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2012, p. 3) have advised to consult 
senior management before approaching the operational staff (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Jackson, 2012, p. 3), because they have power to allow enquirer’s access to the company 
and its officials. Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2015, p. 378) also agree that the person 
in-charge in the organisation is more likely to involve if “the interview topic is seen more 
to be interesting and relevant to their current work”. Based on these suggestions, 
invitation letters were dispatched to the companies that introduced nature of the topic, 
problem of identity theft within online retail and outweigh benefit to the management 
from their participation (Appendix 1).   
 
An initial entry was gained through academic discussion. ShoppingCo was accessed with 
the help of university-industry research collaboration. Marshal and Rossman (1995) and 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011) have advised to learn from an opportunity. Snowballing 
facilitates access to informants through contact information given by already recruited 
participants (Noy, 2008, p. 330). This allows identification by participants already 
enrolled of other members of the same or different groups (Lewis-Beck, Bryman and 
Liao, 2004, p. 884). Snowballing is useful to generate inductive theory (Miles, Huberman 
and Saldana, 2014). Initial entry was used to access more participants from ShoppingCo. 
Snowballing was also used to access other companies. Participants from ShoppingCo and 
TeleCo referred their colleagues. Thus, eighteen participants in ShoppingCo and seven in 
TeleCo were accessed using snowballing. ShoppingCo2 and PublishingCo mentioned in 
Figure 4-6 were also accessed by the recruited peer organisations. However, since only 
one interview was possible from these two companies, therefore, these were considered 
as mini cases and were discarded. 
 
To access more participants, LinkedIn professional networking site was used to search 
relevant audience (Figure 4-3). An advanced search criterion was applied to find the 
companies and the industry in which informants work. The well-known online retail 
organisations were invited via an email attachment. Over 300 participants were 
approached but only five participants from PaymentCo and NetworkingCo 2 agreed due 
to the sensitivity of the topic. 
 
 Chapter 4: Methods  89 
The special focus was given to fraud, risk, IT-security and compliance officials due to 
their knowledge and expertise in the information security. LinkedIn groups such as Fraud 
Prevention Network, Anti-Fraud experts, Information Security Community, and UK Loss 
Prevention were joined to access relevant participants. This technique reflects Flores, 
Antonsen and Ekstedt (2014, p. 93) advised that:  
“In information security contexts, generation of knowledge can be 
manifested through information security specialists being hired to 
perform activities that increase information security knowledge, or 
having dedicated units within the organization that are responsible for 
those activities.” 
 
 
Figure 4-3: LinkedIn search for relevant participants 
 
A key aspect of site selection is convenience, i.e. “easy access to the research site” 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1995, p. 51) both geographically and immediately (Miles, 
Huberman and Saldana, 2014). Therefore, companies based in the Northwest of England 
were selected. Out of 32, only five participants were based in the Southeast and the rest 
were from the Northwest.  
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4.5.2 Unit of Analysis  
This study considered online retail as the unit whereby special focus was given to the 
teams engaged in information security. Yin (2009) suggests that evaluation of previous 
theories, units of analysis and the data collection protocols guide empirical data collection 
efficiently. Figure 4-4 shows the units of analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Units of analysis 
(Adapted from Yin, 2009) 
 
Figure 4-4 reflects the situation associated with organisational and individual 
characteristics. Organisational characteristics such as fraud prevention tools and 
techniques, security operations, efficient communication and frequent collaboration can 
examine what is working in the organisation. This aspect reflects bottom-left box (Figure 
4-4) which evaluates how organisation works. Individual responses were required to 
evaluate motivation, incentives, abilities, trust and willingness to share their learning 
experiences. The individuals’ response reflected in top-left box which evaluates 
behaviour, attitude and perception. This criterion was also followed previously (Miles, 
Huberman and Saldana, 2014) whereby researchers explored imprisoned suspects and 
their booking arrangements. They interviewed all people involved such as police, 
suspects and attorneys. They also observed phenomena in person and collected relevant 
documents.  
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Similarly, knowledge sharing practice requires multiple units of analysis whereby each 
organisation is analysed to consider individual and organisational outcomes. In doing so, 
exploring organisational information security policies and practices to prevent identity 
theft and asking whether company resources and capabilities were effective in exploring 
external knowledge. Therefore, considered both, the identity fraud practices and 
organisational abilities to explore external knowledge. The other aspect such as how their 
members of staff involved in this profession react to the knowledge sharing process 
required a direct mode of communication with the staff. Both aspects were considered in 
the design: information security department (their abilities and recourses, policies and 
practices) and the individuals’ behaviours, attitudes, perceptions, trusts, and fears of the 
knowledge sharing process. An individual aspect considered opinions from real actors. 
This helped to address RQ2 and RQ3 whereby individual behaviours, perceptions, and 
attitudes were required. The members closely related RQ1 and RQ4 to organisational 
abilities aiming to gain an external knowledge and its utilisation.  
 
4.5.3 Interview Design 
Interviews are valuable sources when an inquirer seeks experiences of participants 
(Kumar, 1999). It is purposeful interaction with participants and the purpose is to gather 
valid and reliable data that answers the research questions adequately (Saunders, 
Thornhill and Lewis, 2015). Three interview designs are available: unstructured, semi-
structured and structured (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2015, p. 374), and this study 
adopted a semi-structured design. Semi-structured interviews bring a number of benefits 
based on the topic. Firstly, the topic considers a specific research area rather than a general 
discussion, which requires unstructured discussion, whereby a talk may have no specified 
boundaries (Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012, p. 136). Secondly, the research 
area is relatively new; therefore, it requires an in-depth investigation. A structured 
interviews design is fixed whereby pre-coded questions and answers are followed that 
limits exploration (Ryan, Coughlan and Cronin, 2009). This study is explorative and 
requires discussion with security professionals and involves participants’ opinions based 
on their learning experiences. The semi-structured interview design considers a pre-
defined set of questions with a motivation to omit existing questions or ask new ones 
depending on responses (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2015). Semi-structured 
interviews are helpful in an inquiry where either the context is unclear or confidential 
(Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). Both of these elements are consistent with 
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the present study. Firstly, there is limited empirical literature on the information security 
knowledge sharing research in the security profession. Secondly, identity theft is a 
sensitive topic involving discussion of business operational information consisting of 
customers’ details, financial transactions and organisational abilities related to 
prevention. Therefore, a semi-structured protocol is designed as explained in Appendix 
2. 
 
In terms of practicality, the following procedure was employed. Figure 4-5 shows one-
to-one and one-to-many interview techniques. Each has its own pros and cons. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Forms of interview design 
(Adapted from Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2012, p. 375) 
 
Group interviews technique such as focus groups is useful in saving time and the cost of 
traveling. This technique was utilised in the similar studies (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 
2014; Elyas et al., 2015). However, a major disadvantage of group interviews is that 
finding real facts based on accurate information relevant to experiences and attitudes in 
the presence of number of participants could be distracting. Ryan, Coughlan and Cronin 
(2009, p. 309) state that this may not facilitate the exploration of participants’ perceptions, 
understandings and experiences. Knowledge sharing is a behavioural concept and a 
personal opinion was required from the participants depending on trust, relationships and 
value gained from the knowledge. In the group interviews, the participants may seem 
reluctant to share their personal opinion in front of others. This study chose to explore the 
online retail industry. Bringing participants from the security profession under the same 
roof in this industry was difficult. Therefore, one-to-one interviews were conducted.  
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Figure 4-5 shows three choices to conduct one-to-one interviews. This study chose face-
to-face interviews. The face-to-face provides an environment to observe participant 
through body language, facial expressions and eye contact. This enhances interpretability 
of a person’s response (Ryan, Coughlan and Cronin, 2009). 
 
Interview Protocol 
The design of the interview protocol was based on the research aims and objectives on 
key research questions. Previous theories guided the design of the research instrument, 
and protocol was mapped onto the research objectives (OBJ1-OBJ5) and the key research 
questions (RQ1-RQ4) are explained in detail in Appendix 2. 
 
The interview protocol began by asking demographic questions and the purpose was to 
initiate a comfortable environment for more fluid interaction (Block #1). These questions 
are simple one in which the participant’s role and responsibilities were addressed. The 
interviews were started with simple questions that were useful to build interviewee trust 
for the forthcoming set of complex questions (Ryan, Coughlan and Cronin, 2009). 
Interviewee and interviewer need to be comfortable (Rubin and Rubin, 2011). To 
facilitate the environment, simple questions were designed on Wilhelm’s (2004, p. 9) 
seven stages of the fraud management life cycle. This technique helped to explore each 
participant’s roles and responsibilities. Questions from Block #1 were explicitly designed 
to achieve OBJ1 and explored various fraud prevention measures. These questions also 
contributed to OBJ4 and OBJ5 where an element of the conceptual framework associated 
with the participants’ nature of knowledge is discussed (Chapter 3, Section 3.5).  
 
Block #2 to Block #6 was specifically designed to address OBJ4 and OBJ5 through the 
exploration of inter-organisational knowledge sharing practice and a synthesis of 
frameworks. However, each set of interview questions addressed different key research 
questions (RQ1- RQ4). For instance, from Block #2, QNo.5 addressed RQ2 which seeks 
to find the extent to which partnership works between the organisations and the conditions 
that support partnership collaboration. From the same block QNo.6 contributed to RQ1 
that seeks to address what is working for retailers from subscriptions to established fraud 
forums. Similarly, QNo.7 concentrated on RQ3 which evaluates officials’ motivation (or 
lack thereof) to contribute to participate in virtual communities. A construct associated 
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with members’ behaviours concerning performance limitation hurdles knowledge sharing 
and the collaborations were assembled in (Block #4, QNo.14). 
 
Block #6 was designed with extra questions that addressed managerial actions such as 
QNo.1, which was based on Australian and Korean empirical studies, which found that 
senior managers consider their roles technical, mainly focusing on the maintenance and 
availability of technology (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014, p. 366). Similarly, Barringer 
and Harrison (2000, p. 380) explored whether management considers more ‘skills 
development’ and the knowledge transfer process rather than considering cost benefit 
analysis (QNo.3). Managers select their knowledge collaborator (QNo.4). They consider 
the risk of sharing explicit knowledge such as blueprints or documents (2012; Easterby‐
Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2008).  
 
4.5.4 Pilot Study 
A pilot study is a useful approach of assessing the quality of an interview protocol 
(Chenail, 2011). Yin (2009, p. 92) also agrees that it helps in refining data collection plans 
based on: “both the content of the data and the procedure to be followed”. Therefore, 
pilot study was conducted before visiting companies to assess the content of the interview 
guide, to assess relevance of questions, to ensure the use of simplified language and other 
practical aspects (such as duration, recording, transcribing). The pilot was divided into 
two phases. The first phase included distributing a printed schedule among the four senior 
research colleagues for consultation and followed by discussion. The comments received 
were implemented in the interview guide. In the second phase, four face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with four colleagues. During two pilot interviews conducted 
face-to-face, it was observed that some components needed more depth. As a result, more 
literature was reviewed to refine research questions and then two more pilot interviews 
were conducted. The transcript of the first interview was produced and discussed to refine 
further interview guide for better language and style.  
 
4.5.5 Research Ethics  
Moral and ethical considerations are pre-requisites in a study which involves human 
conduct: i.e. “First do no harm” (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014, p. 56). This applies 
to both the researcher and the researched. The former requires security measures such as 
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familiarity with research site and the people recruited. The latter applies to anonymity, 
confidentiality and security of the participants’ rights. This study followed ethics 
guidelines produced by the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences ethics committee at the 
University of Central Lancashire. The ethical approval was obtained before conducting 
field visits.  
 
Gaining trust with participants is essential in a study based on empirical investigation 
such as interviews. It is also advised to consider participants anonymity than the quality 
of the knowledge produced. However, the truth of unintentional disclosing of participants 
rights to gain that quality was all that counts (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014, p. 56). 
Failing to gain the trust can cause exaggerated or fake information from the participants 
(Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012, p. 157). An informed consent section 
detailing how participants’ personal information and company name will be reported in 
formulating the findings was considered in an invitation letter (see Appendix I). 
Confidentiality agreements were also signed with ShoppingCo. Participants from other 
organisations were informed on how data will be collected, saved and used (Miles, 
Huberman and Saldana, 2014, p. 63). The purpose was to gain trust with associated 
participants by informing them how the results will be disseminated and what would be 
the benefit for them from their participation.  
 
Protection of participants’ right is a fundamental aspect associated with the interview-
based research (Ryan, Coughlan and Cronin, 2009). To consider participants’ 
confidentiality pseudonyms were assigned to each participant and associated company. 
This is similar to internal documents explored from companies during the field visit. 
Table 4-3 and 4-4 consider confidentiality and anonymity. However, Miles, Huberman 
and Saldana (2014, p. 56) raise the question that “What good is anonymity if people and 
their colleagues can easily recognise themselves?” Therefore, interpretation and 
conclusion checks were performed.   
 
The interviews were recorded in audiotape format. Participants were provided with an 
opportunity to pause audiotape wherever the interview required any sensitive discussion. 
Participants were also informed about their right of withdrawal from participation if they 
feel uncomfortable with the data provided. Audiotapes were transcribed and coded using 
Nvivo software by manual typing.  
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Transcription interview tapes was time consuming but useful to data analysis. The 
interviews were transcribed to evaluate what was said by whom and under which tone of 
voice (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2015). Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2015) 
discussed four approaches commonly used to transcribe audio-recorded interviews. The 
first is to pay a touch typist. Paying a touch typist could be expensive and prone to breach 
of the confidentiality agreement signed with the companies. The second is the use of voice 
recognition software that converts a voice into text. It is prone to noise problem due to 
different dialects, pitches and non-vocal. The third approach is based on the suggestion 
to use data sampling whereby only the part of the speech that is deemed useful is 
transcribed. It is difficult to decide what part could be useful for analysis. This study 
considered a start-play-stop-play mechanism. This process is time consuming, however, 
it is useful in providing a rich understanding of the data collected and facilitated an early 
understanding of the themes generated. The transcriptions were cleansed and reviewed to 
reduce errors. The non-verbal clues from the interviews such as laughs and pauses by 
participants were also transcribed.  
 
4.6 Data Analysis Procedures 
Yin (2009) suggests that units of analysis need to be same as the study question(s). This 
facilitates a comparison and contrast with previous theories and literature. Transcript 
summaries (coding and interpretation), reflective diaries and self-memos support data 
analysis (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2015). In soft-copy transcript Word documents, 
new comment technique was used to assign code and interpretation to a chunk of data. 
This is similar to transcript summary whereby data was first condensed and long 
statements were briefed (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2015, p. 576). A snapshot of this 
process is provided in Appendix 4.  
 
4.6.1 Qualitative Coding 
The coding criteria used in this study reflect Saldana’s (2009). This study aimed to 
evaluate inter-organisational knowledge sharing practice in the online retail sector 
surrounding identity theft. The interviews were conducted to explore data surrounding 
knowledge sharing framework from Chapter 3 and security measures from Table 2-3. The 
purpose was to synthesise components of the framework in the security profession. This 
study aimed to propose an extended framework in the security profession. Therefore, 
themes were drawn from theoretical framework. However, this study does not limit to 
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already identified themes. New themes have also been identified from the interview data, 
which in turn support induced theory (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014). These 
themes were based on repetitive patterns coming from the data such as covert security 
operations and police-retailer relationship. The data has been categorised to facilitate 
analysis (Appendix 3).  
 
Each transcript was read and re-read, and then coded with interpretation (Saunders, 
Thornhill and Lewis, 2015). This technique was applied to both printed transcripts as well 
as soft-copy Word documents. In Word documents, ‘insert new comment’ technique was 
used as self-memos practice. The assigned codes were drawn based on both, theories and 
data driven. Theory-driven codes were generated from themes discussed in the literature 
(Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Themes identified (Table 2-3) were used as deduced code 
from literature. This is particularly related to the first research objective (OBJ1) which 
aimed to explore identity theft prevention measures. Similarly, to address research 
objectives (OBJ4 and OBJ5) themes identified in Chapter 3 is considered which is based 
on conceptual framework. Data driven codes are provided in Appendix (3) with a 
hierarchy of coding manual. It also shows pre-identified codes.  
 
4.6.2 Criteria of Interpreting Empirical Data 
Nvivo 10 software package is useful for analysing qualitative data. It provides automated 
coding techniques. However, unlike statistical analyses these outputs cannot be used as 
final conclusion. It need further description. Yin (2009) describes that a minimum 
condition of case study based research is dependent on verbatim records. An evaluative 
explanation of a case is underpinned to response research questions. These analysis 
requires human analytics such as, “thinking and listening to how texts speak” (Smythe et 
al., 2008, p. 1389).  
 
The Nvivo software package however facilitates pattern-matching with the frequency of 
the codes repeated. Two rounds were used to analyse the codes. The first is self-analytic 
strategy utilised through matrices, tabulation, flow chart, and graphics (Miles, Huberman 
and Saldana, 2014). Figure 5-1, Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 are evidences of this analysis. 
The second round took place based on a discussion to explore why a particular pattern 
occurs frequently. This process assisted comparison with previous literature and post 
analysis thinking. 
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4.6.3 Logical Linking Criteria 
Yin (2009) has discussed two main logical models: (1) individual - traces behaviour 
taking place in an individual’s mind in the organisation, and (2) organisational - traces 
events taking places in an individual organisation. Both, individual behaviour, and 
organisational events are considered in this research cases. Each case firstly explains the 
identity theft prevention process that basically concentrates on security operations, 
measures, events and involved stakeholders. Secondly, it explains a knowledge sharing 
organisation as a whole and the experience of an individual within it.  
 
4.7 Summary of the Field Visits 
Participants were selected at various management levels ranging from top to middle 
management and then individuals performing security-related activities. This criterion 
allowed assessment of the power and powerlessness of the participants at various 
management levels associated with knowledge sharing decisions. Respondents were also 
selected based on their activities. The focus was placed on information technology 
personnel and on other relevant staff such as, those involved in risk, compliance, and 
fraud prevention teams. The background of some participants belongs to core technical 
areas such as IT security professionals, while others were field-based investigators. Some 
of these participants were engaged in the security professionals’ skills development 
programs to ensure security awareness culture inside organisations (i.e. eLearning 
programs and in-house awareness programmes). Some members from networking forums 
were also interviewed because they are engaged more than these companies in providing 
the networking facilities and the fraud prevention knowledge base to control identity 
theft. Although these networking companies are not online businesses, however these 
organise meetings for online fraud departments from retail sector organisations and these 
are in a position to see the dynamics of the online interaction. Data was collected from 
four companies and the methods of data collection are summarised below (Table 4-2). 
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Table 4-2: Case study companies’ size 
Company Staff Methods Enterprise 
ShoppingCo  Over 4000 Interviews, informal discussion, 
field notes, internal documents, 
observations 
Large  
PaymentCo Over 1000 Interviews, formal discussion, field 
notes, internal documents, 
observations 
Large 
TeleCo Over 100 Interviews, informal discussion, 
field notes, observations 
Small to medium 
NetworkingCo Over 40 Interviews, internal documents, 
observations 
Medium – based 
on the purpose 
 
 
Table 4-3: Company and participants’ codes 
Company Code Serial Participants’ Code Participants’ job Role  
ShoppingCo 1 “Jon” Senior manager 
2 “Bram” Senior manager  
3 “Celia” Auditor 
4 “Sam” Senior manager  
5 “Greg” Senior manager  
6 “Freddy” Senior manager 
7 “Adie” Analyst 
8 “Lyn” Analyst 
9 “Ronny” Analyst 
10 “Pat” IT Security Specialist 
11 “Mandy” Middle manager 
12 “Fran” Identity theft Adviser 
13 “Drew” Identity theft Adviser 
14 “Bella” Identity theft Adviser 
15 “Debra” Senior manager 
16 “Carl” Head of Physical Security 
17 “Opt1” Technical 
surveillance counter 
measures  
Explained by Technical Security 
Manager 
18 “Opt2” Operation 
Managed Delivery 
Briefed by a groups that performs 
security operations  
PaymentCo 19 “Jackson” Senior fraud and risk specialist 
20 “Pon” Manager compliance 
21 “Fredrick” Director card services 
NetworkingCo 22 “Sophie” Financial Crime and Intelligence, 
Deputy Head  
23 “Ben” Financial Crime Intelligence 
Manager 
TeleCo 24 “Gizmo” Data Manager 
25 “Happy” Head of IT 
26 “Jessie” Business Recruitment Director  
27 “Mac” Head of Quality and Compliance  
28 “Nickel” IT Support 
29 “Oliver” Outbound Agent  
30 “Preston” Training and Compliance 
Manager 
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Figure 4-6: Data collection timeline and field visits  
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Figure 4-6 illustrates field visits by identifying the timeline, the participants, and their 
roles. The first investigated company was ShoppingCo. Field visits within this company 
consisted of 16 face-to-face interviews and 2 practical briefings covering how security 
operations are performed. The data from this company was collected from May to July 
2014. The field visit began by interviewing the intelligence department whereby three 
security operation managers and a head of intelligence were interviewed. It also collected 
data from a member of compliance team, one training manager, and three operations 
support analysts. One participant from IT-Security was interviewed same day as 
operations support analysts. Five participants from the fraud department, two middle 
managers and three identity theft advisers were also interviewed. A head of physical 
security was interviewed as well. ShoppingCo briefed two security operations: first was 
led by a technical security operation manager (Opt1), whereby it was discussed how latest 
technology prevents identity theft. The field study was concluded with a second security 
operation (Opt2) briefed by a group that performs covert security operations.  
 
ShoppingCo2 was then investigated and ended up with only one interview with the head 
of security in July 2014. The company was approached with the help of ShoppingCo by 
using a snowballing approach. Initially they agreed to provide access to at least 10 
informants. However, they changed their mind for several reasons. Firstly, from 
University of Central Lancashire three researchers approached the company at same time. 
Because in the retail industry time is precious, therefore, they were unable to decide which 
investigator should be given an access. Secondly, they were concerned about the 
sensitivity of the research topic which involves company’s performance and sensitive 
data such as, customers’ information. Direct invitation was also sent to others at least 
more than other 20 informants with a number of reminders. Nevertheless, it appeared to 
be with no fruition.  
 
PaymentCo was visited next from February to April 2015, three interviews were 
conducted, and internal documents explored. The first interview was conducted with a 
senior fraud and risk specialist. This was followed by a compliance manager and finished 
up with a director of card services. Similar to ShoppingCo2, at least more than 20 
participants were invited and reminded for an interview. Snowball was also applied, with 
no fruition though. 
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Next, NetworkingCo was investigated with two officials on the same day in May 2015. 
The first participant recruited was the deputy head of financial crime and the second was 
financial crime intelligence manager. The nature of the company was elaborated 
sufficiently with two participants as they provided rich information on how networking 
facility was used by the retailers to reduce identity theft risk.  
 
There was one interview with PublishingCo with the director conducted in July 2015. 
The company was small. They were also failed to show knowledge intense activities such 
storage and retrieval, or gaining knowledge from other peers. Even though they were 
online, they had no fraud related staff. As a result, it was discarded from further 
investigation.  
 
The data collection process ended with TeleCo with seven officials at different levels 
from July to August 2015.  In Figure 4-6 above, the participants from ShoppingCo2 and 
PublishingCo were also discarded due to very limited access.  
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Documents collected in field are summarised and coded (pseudonyms) as follows.  
Internal Document Codes 
 
Table 4-4: Internal documents codes 
Company Serial Code Document type 
ShoppingCo 1 (ShoppingCo.Doc1. 2014) Word document (prepared for talk to 
explain ShoppingCo.PPT1): Covert 
Security Operation – a one way forward 
combating retail crime, presented at 
Retail Fraud Conference, 2014.  
2 (ShoppingCo.Doc2. 2014) “Greg’s” think piece, presented at 
British Retail Consortium Conference 
3 (ShoppingCo.Doc3. 2014) Word documents (prepared for talk to 
explain ShoppingCo.PPT2): Fraud 
Prevention Strategy and involved teams 
responsibilities. A talk presented at 
London Crime Scott, emailed to Author 
4 (ShoppingCo.Doc4. 2014) Covert Operations – the Retail Process 
5 (ShoppingCo.Figure1. 
2014) 
Group Security Structure 
6 (ShoppingCo.PPT1. 2014) PowerPoint presentation explains 
covert security operation – a one way 
forward combating retail crime, 
presented at Retail Fraud Conference 
2014  
7 (ShoppingCo.PPT2. 2014) PowerPoint presentation explains 
security operation and teams, presented 
at London Crime Scott 
PaymentCo 8 (PaymentCo.Doc1. 2014) Retrieval Request Report – UK policy, 
a document based on knowledge learnt 
from Merchant Risk Council, 2014  
9 (PaymentCo.Doc2. 2014) UK risk monitoring Task list, weekly 
work schedule 
Networking
Co 
10 (NetworkingCo.Doc1. 
2014) 
Interactive Datum Newsletter. An 
internal newsletter shared with 
members only. 
11 (NetworkingCo.Doc2. 
2015) 
Confidential Datum Newsletter. An 
internal newsletter shared with 
members only. 
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CHAPTER 5 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter reports the results obtained from ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, TeleCo and 
NetworkingCo. It is divided into four major sections. Each reports findings from one of 
the respondent organisations. It begins by presenting findings from ShoppingCo. 
PaymentCo is then reported. ShoppingCo and PaymentCo due to dealing identity details 
were found more prone to identity theft and related frauds. Therefore, these companies 
are reported in depth. These businesses had dedicated risk assessment and fraud 
prevention departments to help address and mitigate identity frauds. TeleCo is a small 
organisation works for other businesses and holds customers’ data. Finally, 
NetworkingCo is explained as either to support or reject insights from the other three 
cases by discussing the extent to which online forums are useful to help address and 
mitigate identity theft. The criteria of analysing results are centred on the research 
objectives and key research questions. The chapter reports identity theft prevention, and 
then evaluates knowledge sharing practice in each organisation. Elaborating the major 
findings concludes this chapter. 
 
5.2 ShoppingCo 
ShoppingCo is a multi-brand online retailer listed in the top 50 UK retailers by sales 
during 2014/2015 financial years. The company employs between 4,000 and 5,000 staff 
with 80% of its consumers buy products online. It provides consumers with a credit based 
on ‘buy now and pay latter’ schemes. Consequently, they are highly susceptible to high 
loss due to identity theft. As a result, it employs identity theft prevention and other risk 
assessment related staffs to take proactive preventative measures.  
 
5.2.1 Identity Theft Prevention Practice 
In the ShoppingCo, fraud prevention process is central surrounded by four supporting 
elements to help prevent identity theft. Figure 5-1 shows three major internal (top 
management, IS teams and fraud prevention) and two external (mobility and external 
investigative support) sources engaged in the fraud prevention process. Fraud prevention 
is located at the centre of the organisation connected by top management and internal 
information security departments. This department also gains support from two 
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outsourcing companies that provide security programs such as anti-phishing and web 
solutions. This department jointly perform security operations with the police and courier 
companies. This process is illustrated in Figure 5-1. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: ShoppingCo identity theft prevention components 
 
 
Fraud Prevention Process 
Figure 5-1 shows two major teams engaged in the centre of the fraud prevention known 
as Fraud and Intelligence. The former deals with customers and fraudsters on the phone 
and the latter finds root causes of committed fraudulent cases to produce legal evidence 
for prosecution.  
 
Fraud: ShoppingCo identifies suspects using two components. Firstly, customer 
profiling is implemented using tactics such as flags and alerts. Secondly, a victim informs 
the company on a phone call. The Fraud team handles these complain from potential 
victims. This team is consisted of fraud prevention experts and identity theft advisers. 
The former deals with customer profiling history and the latter deals with complains 
coming from victims of compromised identities. Customers profiling techniques are 
summarised in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1: Customer profiling 
Operation Purpose 
Device recognition 
 
“Cookies” are stored on buyer’s system to identify who are they, 
which device do they use to prevent loss from same person (the 
details of this tactic can be found on: 
https://www.gov.uk/help/cookies) 
Password protection Answering security questions such as mother’s maiden name, 
child hood school and street where they played first helps to 
prevent account hijack. 
Customer spending 
history 
Data mining tactics are implemented to determine how much 
customers spend normally, how regularly do they spend and their 
methods of payment. 
Identifying limit on the 
first order 
ShoppingCo limits expenditure on first order of its new registered 
customer to avoid a considerable loss.  
 
Customers’ profiling history (Table 5-1) is a proactive process to prevent identity frauds. 
This involves checking whether the parcel is going to an alternate delivery address. This 
system looks at whether the item ordered is expensive, or if it is linked to a suspicious 
area such as the London metropolitan region where most crime originate. ShoppingCo 
revealed that over 60% of fraudulent cases occurred in London. Therefore, they carefully 
evaluate address, telephone number and email and match with previous fraudulent cases. 
In doing so, a device recognition system helps to identify a fraudster if he or she used 
same device to place an order previously. NetworkingCo also comments on the benefit 
of using device recognition (Section, 5.3.1). A fraudulent database of compromised 
identities is checked with their IP addresses. To secure a customer from compromising 
identities, they implement security questions. The company also limits the first order on 
newly registered accounts to prevent losing more than a minimum amount.  
 
Customer spending history (Table 5-1) is consistent with “intrinsic features extraction” 
whereby companies evaluate the spending patterns of customers to detect any fraudulent 
act (Van Vlasselaer et al., 2015, p. 41). Van Vlasselaer et al. (2015) have discussed useful 
components to evaluate customer profiling such as checking frequency of transactions, 
the amounts normally spend the customer, and time spent since the last transaction. 
However, these authors focus on a wider context. They covered companies that offer 
global online shopping. Therefore, many features are inconsistent with ShoppingCo’s 
event occurrence system. ShoppingCo sells products within the UK only. Checking 
currency, regions and country is not relevant. Customers profiling techniques are also 
used and discussed by PaymentCo (Section 5.3.1). Van Vlasselaer et al., (2015) deduced 
from companies similar to PaymentCo discussed in the following section. 
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ShoppingCo’s reactive process starts when customer telephones to report that he or she 
has received a letter from the company about unknown online purchases. As evidence, 
ShoppingCo obtains signed document from them called “deny all knowledge”. The 
purpose is to confirm whether the case belongs to first party frauds, whereby a customer 
deceives the company by using their own details and after receiving the item, they deny 
all knowledge. As a result, ShoppingCo either removes fraudulently registered accounts 
or modifies the details of existing genuine customer. In either situations, they report the 
case to the database of compromised identities to keep other companies informed from 
being victimised by the same person. Fraud prevention team forwards ‘referral’ 
consisting of information such as a name, delivery or IP address to the intelligence team 
for further investigation. 
 
Intelligence department: The Intelligence team consists of dedicated analysts known as 
Operations Support and field-based investigators to perform Security Operations (Figure 
5-1). These teams produce legal evidences to present to the court either to recover the 
assets lost or charge a penalty. Output from this team is a “package” that consists IP 
address, credit history checks, addresses, and other associated information that identify a 
suspect. To produce this package, they use 192.com to collect address information and 
Equifax to check a customers’ credit history. The package is then forwarded to Security 
Operations to perform covert security operation jointly with the police to arrest suspects. 
Security Operations is a field based team consists of retired police officers. They are able 
to gain police involvement. They provide statement of facts, computer screen Google 
maps, printouts, call recordings and view of delivery address as supportive evidences to 
the police (ShoppingCo.Doc4. 2014). These details are submitted in the form illustrated 
in Figure 5-3 to gain help from law enforcement.  
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Figure 5-2: Managed Delivery Contact Sheet 
(Source: ShoppingCo.PPT2, 2014) 
 
 
External Investigative Support 
Ahmad, Maynard and Park (2014, p. 359) discovered that “In the west, civilian 
organisations can only apply security strategies at a defensive capacity”. Therefore, they 
need to use police to take legal actions against the fraudsters. Members from ShoppingCo 
supported this view as follows: 
“The retailer must NOT, in any circumstances, insert technical 
equipment (e.g. a tracker device) into the parcel, without the expressed 
knowledge and/or authority of police. To do so would constitute a 
breach in RIPA and contravene the MPS Directed Surveillance Policy 
[Metropolitan Police Service].” (ShoppingCo.Doc4. 2014) 
“As [a] civilian organisation, we have no physical rights to search 
anyone under law.” (ShoppingCo.Opt1) 
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External support from police is a prerequisite. Therefore, ShoppingCo reports identity 
cases to National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) by using their channel called ‘Action 
Fraud’. They also plan covert security operations to trap suspects. Covert security 
operations are proactive security measures used to arrest identity thieves or intervene to 
prevent genuine customers from being defrauded. 
To perform covert security operation requires Courier Company support which delivers 
parcels. Covert operation involves tracking devices and geographic zone software. They 
hide trackers in the parcels going to the suspect’s address and record movements by using 
Gizmo Zone software (Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking).  
 
The covert security operations are useful because it helps to arrest or intervene with the 
fraudster. It also helps to collect audio and visual evidences useful in the post-arrest 
investigation process. In collaboration with the police, ShoppingCo have arrested and 
interviewed a number of suspects to find root causes (ShoppingCo.Doc1, 2014). They are 
able to understand the ways in which criminals can defraud the companies may help to 
avoid same suite of threats in the future. Using covert security operations ShoppingCo 
has prevented frauds worth of millions of pounds and have arrested over 200 identity 
thieves within eight months (ShoppingCo.Doc1. 2014). ShoppingCo is proud on its 
intelligence system and human resource. This is evident as follows: 
 
“The only time that we believe at case and investigation will be turned 
down would be for two reasons: First, limited resource or other 
priorities [by the police force]. Second, the evidence that we suggest is 
not sufficient for prosecution under the lack of evidence. Those 
occurrences are very rare on the evidential prosecution side, because 
our guys are very good at what they do.” (ShoppingCo.Opt2)  
“They [police force] have been very pleased because of the document 
that we do… We do professional prosecution files. We just hand the 
police a very little to do. Others companies do not do that.” 
(ShoppingCo.Jon) 
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Top Management Support 
Top management supports implementation of several information security 
countermeasures. Firstly, a deterrence policy helps to prevent internal theft. Secondly, 
ShoppingCo provides efficient training programs to ensure insider security culture and 
data preservation. Thirdly, company runs on regulations identified by standard 
organisations such as ISO. These are explained below. 
 
Deterring internal frauds: Wilhelm (2004, p. 13) asserts that leaders develop security 
policies to prevent fraud. Elyas et al. (2015, p. 77) also support that “it should be 
sponsored by senior management”. This study confirms that top management is engaged 
in policy production. Employees are restricted to access their own devices at certain 
premises such as shop floor warehouses and datacentres where information system is 
stored. A participant from senior management evidences this as.  
“[My] role increased into policies production [and] increased into 
eLearning program development” (ShoppingCo.Freddy).  
Korean organisations have used non-disclosure agreements, codes of conduct, and 
penalties to deter staff from stealing customer information (Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 
2014). This study however has found use of employment terms and conditions whereby 
consequences for non-compliance of company rules and regulation is explained. In shop 
floor warehouses and in the datacentre staffs are restricted to use electronic devices. This 
is consistent with fear from Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) in the offices (Trustwave, 
2013; Bashir and Khan, 2015) which welcomes insider threat of stealing information. 
This is echoed from a participant: 
“It is in terms and conditions [for] employment. It sounds rude but you 
work for us and you go to shop floor, you go to warehouse which has 
£55 million stock in it. You are not taking your phone. What do you 
want! A job or to be fired?” (ShoppingCo.Freddy)  
These rules and regulations are not restricted to shop-floor employees only, but senior 
management also is restricted. They depend upon biometric phone scan and security 
codes, due to use of confidential information in their devices. In addition, they are bound 
to use of company owned devices and products which deemed safe rather than BYOD. 
Senior management has shown trust in Apple Inc. products more than android. This is 
evidenced as follows: 
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“We find that Android is not as secure as Apple which is ridiculous 
because we are selling hundreds of tablets per week. And the 
hackers hack back into us. I don’t know what retail industry is 
doing with regards to tablet security in research and 
development.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
Regulatory compliance: ShoppingCo is efficient to follow governed procedures. 
Regulatory compliance in the ShoppingCo is twofold. Firstly, they implement law 
governed by financial service sector such as information security management standard 
ISO27001. Secondly, they use procedures useful to improve technicalities in the 
investigation process such as Regulation of Investigatory Power Act 2000 (RIPA). Their 
data compliance team perform internal and external audits on ISO27001 standards. They 
need to ensure that they are compliant with customers’ information security procedures 
(Elyas et al., 2014). This is evidenced as follows: 
“By law under English law and under the financial service sector which 
is governed by the financial authority, we have to have electronic 
protection by law, we also have to have electronic protection by 
association... There is a huge commercial drive when you order mobile, 
tablet by phone you are borrowing money. Therefore, there is no choice 
but to invest.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
RIPA’s1 procedures are used for robustness and efficiency in producing legal evidence 
(ShoppingCo.Doc1. 2014). They are not confined to follow RIPA’s standards, but they 
do so for its efficiency. 
 
Security awareness training programs: Value from information security training and 
awareness programmes was identified (Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3). Special training 
programmes for employees hired to ensure information security, and a general training 
for all members of staff to understand the value of customers’ information were 
implemented. ShoppingCo addressed both of these training streams. This is evident from 
their activities and the training programmes for staff. The participants also identified, for 
instance:  
“ShoppingCo has an attitude of serious crime.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
They train their security staff to reinforce their information security behaviour and 
attitude. Special compliance eLearning programmes incorporate data protection 
                                                           
1
 More detail about RIPA can be found on 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/pdfs/ukpga_20000023_en.pdf 
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eLearning systems designed for staff directly engaged in data protection. These members 
take these courses on an annual basis to pass the test. These findings confirm the 
suggestion provided by an earlier empirical study (Elyas et al., 2015). Elyas et al. 
conducted a study with Australian businesses whereby general mainstreams training was 
organised for all types of audience. Australian organisations failed to design training 
programmes specific to employees officially hired to protect customers’ data protection. 
This practice is important to the absorbed knowledge gained from external organisations. 
Elyas et al.’s (2015) participants agreed to the notion that their knowledge is reactive in 
nature. These officials have advised top management to consider special training courses 
that enhance their technicalities in a proactive capacity. ShoppingCo addressed training 
programs that consider the relevant audience and echoed as follows:  
“In a warehouse environment, you will be trained on security 
awareness to managers, because even though I am in-charge, this stage 
is too big for small teams. So what we need to do is to cascade 
responsibility. So within a warehouse, we would say a key is what 
training would be benefit from. Say they would be benefit from conflict 
management. If you do not get conflict, it does in the high street where 
somebody can come in, like shoplifting and you are in direct conflict. 
What they would is security awareness [programme] they look for.” 
(ShoppingCo.Carl) 
 
Information System (internal teams) Support 
Data compliance: ShoppingCo uses services from third parties and needs to share its 
current customer database with service providers to fulfil service requirements. They 
provide an example of using telecommunication services from one of largest call centres 
in the world. The data compliance team is composed of field-based auditors. They ensure 
that the data stored at outsourcing organisations is safe. The auditors not only audit 
outsourced businesses but also concentrate on the company network. They audit third 
parties by employing the ISO27001 standard. A participant from the compliance team 
discusses as follows:  
“We have [recently] done ISO27001 course. So that is the information 
security management system. We audit [third party suppliers] against 
that standard... Any data that is stored and the backup needs to be 
encrypted, their network and infrastructure needs to be secure” 
(ShoppingCo.Celia). 
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IT- Security: The IT Security team monitors network traffic. The purpose is to confirm 
that any data or employee details going to third parties is private and transmitted in an 
encrypted format. If a member of staff emails to anybody by a mistake, they may have no 
longer access to restricted information. The IT Security team performs activities such as 
network monitoring, emails monitoring, access management systems, authentication and 
other IT security related activities. They outsource some work to a company called ‘Web 
Solutions’ (a pseudonym) to facilitate monitoring. Web Solutions provide ShoppingCo 
with a software package consisting of cloud protection, email analysis and web filter 
security protection. A participant discusses this facility as follows: 
“We also have [a] third party email filtering system which is on the 
cloud. It has recently been taken from the ‘Web Solutions’.” 
(ShoppingCo.Pat) 
ShoppingCo also addressed activities which consider implementation of 
compartmentalisation discussed in (Table 2-2) whereby data is divided and stored into 
zones. IT security participants restrict or extend staff emails accesses depending on 
business needs. They also limit software packages used in the communication process at 
the departmental level. For instance, fraud prevention, business continuity, IT Security 
and data compliance own their own Yammer groups due to the nature of their work to 
deal with the sensitive information. Yammer is proprietary social media platform 
discussed in latter in this chapter.  
 
Technical surveillance countermeasures: ShoppingCo employs sophisticated research 
tools called ‘electronic hostile devices’. These tools help to detect threat or suspicious 
activity. They use bug detectors, frequency transmitters, and ultraviolet markers, Delta V 
advanced range of radio RF bug detector, and module frequency modulators. These tools 
secure major corporate briefings from industrial espionage. Major corporation meetings 
were swept using these devices. They also sweep data centres, executive desks, and the 
fraud department regularly. For instance: 
“Every month my colleague Ken [pseudonym] and I electronically 
sweep the executive desks. There are 140 employees in Location3 
covering fraud prevention... We sweep that area.” (Shopping.Opt1)  
They either put a camera on a bug to identify the suspect or destroy the device and feed 
misinformation. Their first action is similar to Flayton Electronics (McNulty, 2007) 
where the author suggests that leaving the vulnerability helps to capture the suspect.  
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Mobility Support 
ShoppingCo uses many outsourcing services including ‘Security Consultancy’ 
(pseudonym) and ‘Anti-phishing Solutions’ (pseudonym). Anti-phishing solution is a 
registered company that has capability to crush out fake website created using 
ShoppingCo name. This provides ShoppingCo an outsourced built-in solution to help to 
prevent identity theft. Consultancy helps them in anti-phishing techniques. A participant 
provides its example as:  
 
“Faddy’s [Pseudonym] skills regard to hacking and anti-hacking. 
Faddy gets quality IP and other address information to ‘Anti-phishing 
Solutions’ and they have the capability of crashing it out… He is able 
to get into the underground web sites. It is owned by an organised 
criminal gang.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy).  
 
They hire Faddy’s skills to identify phishing sites. Faddy’s collects information about 
fake websites created using ShoppingCo’s name to fool customers into revealing their 
personal details and forward it to Anti-Phishing Solutions to cause these fake sites to 
crash, rendering them inoperative. 
 
5.2.2 Knowledge Sharing Practice 
ShoppingCo actively participates at conferences and deliver regular lectures to share their 
knowledge and experience. Security officials share their learning experience from the 
security operations (ShoppingCo.PPT1. 2014; ShoppingCo.PPT2. 2014). They describe 
the roles and responsibilities of various teams involved in identity theft prevention and 
explain fraud prevention processes (ShoppingCo.Doc1. 2014; ShoppingCo.Doc3. 2014). 
They not only share this knowledge with peers but also support the police in 
understanding the nature of the business crimes. They work with many official bodies 
including the Metropolitan Police, the British Retail Consortium (BRC), the National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), the National Crime Agency (NCA), and the Scotland 
Yard. They are all active in the fraud prevention explained in Figure 5-1. However, 
ShoppingCo lacks direct collaboration with peer organisations. Several factors 
discourage this collaboration such as industrial espionage, reputational damage, losing 
customers going to the rivals, and wasting time on knowledge of low quality coming from 
other retailers. Since ShoppingCo believes, they are better in the fraud prevention 
knowledge. They value learning from peers at official forums than direct interaction. 
 Chapter 5: Data Analysis 115 
ShoppingCo’s knowledge sharing abilities, characteristics, inter-organisational 
dynamics, and the nature of its knowledge are explained as follows.  
 
ShoppingCo Characteristics  
Knowledge absorptive capacity 
What is working with regards to knowledge absorbed to address and mitigate identity 
theft? 
ShoppingCo has abilities that inform absorbed knowledge gained from external 
organisations. Both categories found in ShoppingCo that address knowledge absorptive 
capacity (Figure 3-4). They appoint experienced professionals and provide a series of in 
house on-the-job trainings. This is evidenced as follows: 
“Faddy's skills regard to hacking and anti-hacking is sharp. He is not 
cheap. He is very short after it. Instead of using him in consultancy, he 
has now been given full contract and he works directly for the Owners, 
same as I.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
“You get training session in here all the time. If a new tools comes in 
you get trained on it” (ShoppingCo.Bella) 
What does not seem to be providing benefit? 
There is lack of trust between members of staff and the top management. There is gap 
between Spiderman Category A and Category B that links these two categories (Figure 
3-4). This will be described later in this section.  
 
Intra-organisational transfer capability -What is working? 
ShoppingCo’s internal communication mechanisms are summarised in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2: ShoppingCo internal communication mechanisms 
Mechanism Use 
Yammer  A company owned personalized social media software that 
updates team achievements (i.e. posting pictures of arrests 
with associated department). They also use Facebook 
groups personalised and used within the company.  
Shine Shine is another company owned social media tool used to 
reward and recognise people within the company who help 
each other to improve collaboration. 
Maximo IBM’s Maximo Asset Management  
Telephone 
conferring  
Telephone conferencing is used for inter-departmental 
communications to explain teamwork. 
Email An email is used to pass work from one team to another. 
Microsoft Lync An online chatting forum used to discuss work and ideas. 
Organised trainings Inter-departmental trainings 
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Table 5-2 shows that ShoppingCo is fully equipped with abilities to diffuse knowledge to 
its staff. IT Security officials with core technical abilities use IBM’s Maximo to handle 
security threats. A participant state: 
“We also have the other way of communicating which is Maximo- it’s 
a way of creating trouble tickets… We use Maximo not just for physical 
things but also, for example if there is some sort of breach of security 
which creates an incidence that would also be communicated and 
recorded within Maximo, that’s just one of the tools we refer for 
communication.” (ShoppingCo.Pat) 
Apart from digital mediums, they use offline interactions such as inter-departmental 
communication. Offline mediums dictate inter-departmental learning. Inter-departmental 
communication by training is evidenced as follows:  
“We would show other departments of our company how we do as 
fraud team, so we would be delivering it to them in August. We are 
going to do presentation over there to show what the fraud department 
is all about. So it is within our organisations there are different sites 
that permanently deal with data collection at LocationX [i.e. call centre 
team]. It will be myself and a group of 10 of us in the fraud department 
who will be delivering the session.” (ShoppingCo.Drew) 
This statement evidences that they select champions from the teams to spread awareness 
regarding data preservation to other teams engaged in the data usage. Since the call centre 
team is directly engaged with customers’ data, they consider it necessary to make them 
aware of its value. 
 
ShoppingCo addressed a few applications that members are encouraged to use (Table 5-
2). Yammer and Shine are social media sites used by the company to spread better 
awareness of the company goals rather than knowledge or best practice. Following 
statement explains the use of these social media applications. 
“We arrested someone two or three weeks ago by Greg's investigation. 
So on Yammer we posted a few pictures of the police man and the parcel 
and explained what we have done, because there is four and half 
thousand people at ShoppingCo, and most of them think of the security 
as a biggest man standing at the door checks who they are as they go 
through the door. So a lot of people do not actually realise who we are 
and what we do. Which is a shame because we have a very good 
security department. I don't think there is many [companies] in the 
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country that are very close to one that do. So it is used as tool to 
advertise what we do. But not for exchange of ideas.” 
(ShoppingCo.Sam) 
This statement confirms fears discussed in Section 3.3.2 whereby DiStaso, McCorkindale 
and Wright (2011) found that members lack control over use of social media application 
due to criticism from management, negative reaction from colleagues to the content 
shared and the theft of intellectual property. Since Yammer and Shine are relatively new 
in ShoppingCo, participants were unable to address how management reacts to the posts 
that members share. Management, however, addressed distrust in using these tools to 
share fraud prevention knowledge due to lack of internal trust. Lack of internal trust 
prevents swift knowledge dissemination among the staff. Knowledge is not adequately 
shared within the organisational boundaries, therefore, blocks knowledge utilisation. The 
company is suspicious of employees who can steal intellectual property of the company 
such as valuable knowledge. This fear is echoed: 
“Everyone has a Yammer account; we are encouraged to use it. 
However, we do not talk about security on it. Group security has its 
own Yammer and is password protected with ID residents only. So we 
talk about fraud and about financial services only in that approved 
forum. Otherwise, it is like as if we talking about how many frauds has 
been done to public. So fraud prevention, business continuity, data 
compliance, group security, we have our own Yammer which shuts the 
doors for others. [However], we do not necessarily publish everything 
on Internet about innovations and ideas such as how we are going to 
stop this on ‘Yammer’. A lot of our staff members are our thieves. Our 
thieves will use Internet to steal against us and discuss, as they know 
how to do it. So we have to be careful about how much we give away.” 
(ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
This statement shows that ShoppingCo encourages staff to use social media inside the 
organisation regardless of whether members belong to top management or individual 
working in the teams. However, senior management is fearful from its use from the 
members who can transfer unnecessarily information. They believed that extensive use 
of communication media could cause to leak important and confidential information. 
Consequently, internal thieves may steal ideas from the company and sell it to other 
businesses in exchange for money. This thus limits them to share their knowledge openly 
inside the organisation. They could not address the use of intranet as a central system that 
manages security knowledge coming from various sources to share centrally (Flores, 
Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Argenti, 2013). They could not address in-house employee 
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oriented publication in the security profession (Verčič, Verčič and Sriramesh, 2012). 
They failed to address any formal mechanism that uses external knowledge to benefit the 
business. For instance: 
“I am in very good contact with other companies. About six months 
ago, I shared those detail with all of my colleagues via emails. I do not 
know if they spoke to that person or not. No one needs to be that ahead. 
At least they know that I was there. And in fact when I need to contact 
someone from other company just recently, I sent an email to my 
colleagues does any know this [person]; and three people came back 
that there is the person you need to speak and there is the telephone 
number. So it is there but not a formal structure I suppose.” 
(ShoppingCo.Sam) 
The above statement states that knowledge and information explored from external 
sources are not adequately shared within security teams due to lack of formal 
communication. A communication manager may assist to overcome the gap found 
internally. There is the possibility that members keep their ideas and feelings from 
management if it is withholding information from them (Argenti, 2013). Fear from 
internal investigation also hinders senior management from formal collaboration. Senior 
management can be against the investigation. The fear from internal investigation is 
echoed as follows: 
“No, we don’t see each other, because of so why geographically 
spread. Everybody speaks to everybody on phone daily, emails daily. 
Skype or FaceTime is better, because there is your body, there is your 
team, and there is your security group. That is daily, quite frequently, 
but used with the invitation only. It has to be confidentiality around 
those meetings, because people are listening. It might be internal 
investigation. It might be against the very senior person. It happens. 
We have to be protected, and that is why we have our own separate 
Yammer, because we cannot share our gripes, our groans, and any 
great idea, because it is too wider audience. But we use it. Not only 
Yammer, we have LinkedIn accounts. We are on LinkedIn as well.”  
(ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
This statement reveals several factors. Firstly, it illustrates the kind of favoured 
technology managers use to contact teams such as Skype and FaceTime. Secondly, it 
shows distrust on the social media application used for internal communication.   
 
Motivation to teach and learn 
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Participants suggest that there is no monetary gain in sharing knowledge with peers. 
However, they value an improved learning process and seek recognition from 
management. This enhances their level of satisfaction and trust in the company. 
ShoppingCo is a large organisation and members are situated at various locations. The 
management through the company owned application such as Yammer and Shine (see 
Table 5-2) recognises valued staff by posting their achievements internally with 
comments as follows: 
“There is no monetary kind of incentives it is just a knowing, breathing 
and living our values we have got with company a set of values that we 
do. Idea is to as a business knowing that you are kind of putting and 
ticking each of those boxes. We have got a new recognition schemes 
"Shine" [social media application] which has recently been launched 
just a couple of weeks ago that puts different posts if you spot to one of 
our values live the purpose so that’s our help. I get a lot of personal 
satisfaction with what I do and you see your team get a lot of flourishing 
that would be nice… Ultimately to prevent further losses, to ensure we 
are doing what we need to do let the business progress. We are playing 
our part as department. When we get the results that motivates me. And 
knowing my team is doing a good job and helping and supporting. If 
my knowledge, and all learning I can pass that to help somebody else, 
that will motivate me to do more.” (ShoppingCo.Debra) 
 
This statement emphasises that sharing team achievements and recognising individual’s 
performances enhance employee satisfaction and improves trust within the company. It 
is also evident that company owned social media tools are used for posting internal 
achievements rather than sharing knowledge within the organisation.  
 
Inter-organisational Dynamics 
Power Relations 
What does not seem to be providing benefit? 
Power relation issues exist in ShoppingCo where a win-win situation found as a barrier 
that hurdles one-to-one collaboration. They supported problem of knowledge asymmetry 
discussed explicitly in the theory of peer relations in Chapter 3 (Section, 3.4.1). The 
theory stated that organisations either provide knowledge of low quality or lock-in 
knowledge within their boundaries. ShoppingCo addressed knowledge lock-in rather than 
providing knowledge of a low quality. ShoppingCo employees consider themselves as 
members of a competent organisation equipped with abilities and knowledge to tackle 
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identity theft. Jon and Freddy have stated their views previously that their teams are 
competent in producing legal evidences to present in the court. In addition, following 
comments further support their proudness of the power of their intelligence systems. 
“I think ShoppingCo is leading the way really with regards to the way 
that we deal with frauds. So they [other retailers] do look to us really 
for our knowledge.” (ShoppingCo.Bram) 
This statement shows that other similar retailers lack the intelligence to tackle the identity 
theft. Therefore, they depend on ShoppingCo’s knowledge. This supports the resource 
dependence theory discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4). The theory stated that companies 
extensively depend on input generated outside of the boundaries (Barringer and Harrison, 
2000). However, the question is, whether ShoppingCo is competent in the knowledge, 
unless other organisations of similar nature are also investigated. There is a possibility 
that the company is more competent than it really is. NetworkingCo has evidence of 
whether some companies are better than others are and in what sense they are different, 
since they connect several members and able to see the dynamics operating between the 
companies (see Section 5.5.1 below). This is assumed that higher position in knowledge 
possessed by ShoppingCo hinders the formation of strategic alliances whereby staff 
members from other companies can work together in knowledge exchange relationships 
as evidenced as follows: 
“I have never looked at the company and say actually I need to be 
talking to them. And in the security world if there are many groups as 
ShoppingCo, more security department like ShoppingCo, it will be very 
easy to start having a proper collaboration. There is another company 
similar to ours and they have only one man who covers the whole 
country. He goes to talk to me (laughs). So [if] there are more 
companies like ours, I think we can do it better. (ShoppingCo.Sam) 
This statement shows that collaboration is possible when other retailers also improve their 
intelligence. This statement implicitly addressed their fear from gaining knowledge of 
poor quality from other retailers due to lack of knowledge resources. They welcome a 
proper collaboration with a condition of relevant abilities and resources.  This statement 
explicitly answers the key research question RQ2 (b) which was asked to investigate the 
condition to which companies are willing to share fraud prevention knowledge with each 
other. ShoppingCo members identified a need, to balanced knowledge from their 
competitors.  
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Structures and mechanisms  
Partnership:  
Referring back to literature review, RQ2 (a) was asked to investigate 
extent to which companies are willing to share fraud prevention 
knowledge with each other. 
ShoppingCo lacks the desire to address any activity which motivates employees to engage 
in external communication on a formal one-to-one basis. They can do work-related 
collaboration with other organisations. Such collaboration however, does not address 
knowledge sharing elements and is limited to senior management as evidenced from the 
following: 
“If we need a help from one of our competitors we ring them inside [by 
a phone] and ask them we have got a problem in xyz area, have you; 
yes; then let us meet on a cup of coffee and have a chat. Thus we do not 
detail out our customers’ data.” (ShoppingCo.Sam) 
“When we feel there is need [to collaborate] we do that, but it is very 
limited.” (ShoppingCo.Bram) 
These statements illustrate a fear of collaboration clearly in unnecessarily disclosing of 
customers’ information. Participants from senior management positions reinforced this 
fear. Participants collaborate with peers in other organisations to find evidence associated 
with the identity theft. However, they omit customers’ personal details during 
collaborations. They consider their customers’ information as an important asset as 
echoed in the comments. 
“Our customers are the data that we have.” (ShoppingCo.Bram) 
“There is no difference in a warehouse than in the office. Walking out 
with data of 50 million customers is more dangerous than walking out 
with 20 carat gold.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
ShoppingCo revealed that alliance formation is not useful unless it involves formal 
contract. Their pre-requisite condition that opens doors for alliances formation is formally 
signed official contracts among the retailers. This statement answers the condition seeks 
the study question (RQ2 (b)). They failed to address strategic alliances to learn from 
different peers. They lack in sufficient trust on a formal basis and support this view as 
follow: 
“We have to trust them [first] and we do things on agreements. That is 
why we as business, and my guys at that meeting was stressing that we 
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need a department, so that everyone’s information goes in that pot. That 
is where the business world is crying for.” (ShoppingCo.Jon) 
This statement is evident of lack of retailers trust in each other and ShoppingCo members 
assumed superior position hinders knowledge sharing and collaboration. Instead of 
suggesting one-to-one collaboration, they addressed the use of police as a communication 
mediator in circulating their knowledge to others as echoed below: 
“The way forward is not Retail Company talking to Retail Company. 
The way forward is retail company is telling the police; the police are 
sharing it with other businesses. It should not be retail to retail.” 
(ShoppingCo.Greg) 
There are two major reasons for trusting police as communication mediator to share 
knowledge among the retailers. Firstly, police have procedure to grade and sanitise the 
information. The value of the knowledge and validation of the source are both identified. 
Recipients can trust shared content. Secondly, companies can make better relationships 
with the police force. Establishing good relationships with police is their need, because a 
police unit lacks to deals with business crimes. Retail industry in the UK lacks a dedicated 
fraud unit, whereas other industries such as banking, mobile, and insurance have their 
own financial crimes units whereby, they are officially assisted by the police force. As a 
result, retailers need a close collaboration with the police to deal with business crimes. 
Trust is an important element in the security profession, as they possess distrustful nature. 
Even though the use of police as a communication mediator is suggested, however, 
ShoppingCo is not completely satisfied by its use. The other participant echoed follows: 
“Now the beauty of the Metropolitan Police is that they are the biggest 
force in the country. They have forty-three boroughs. So they are 
splitting to forty-three sections. And they have done a report which is 
telling everyone in Metropolitan Police on how to investigate Business 
Crimes. And they have mentioned our company name. So we are quite 
well thought of within Metropolitan police. It refers to ShoppingCo 
[and] to other companies. So that is how far we are into them. The City 
of London Police is responsible for fraud investigation in the whole of 
the UK except Scotland…. Now similarly they have done the document, 
which they have circulated outside the Metropolitan Police to the other 
police forces and when Bram goes to knock on the police doors, that he 
need assistance; they actually know that we are involved that they have 
documents from those two forces.” (ShoppingCo.Jon) 
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Official Forums: Regarding official forums, a gap was found in the literature review and 
a question was asked whether shared knowledge is able to reduce risk. What is working 
for the retailers about knowledge sharing to address and mitigate identity theft? 
ShoppingCo uses online forums to gain an external knowledge (Table 5-3). Senior 
management is engaged with these collaborations. They attend official meetings 
organised on forums. ShoppingCo’s engaged day-to-day security related working staff 
advisers, analysts and specialist, however, do not avail an opportunity to attend forums’ 
events and organised conferences to share their learning experience. The following 
quotations evidence this view: 
“We do not have any direct contact with external organisations. At my 
level, I do not. I know a kind of head of our department level- they do 
site visits and do it at higher level.” (ShoppingCo.Debra) 
“We do not have any contact with them [CompetitorCo-X, 
CompetitorCo-Y] as matter of course… That might be a question you 
better ask to our manager.” (ShoppingCo.Pat) 
“We have one of our regional manager who attend that meeting and 
then he feeds that stuff back to us, but we do not deal with anyone from 
CompetitorCo-X, CompetitorCo-Y.” (ShoppingCo.Adie) 
In these statements, most of the interviewees referred their managers’ names in external 
collaboration rather than discussing their own learning experience. These forums and 
networking structures are summarised in Table 5-3 below. 
Table 5-3: ShoppingCo knowledge sharing structure 
Structure Organisation Reasons 
Online fraud 
forums 
BRC The British Retail Consortium brings retail companies 
together. They organize monthly meetings and 
conferences to discuss and resolve issues in this 
industry. 
Cifas Cifas was Previously Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance 
System (CIFAS) provides a compressive database to 
subscribers to upload fraudulent information and search 
fraudulent cases. They also provide networking to 
facilitate security officials’ face-to-face interaction.  
NFIB National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) provides 
assistance with police to take actions against identity 
thieves.  
One-to-one 
collaboration 
with no joint 
ownership 
CompetitorCo-X CompetitorCo-X is also a financial organisation which 
offer its customers credit to purchase products from 
them. Reciprocity is therefore considered. 
 CompetitorCo-Y A neighbour company situated in the same geographic 
region facilitates more interaction with ShoppingCo. 
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Forums provide a platform for formal meetings based on monthly, quarterly, and 
annually. Respondents suggested a number of reasons to use these forums. The most 
frequently mentioned reason is trust and contractual governance. Firstly, these forums 
operate on signed agreements. There are rare chances of information leakage. Secondly, 
they can trust the content shared at these events. Thirdly, using Chatham House Rules 
whereby members are not allowed to disclose what they have discussed, they run sensitive 
agenda in these meetings. Chatham House Rules are part of Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. The rules guide that participants are free to use information 
received, but neither they identify nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), not that of any 
other participant, may be revealed. Participants provide evidence as follows: 
“We have an agreement between ourselves and the companies [on 
online fraud forums], to share data [and] to sign a document for our 
own wellbeing.” (ShoppingCo.Jon) 
“The only sign that we would share information that doesn't breach 
data protection law is through BRC. We are all [connected] with BRC 
and it is controlled. This is the success that we are getting out to this 
particular initiative, certainly, that is shared at the BRC level. But 
individual case is maintaining confidentiality on the customers as 
always.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
The only member interviewed from ShoppingCo2 provided a different opinion to trust 
security officials from other organisations as follows: 
“There are some terms of reference which are pretty clear-cut. We do 
not breach competition law. We use Chatham House Rules [on these 
online forums] bearing in mind they come from Police, Military or 
Security backgrounds. This is not that alien to them. Very few people 
come to this sort of roles of that background.” (ShoppingCo2.Head of 
Security)  
ShoppingCo members have a little or no collaboration with peers from CompetitorCoX 
and CompetitorCoY. The only things that connect them with these companies are the 
similarity in the nature of the work, and geographic closeness. Even though these 
elements are addressed, they agree that most of their collaborations with peers take place 
at online fraud forums discussed.  
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Virtual communities: ShoppingCo participants could not provide answers to low level of 
active participation. Even though some of them are LinkedIn group members, they do not 
participate over these forums. Senior management clearly dictate the lack of e-trust. 
However, other members addressed lack of awareness and lack of time in the use of these 
applications. They provided their opinion on RQ3 (a) by addressing why some individuals 
do not take part in information security knowledge sharing. Senior management is 
reluctant about social media due to security concerns. They believed that sharing best 
practice on LinkedIn groups is like to giving fraudsters a weapon to attack the company, 
because it shows their weakest point. They also consider reputation of their company. 
Leakage is inevitable. They cannot share company woes in public. They believe that these 
groups are full of vulnerable people due to wider audience consisting of national and 
international security professional as evidenced as follows:  
“I have never known anyone been declined… There are certain 
fraudsters and criminal organised wings siting on these forums to listen 
to best practices and procedures to get around it… I am happy to share 
knowledge within the department if its activity, if its criminal methods, 
or criminal activity oriented, I would not discuss with anyone except 
my department, because I am giving some one the tools to commit.” 
(ShoppingCo.Freddy)  
There is a limited use of virtual communities by the ShoppingCo analysts, specialists and 
advisers due to unfamiliarity with LinkedIn groups and their usage to improve 
knowledge. Evidences provided by these members include an example as stated: 
“Not then aware of that, but I don’t know our manager would be.” 
(ShoppingCo.Lyn) 
There is lack of awareness of relevant online groups whereby security professionals 
subscribe improvement in their knowledge. There is also lack of motivation. For instance, 
other participants stated that they have been provided with sufficient knowledge inside 
the organisation. This would outweigh the benefits of subscriptions to these LinkedIn 
groups and is echoed as follows:  
“Because you learn everything here… For my job what I do I do not 
need to go to anywhere outside. You get training session in here all the 
time. If a new tool comes in, you get trained on it, so you don’t need to 
do anything else.” (ShoppingCo.Bella) 
“Different organisations geographically scattered such as TechCo as 
well. I probably have emails of them I do not choose them as matter of 
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course. I have so many emails of different outside organisations in a 
great deal. I do not have a time to follow up. Our business is usually 
quite intense. We have a lot of work to do in a short period of time and 
the recourses we have entire recently. Our day is totally taken with 
business usual the demands of the business. To answer your question, 
it’s not coming out and spend half an hour for example somewhere.” 
(ShoppingCo.Pat) 
 
Informal social ties: Peers moved to other organisations assist generating informal social 
networks those support in obtaining an external knowledge from across the organisational 
boundaries. Among others, Pat provides an opinion as follows:  
“Now a lot of IT people over those years [have] since moved from 
ShoppingCo to TechCo [pseudonym]. Although they have slightly 
different regime, because I know these people and they know me, you 
have the friendship which goes on many-many years. You get 
information that way as well.” (ShoppingCo.Pat)  
These evidences are consistent with the literature discussed in Chapter 2, whereby 
Almeida, Hohberger and Parada (2011) and Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008) 
suggest exchanging officials to exchange organisational knowledge. Informal social ties 
thus are formed by members’ exchange. ShoppingCo’s IT-Security manager was an 
example of qualified professional coming from TechCo. A TechCo is renowned IT 
organisation and world leading company in the IT industry. These findings suggest that 
ShoppingCo have sources to bring an external knowledge in the form of a member 
moving to another company or appointing a new member from other organisations. In 
terms of geographic mediated networks, Jon a senior manager states that: 
“Head office of CompetitorCo1 is in location-G and the Head office of 
CompetitorCo2 is just across the road here. Other organisations are 
scattered around the country, but we have a big coming together at 
forums, business meetings and business conferences.” 
(ShoppingCo.Jon) 
 
Trust and Risk 
Sensitivity of knowledge – the leakage concerns: participants already addressed issues 
of leakage of customers’ information in the collaboration. Including this, there are many 
other risks such as industrial espionage and reputational damage inhibit collaboration 
among the retailers sharing knowledge with peers from other organisations. These are the 
major concerns at senior management positions. ShoppingCo’s participants consider 
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industrial espionage as a major threat whereby rivals may try to steal intellectual property 
such as ideas and information. ShoppingCo electronically sweep organised meetings to 
detect any suspicious act. They believe that industrial espionage has been around since 
people could learn to speak. This is associated with stealing someone’s ideas and 
information. In a briefing during technical surveillance counter measures, they provided 
example associated to industrial espionage as: 
“We are talking about multi-million-pound acquisitions. That meeting 
has to be protected from people who will criminally intrude and sell 
that information to the rivals.” (ShoppingCo.Opt1) 
This statement dictates fear from internal members who could intervene or a rival may 
send an official to spy information from secure corporate confidential meetings. 
Reputation is a key to success. Breach of customers’ information publicly and rumours 
of loss published in the news may damage the company’s reputation. Consequently, 
companies lose customers and prevent them from discussing ideas openly as evidenced: 
“There is nothing going to be personal about it. But what we would not 
do is to make ourselves foolish either. There is reputational damage to 
take into consideration. You cannot go into open meeting through all 
on your woes on the table. That table has to managed and controlled 
for reputation as well as anything else. It will only be shared at official 
level and will only be shared with an association [fraud forums] that is 
deemed safe for reputable by a heads of group security or even at 
executive level. Not publicly.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
The Nature of Knowledge 
To determine whether security officials’ nature of knowledge is actions oriented that 
needs more effort to share with others (Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 2013) or the process 
follows the steps outlined by Nonaka (1994) they were asked whether they require face-
to-face mechanisms to clarify receipts what they do. To explore nature of their 
knowledge, participants were asked about the skills required for their roles and whether 
experience helps them to perform their tasks efficiently. Asking these questions will help 
ascertain knowledge can easily be communicated using digital mechanisms. Variety of 
perspectives was found. Mostly participants supported that they prefer face-to-face 
mechanism than digital regardless of the nature of their knowledge and the team they are 
engaged in.  
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Figure 5-1 shows a number of internal teams involved in the identity theft prevention. 
Each team consisted of a different set of capabilities and responsibilities. Figure 5-3 
below illustrates the nature of the knowledge of each team and its normal day-to-day 
activities. These teams and their routine work have already been explained in a previous 
section. To seek the extent of their abilities to gain and absorb new knowledge, they were 
asked about training provided and whether past experience is useful. One response about 
the past experience from a member of the Fraud team is that:  
“I think experience can help. However, we have new staff. So although 
experience help but you don’t have to have experience to do the job.” 
(ShoppingC.Fran) 
This identifies that their work is process-based that uses of a series of steps. This is similar 
to the responses from the participants belonging to Intelligence departments such as 
Operations Support, Security Operations, Data Compliance, and Training.  
 
For members working in the IT Security and technical security such as surveillance, the 
nature of their work is practical, involving the use of technical software and hardware 
devices. They perform activities like enhancing network security, monitoring emails, 
monitoring internet access, combatting hacking and anti-hacking, crashing phishing 
websites, and electronically sweeping internal office spaces. A participant from IT 
Security elaborates on the team’s work: 
“I just put encryption disk to put some details on. We do encryption, we 
do email monitoring… we also do internet monitoring – people access 
to the Internet. We have a Team-G which is filtering system whereby 
peoples email is restricted or extended depending on business 
requirement.” (ShoppingCo.Pat)  
Technical security is engaged in phishing and anti-phishing, and requires the member 
proficient skills to perform hacking and anti-hacking activities. There is possibility that 
members involved in surveillance and IT security are skilled with computing knowledge 
base. As a result, their knowledge contains elements of high tacitness compared with 
other teams.  
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Figure 5-3: ShoppingCo information security teams and their nature of knowledge  
 Chapter 5: Data Analysis 130 
Process-based knowledge illustrated in Figure 5-3 may be shared easily with the help of 
digital mechanisms. However, practice based knowledge may be is difficult to convey 
message when shared electronically because of high degree of tacitness (Panahi, Watson 
and Partridge, 2013). This type of knowledge may require face-to-face interactions to 
convey their message effectively (Nonaka, 1994). Members, therefore, prefer face-to-face 
interaction to explain what they do and how: 
“We do face-to-face [interaction] it is easier enough. It is always better 
discussing, because if you have the question you can get response 
quickly” (ShoppingCo.Fran) 
One member with a core technical background confirmed that sharing knowledge through 
social media is more difficult than having a conversation. This is explained as follows: 
“Yeah it is difficult. It is better to speak to people. Although we deal with India more on 
a superficial basis, we don’t get in integrity with technical details with them at all.” 
(ShoppingCo.Pat) 
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5.3 PaymentCo 
PaymentCo is a group that sell online payment processing services. Online gambling 
businesses are its major customers. PaymentCo plays an intermediate role between the 
banks, merchants and the card schemes (i.e. VISA and MasterCard). They provide 
customers with a payment facility to purchase and pay with a secured transaction system. 
They help retailers to obtain a multi-currency system from around the globe. The 
company serves thousands of businesses and millions of consumers by offering a mobile 
payment system. They share risk associated with the identity theft in the form of 
chargeback frauds discussed earlier. PaymentCo therefore has risk analysts and credit 
check teams to evaluate risk assessment to deal with identity theft.  
 
5.3.1 Identity Theft Prevention Practice 
PaymentCo provides two elements of the service such as a gateway service and an 
acquiring service. A gateway service is provided directly to a customer or to the retailers. 
It involves processing payment for the merchants. PaymentCo have no liability with the 
charge of transactions involving a gateway service. In this type of service, they forward 
card details to the acquiring bank or the card issuer to do checks. Therefore, this element 
is of low risk to PaymentCo, since it involves financial interaction, there is only 
processing of the information. The other service is bureau or acquiring service. This 
service involves a joint liability whereby PaymentCo shares risk with the companies to 
whom they sell services called merchants. Foreign exchange, e-gambling, binary auction, 
sports events and music concerts are their common merchants.  
 
PaymentCo supports identity theft definition whereby an owner of the identity defrauds 
companies using his or her own details. Chapter 2 (Section, 2.2) discussed that merchants 
are responsible to refund the customer regardless of risk measures taken by them if they 
request a chargeback (Khan, 2015). PaymentCo provides similar opinion as follows:   
“We set up payment pages for the merchants. So when the shopper goes 
to the website and says okay I like that pair of shoes and checks out. 
That checkout then takes them to the payment page. They would then 
know the card details. PaymentCo process the information and sends it 
to the shopper’s Card Company or bank. The card company would 
come back to PaymentCo to confirm and [we] say yes we know them. 
They are then authorised. If it is not [authorised], we will then send this 
information back to the shoe retailer. Now say for example this shoe 
retailer was having financial problems, they could not fulfil the orders, 
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they could not ship the goods then the person who placed the order will 
contact the card company and request the chargeback. Now if there is 
no enough money on their [retailers] account, then PaymentCo could 
essentially bare that loss. So say for example there is hundred 
transactions for the one hundred pounds - there is potential loss.” 
(PaymentCo.Jackson) 
This statement dictates that PaymentCo has a number of threats concerning identity theft. 
Firstly, customers buying from retailers can defraud. Secondly, there is possibility that 
merchants themselves could be organised criminals who designed webpages to steal 
identity details and financial information. Jackson’s explanation confirms Khan’s (2015) 
definition regarding chargeback fraud whereby consumers defraud companies using their 
own details. However, an element associated with an intermediate payment service 
provider was missed. PaymentCo as service provider has risk of financial loss, when 
merchants are either of fraudulent or financially instable. The amount of loss is also 
shared by card schemes (Visa, MasterCard and American express). Therefore, risk 
assessment reports assess merchants’ potential liability, credit checks and transaction 
monitoring. These strategies help them to cope with fraudulent or high-risk merchants. 
Merchants prone to identity theft include online gambling and customer services tickets 
for concert support events. Fraudster can attempt to buy tickets using stolen cards and 
then they can easily sell. Similar to ShoppingCo, PaymentCo addressed customer-
profiling techniques to reduce identity theft as follows: 
“We are looking at merchants with a high level of refunds, high value 
transactions, chargebacks, high level of authorisations, velocity which 
is happening may or may not come across - which is say for example 
same card used at multiple locations to say- email address used at 
multiple locations by shoppers. High level of decline, merchants have 
been inactive for a while – they have not process transaction for a 
while, somebody put one through somebody called bust out fraud – 
which is quiet common term in fraud circle where an account is taken 
over by fraudsters – that account we just set inactive. The fraudsters 
get hold of the merchants’ identity and start to put transactions. For 
say if a merchant has not been processing for a long period while we 
certainly out that transaction, we want to query that and question that. 
So there is set schedule of work that we look at and work through.” 
(PaymentCo.Jackson) 
Similar to ShoppingCo, PaymentCo addressed the use of event occurrence matching IP 
address and transaction monitoring. They consider measuring whether the same card and 
email account is used at multiple sites to place an order. Customers profiling from 
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PaymentCo discussed is similar to findings discussed from (Van Vlasselaer et al., 2015, 
p. 41), since they covered companies offering online shopping globally.  
 
5.3.2 Knowledge Sharing Practice 
PaymentCo’s participants were aware of their competitors and companies of the similar 
nature. Officials from PaymentCo interact with peers in networking events such as 
conferences including events organised for risk related measures. A director of card 
services details his opinion about the teams those who attend networking events as 
follows: 
“I myself don’t, however the fraud, risk and compliance [officials] do 
attend networking events. I meet with directors of other companies to 
talk about not individual frauds but to talk about high-risk programs.” 
(PaymentCo.Fredrick) 
This statement clarifies that top management is engaged in technical rather than strategic 
roles to prevent the identity theft. This statement confirms Ahmad, Maynard and Park’s 
(Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014, p. 366) findings that senior management was engaged 
in technical role to maintain the availability of technology and looks at risk superficially. 
This also confirms that directors or top managers are not practically involved in day-to-
day fraud prevention activities.  
 
Knowledge absorptive capacity 
PaymentCo mentioned few activities whereby skills of the members are updated. They 
provided example using Core Personal Development (CPD) as follows: 
“... I have to do 25 hours CPD each year… the idea is to update your 
skills and your knowledge base going to online with how the world 
changes; how the market changing in the regulations.” 
(PaymentCo.Pon) 
 
This statement provides similar practices discussed by ShopingCo. Members from 
PaymentCo also required updating their skills annually, which is mandatory. Members 
also update skills by attending networking events such as conferences. Gaining more 
experience within the industry increases knowledge absorptive capacity. This is echoed 
from these comments: 
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“You get an idea what are the burning topics happening in the industry, 
but the long you stay in the industry, you tend to like in the first few 
days, and you do not understand 90% of it. After being in the industry 
from 5-6 years, then you understand 80 to 90 % of it, and then only 10 
% of it is new.” (PaymentCo.Fredrick) 
This statement confirms the element of absorbed capacity is improved by previous 
relevant knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Junni and Sarala, 2013; Jansen, Van 
Den Bosch and Volberda, 2005). Another interviewee also confirms this as follows: 
“For the fraud analyst I think fraud skills are not necessarily gained in 
the first year. It does take several years of looking at the data, looking 
at the charge backs to understand where the risk is.” 
(PaymentCo.Jackson) 
Relevant work experience helps to improve the learning experience. PaymentCo appoints 
experienced staff and trains them. On-job training involves working with existing 
colleagues to understand the nature of the work rather than attending lectures. These 
officials are active in absorbed knowledge.  
  
Intra-transfer capability 
Participants suggested several software used to communicate internally are summarised 
in (Table 5-4). 
Table 5-4: PaymentCo internal communication mechanisms 
Mechanism Use 
Video conferring  Video conferencing is used inter-branch discussion. 
Email An email is used to pass work from one team to 
another. 
Microsoft Lync An online chatting forum is used to discuss work 
and ideas. 
Intranet Centralised database 
 
PaymentCo addressed that many teams are scattered around UK that do similar work. 
They also have internal colleagues located in branches within overseas. In terms of 
learning from members located at distant sites, they may utilise technology as follows: 
 
“We have a bi-weekly team meeting where these TV hook up like a 
video conference. So we can see each other and have a chat, talk about 
merchants who are causing us problems, talking about particular 
trends of fraudsters of what they are doing, looking out for what 
transaction they are looking at high risk. Internally, yes, discussions 
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are important. My colleague and I sit next to each other and discuss 
about what we can see she talk to me and then in a wider organisation 
LocationX [overseas] to discuss. I think that’s vital to talk to her in this 
fieldwork.” (PaymentCo.Jackson) 
“I normally take back the pack handed out from the events and I scan 
on hard drive and I send it to my team and I send them out to the team 
and his guys in the UK… [But I mentioning that] okay you don’t need 
to read all of this I highlight the sections to read them I think relevant 
to them.” (PaymentCo.Pon) 
These statements support two elements of knowledge sharing and utilisations. They share 
their own learning experiences, and use of what they have learnt from networking events 
from other organisations. They addressed the use of video conferencing for a face-to-face 
interaction support with internal colleagues. They use centralised knowledge base shared 
by risk teams only by accessing through ‘intranet’. They value what they learn from peers 
and subsidiaries.  
 
Motivation 
They addressed natural incentive to share fraud related information with peers and the 
incentive is to reduce risk. Officials from PanymentCo believe that the identity theft is a 
general issue and collaboration in it is important. All participants supported this view: 
“You all are essentially working towards a same goal, and you are 
trying to stop fraudsters and fraudulent merchants. Any exchange of 
detail is helpful; because the reality is that [if] the fraudsters could hit 
PaymentCo, [they could also hit] CompetitorCo1 and CompetitorCo2. 
I think there is no point of hiding information when it comes to fraud. 
…If you could get a fraudster prosecuted, get the police involved then 
it helped us. CompetitorCo1 and CompetitorCo2 helps wider source of 
risk and fraud community. I think really it helps to share that 
information and it helps latter on.” (PaymentCo.Jackson) 
They were asked about their motivations to share knowledge with peers in other 
organisations. Similar to ShoppingCo, they could not distinguish the difference between 
information and knowledge. Sharing fraudsters’ detail is merely sharing information. In 
the statement above, they have explained about their experience related to information 
sharing than knowledge. In the start of interview, the term knowledge was defined and 
explained.  
 
  
 Chapter 5: Data Analysis 136 
Knowledge sharing structures and mechanisms 
PaymentCo uses several structures to explore external knowledge as summarised in Table 
5-5. 
Table 5-5: PaymentCo knowledge sharing structures 
Structure Organisation 
Forums Merchant Risk Council 
Law enforcement conferences 
Visa and MasterCard 
European Congress 
Direct – one-to-one 
relationships 
Past colleagues 
Virtual communities  LinkedIn groups and Twitter feeds 
 
Partnership: They failed to address formation of strategic alliances similar to 
ShoppingCo. However, they learned new trends and techniques from subsidiaries situated 
overseas and utilised formal forums to explore knowledge from peers. 
 
Official Forums: Official forums whereby networking events are organised and a good 
example of it is Merchant Risk Council. Officials from PaymentCo were aware about the 
value of networking and events. They have provided an example as follows: 
“There is European congress turn in to get the opportunity. It is worth, 
because you sit there and there are hundred presentations. You have 
got a lot of different things. They will show you and look out through. 
There is a lot of list of session where people breakout into groups and 
have discussion about certain topics. There is a lot of presentation from 
different organisations about fraud and fraud trends. It is really a great 
conference…Visa and MasterCard do their own conferences as well.” 
(PaymentCo.Jackson) 
So we are members of master card which is like the licence. We are not 
members of particular like fraud group related specifically to fraud. 
(PaymentCo.Fredrick) 
Its compliance e-gaming, e-money conferences whether basically 
advising you of update of what we perceived and what they perceived. 
The update is going to the regulatory framework over the course of the 
next year. (PaymentCo.Pon) 
On a question how they record best practices collected from these events to check their 
acumen and memory, one participant stated that: 
“I might have to use something like that (Audiotape) or just take notes, 
because information is lost otherwise.” (PaymentCo.Jackson) 
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This statement shows that at the moment notebooks were used to record conference 
meetings. However, it can be assumed that participants were interested to use audiotape 
recorder, from being influenced with the recruited interview techniques from this study. 
A similar opinion was also found from TeleCo explained (Section, 5.4) whereby a 
participant addressed the use of interview to learn current trends.  
 
Virtual communities: members who use virtual communities such as LinkedIn and 
Twitter expressed varieties of perspectives. Some of them also subscribe to virtual forums 
whereby they get weekly compliance magazine that add value to their existing 
knowledge. However, these members addressed lack of participation than no 
participation due to several reasons, such as lack of knowledge of invaluable groups, lack 
of time, lack of invaluable e-content shared on the groups. Unlike ShoppingCo which 
addressed no participation to virtual communities, informants from PayementCo 
addressed lack of participation. 
RQ3 (b): Why some individuals have less participation in information security 
knowledge sharing? 
A participant commented that:  
“I get magazine send to me every couple of weeks, specifically 
regarding around gambling compliance. I read those when I get chance 
at home and whether traveling when I have been on the plane. But in 
terms of active day-to-day interaction with forum participation via 
various pages on LinkedIn, I haven’t got time to do it” 
(PaymentCo.Pon) 
 
Even though they subscribe to virtual communities, however, fail to gain proper time to 
participate. Therefore, they are not regular participant in networks due to time constraints. 
Other participant revealed no value of continuous subscription engagement in connecting 
with peers using virtual communities. Participant provide an example as follows: 
“I do follow some payment professionals on twitter. I use Facebook 
purely for personal. I think twitter is quite useful tool for this type of 
industry. I do follow quite a few people on Twitter and they are purely 
risk and fraud based. I look at that on daily basis to find what happen 
to know something new on there. Somebody I follow on Twitter is 
talking about certain experiences and the subject then I certainly click, 
but I don’t necessarily contact many people.” (PaymentCo.Jackson) 
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Some of them use virtual networks to remain updated on industry trends; however, many 
other participants show distrust in the information shared on virtual communities. A 
participant shared an opinion as follows: 
“I use these groups to find out what other peoples are working on and 
what is happening, and what is relevant. I do not really use it to take 
information and then say to somebody that this information I have 
found, because I do not know how accurate it is. Sometime people's 
opinion [such as] someone says 30% of people that use a card spend 
less than £20. How I know that is accurate, just because someone wrote 
there.” (PaymentCo.Fredrik) 
From these discussions, three elements were found that hinder the use of virtual 
communities as a platform for sharing knowledge. Firstly, there is time constraint. 
Secondly, not all groups seem to supply valuable content that support knowledge creation. 
Thirdly, lack of trust in the content shared through virtual communities. There is a 
possibility that the nature of work and time commitment may have an effect. Jacksons’s 
background is explorative dealing with risk to look for clues that help resolving the case. 
Fredrick is the director of card services and Pon is the compliance manger. Nature of the 
responsibility varies which affect their use of virtual communities and hence their 
participation.  
 
Informal social ties: Similar to ShoppingCo, officials from the PaymentCo addressed use 
of past ties that help to resolve issues associated with the identity theft. They utilise 
previous relationships. They also hide information about their customers (merchants) 
during the discussion and believe that sharing fraud related information is not a 
competitive concern. They are supportive in sharing fraud and risk related knowledge to 
overcome the identity theft, as follows:  
“In a fraud and risk environment it is quite community I feel. If I phoned 
up an ex- colleague in PreviousCo – when you are talking about fraud 
you could not give away information about the merchants, but you 
could talk about trends and you could talk about issues. You have got 
sells people – they would not communicate with each other from 
organisations to organisation, which is understandable.” 
(PaymentCo.Jackson) 
“It is a small industry, so you could ignore your competition. You can 
try to work together to find a better solution.” (PaymentCo.Fredrick) 
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These statements provide two views of their understanding. Firstly, they are aware of the 
value of their customers’ information during the collaborations. Secondly, they are aware 
that fraud related people have a competitive advantage in sharing fraud related knowledge 
and trends. Therefore, PayemntCo welcomes collaboration and discussion associated 
with fraud related links and knowledge. 
 
Trust and risk  
PaymentCo addressed similar risk identified by the ShoppingCo, such as a leakage of 
valuable information during the collaboration. However, these officials could not address 
other risk as they normally communicate with peers on the forums. They do not have 
specialised strategic alliances, neither have they shown any demand to form one as 
evident from the following comments:  
“I have been to law enforcement conferences. And they always run I 
think on Chatham house rule- where anything you say in that room will 
so stay in that room. Free to use information. It is say anonymised. You 
are happy to have a discussion about various themes. More often, you 
start at conference, or start at conversation or meeting and someone 
would say the Chatham house rule applies in there and everybody is 
free to discuss. Then it is not going to be open for prosecution (Laugh). 
It is sort of anonymous discussion. That sort of use is quite frequent.”  
(PaymentCo.Jackson) 
Nature of knowledge 
They were asked whether video conferencing is used to improve the learning experience. 
Regarding preference of face-to-face versus online conferencing, a participant responded 
that: 
“I personally prefer face-to-face… I feel like personalised here I am 
watching somebody where I could easily turn off and look at my laptop 
and just going to my emails and he has not got a clue. Whereas actually 
at the events you might have the focus completely on the person who is 
speaking.” (PaymentCo.Pon) 
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5.4 TeleCo  
TeleCo deals with a number of online retailers who sell gas, electricity and phone 
contracts online. TeleCo assists online retailers to reach their customers with minimal 
cost. Since the company communicates with the consumers directly and deals with 
personal information and financial details. Therefore, it is investigated in order to explore 
the measures taken to secure consumers information system. This case was motivated by 
an empirical investigation by Okeke (2015) where the perpetrators of the identity frauds 
are likely to be call centre agents. The company is profit oriented and plans to grow. 
However, the company could not show knowledge intensive activities. Therefore, 
findings from this company case study are limited in terms knowledge sharing and 
management elements due to its size. 
 
5.4.1 Identity Theft Prevention Practice 
TeleCo addressed two procedures to comply with customers’ information security. 
Firstly, company implements Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). 
Secondly, Office of Communication (Ofcom) regulations are followed to comply with 
selling procedures.  
 
TeleCo’s work involves dealing with customers’ information. Oliver, an outbound agent, 
provides an example as “name, address, date of birth, and finally direct debit number” 
(TeleCo.Oliver). Their daily work is engaged with dialler software to deal with 
customers’ information and is stored on an internal server comes with dialler package. 
Considering dealing with customers’ information they were asked about the security 
procedures. A variety of perspectives was addressed with one participant commenting 
that:  
“There is definitely, obviously security management on our data. So 
dialler for example wouldn’t save certain details. For example, account 
numbers, sort code, credit cards 16 digit numbers, CVV codes so these 
would not actually save because it is actually an import field over the 
script so they could actually import customer’s first name, surname or 
address. There are no fields for them to enter any financial details. And 
also there is a feature on the dialler itself that pauses the call recording 
when taking the payment details so they can make pauses when they are 
taking vulnerable information they make pause in the call recording” 
(TeleCo.Gizmo).  
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Statement from this participant suggests that a pause option may be utilised when 
financial details are discussed during the online sale. This stores the financial information 
on the server. However, TeleCo failed to address whether the agents were trained to use 
this option. Another participant addressed the use of an independent server which is PCI 
regulated to store card details supplied by customers; echoed as follows: 
“We have recently PCI certified as a company in terms of transmission 
of secure data such as card details and bank details. We have to comply 
by PCI compliance. We have port in the back which is PCI room which 
is where we take card details its separate operating network. We have 
dialler network and all the rest of service I kept separate from PCI 
network there is no other information I will transfer back and forth in 
the same network on the PCI network we just need to take secure details 
such as card details and bank account details from customers” 
(TeleCo.Happy). 
This statement contradicts previous comments whereby the use of pause option is advised. 
Gizmo’s statement dictates that they omit to store card details. Other interviewee raised 
a question in response to storing customer card details with a slight contradiction as 
follows:  
“We take sort code and account numbers and we pass on secure details. 
What can you do with sort code account number?” (TeleCo.Preston) 
Preston believes that sort code and account number may not be applicable to defraud 
companies. From all specified statements, it is clear that the concern of these officials is 
to secure payment card, financial and banking information. Members from TeleCo are 
not completely aware of the value of customers’ personal information and believe that 
fraudsters only use the card details.  
5.4.2 Knowledge Sharing Practice 
Knowledge absorptive capacity: To improve learning experience of members about 
security procedure, IT manager was asked whether any in-house training program is 
organised or external events are attended by members of staff and responded: 
“We are just a small business and we need to be quite dynamic and 
adaptive sometimes. There will be need for any department to 
temporarily to come in. These guys have been here for a couple of 
years... We have to be flexible in terms of their skills as well they can’t 
just focus on only one area because we are just small company and 
needs to be dynamic... We like to push them we don’t have any structure 
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of performance and development they all develop them for themselves” 
(TeleCo.Happy) 
This statement shows that there is no training offered or awareness systems are provided 
that guide data preservation. These members deal with customers’ personal information. 
They need to be aware of the value of the data supplied by customers.  
 
Intra-transfer capability: These people are situated in same geographic location under 
the same roof and not much efforts and mechanism are required to communicate. 
 
Knowledge sharing structures and mechanisms 
 
Informal social ties: Similar to previous two companies, TeleCo also addressed that peers 
learn new tactics and trends from employees appointed from other similar organisations. 
Gizmo provided states as follows: 
“Yeah we have agents obviously who have joined our team coming from 
other call centres. So the agents give feedback that how the other call 
centres run their business or how they actually manage their side as 
well and they will know to a certain extent for example the dialler 
strategy and the data strategy they wouldn’t know.” (TeleCo.Gizmo) 
Gizmo shows his interest in learning from other organisations using interview technique 
by being influenced by interviewer. However, neither literature considered interview as 
strategy to gain an external knowledge, nor the other participant interviewed in this study 
showed any interest. Gizmo states that: 
“The way you learn about it is really going to interviews other jobs so 
if you’re going to interviews for the dialler management and other jobs 
interview from all the companies we need to get the information from 
the IT people exactly how you’re doing right now.” (TeleCo.Gizmo) 
Nature of knowledge: Nature of their work is a mixture of technical and strategic 
practices. Few roles addressed strategy at senior management positions such as Jessie, 
Happy, Preston, and Mac (Figure 4-6, Table 4-3). Outbound call centre agents possess 
tacit knowledge for persuading people to buy online. Others such as Nickel, Gizmo, and 
Oliver possessed IT skills. Most of these skills are tacit.  
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5.5 NetworkingCo  
NetworkingCo is a none-profit organisation which provides a networking service to the 
online retailers. It is not an online shopping organisation as such, however due to the 
nature of service provided, such as networking and communication, it is considered for 
investigation and support findings from other organisations. NetworkingCo was 
investigated to confirm opinions acquired from officials. NetworkingCo provides 
collaboration and networking facility to communicate, therefore, is able to view the 
dynamics of the businesses. They have provided a clearer view on what works. 
NetworkingCo was investigated to comment on retailers’ motivation and participation in 
the knowledge sharing process. This company is not large. It only recruited fewer than 
100 members of staff (Table 4-2). Therefore, only two officials were interviewed from 
core communication position. Findings from NetworkingCo are structured as follows: 
Value from cross sector data is discussed. Knowledge sharing practice and extent to 
which subscribers of NetworkingCo are willing to share knowledge is then provided. The 
nature of knowledge shared is detailed. Discussing what does not provide a benefit to 
retailers concludes the findings from NetworkingCo. 
 
NetworkingCo Services 
The participating members who pay subscription fees founded NetworkingCo. The 
subscription fee depends on the size of the organisation and the value attached to 
knowledge exchange. The more risk appetite a company is, the more it is paying for the 
subscription. NetworkingCo was initially set to support organisations from the financial 
service sector and the underlined principle was that if the fraudsters can target one 
organisation, they also could target the next organisation. It was formed based on the 
principle that fraud is not competitive. To prevent frauds, they need to connect and 
collaborate. Thus, reciprocity is the key to connecting members.  
 
5.5.1 Forum’s Membership – Advantages  
NetworkingCo was asked several investigative questions including the knowledge and 
information shared with retailers is able to reduce identity theft. Cross sector data, 
synthesised and domain specific knowledge found useful to help retailers in addressing 
and mitigating identity theft as explained below.  
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Cross sector data: NetworkingCo addressed two major services to help retailers in 
addressing and mitigating identity theft. Firstly, they share a central database consisting 
of the fraudsters’ information amongst the subscribed retailers. Retailers use this data to 
check whether the person who is placing an online order is a genuine or a potential 
fraudster. They compare information supplied by the customer against the NetworkingCo 
database before shipping any goods. In response to the question whether knowledge 
shared through networking forums is able to reduce risk associated to identity theft, 
Sophie provides an answer to this as follows: 
“We think there is value for the cross sector data that our existing 
members record on the database to be used in that more transactional 
environment. People open accounts; they try to make delivery, order 
goods and leave the accounts [opened]. It is very sad situation when 
someone opens account mostly for identity fraud related using 
somebody’s name and current details and specify delivery address to 
somewhere else. So it is a case of looking at most appropriate ways to 
get the data into most useful part of the e-retailers chain essentially.” 
(NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
This statement emphasises the need for effective networking forums which share 
knowledge among the retailers, because NetworkingCo as a communication mediator 
found useful medium for centralised databases. Can knowledge shared on online 
communities such as LinkedIn groups benefit information security professionals to 
reduce wheel reinvention (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013; 
Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014). NetworkingCo provides both online as well as offline 
mediums to all members to interact. This aspect has dual benefits. NetworkingCo as a 
communication mediator is a useful networking structure to help retailers address and 
mitigate identity theft. The above statement also suggests that data shared is as important 
as the knowledge to help address and mitigate the identity theft.  
 
Sophie’s explanation regarding identity theft is applicable to any credit granting retailer 
whereby customers create an online account, obtain a line of credit, place an order, and 
receive goods. Credit granting retailers have a great propensity to becoming victims of 
identity theft and related crimes. These retailers involve less financial transactions and 
more information. They mainly operate business on personal information supplied by 
their customers. Sophie agrees with this view by addressing that credit granting retailers 
use fraudsters’ database more than other retailers do. This is view is stated as follows: 
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“We have [members from] the online retail who basically allow 
[customers] to set up an account … and then they expend a line of credit 
to [them to] purchase again, and then customers pay off whatever [they 
have purchased]. So it is the less transaction, and it is the most specific 
area of the e-retailing sector. They will be actually looking to see we 
are offering a line of credit, and can this person afford it… They have 
many things in place which can help prevent fraud mostly around the 
transaction… So they are most representative of the e-retail sector. 
They are taking more information.” (NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
This statement brings to light working operations of many retailers. There are few 
retailers have high risk elements associated with identity theft, whereas other may have 
low risk with customers’ information misuse. However, it is unclear whether a centrally 
shared database is useful to control all types of identity theft cases, because different 
retailers have different risk tolerance. Sophie confirmed that a cross sector information is 
useful for different retailers, because it allows them to check and match fraudulent cases 
committed in different sectors. A suspect, who used a genuine detail to defraud a bank, 
can also use same detail in the retail. Thus, a shared database allows security officials to 
check, relate and identify identity fraud. Sophie further explains that, a risk exists when 
a person’s delivery address does not match the current address, because there is possibility 
that the address on the account checks out, the name on the account checks out, the CVV 
(Card Verification Value) also checks out. A genuine customer may also try to defraud 
the retailer. This issue is already addressed in the literature review (Section 2.2). 
ShoppingCo and PaymentCo have also addressed this problem. Similarly, NetworkingCo 
have also expressed concerns about first party fraud where customers intentionally 
defraud companies using their own details. However, the exact value from loss is 
unknown due to many reasons such as; it is difficult to convince retailers that their current 
customers are deceiving them, and discussed first party fraud can cause reputational 
damage. They also find it expensive to prove that their customers are defrauding them. 
Consequently, companies keep it well hidden.  
 
Synthesised knowledge: NetworkingCo updates members with synthesised best practices 
gained from several sources. In collaboration with s law enforcement departments such 
as the UK Home Office, the London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), 
and the National Crime Agency (NCA), NetworkingCo obtains data on how and why 
fraudsters steal identity information. This information is then analysed and converted into 
 Chapter 5: Data Analysis 146 
a useful report disseminated among the retailers. As such, it provides members with a 
fluid mix of knowledge that they can use to prevent identity theft. Ben gives an example:  
“I have got the operational lead for NetworkingCo’s engagement with 
law enforcement departments. The purpose of that is to try, and obtain 
intelligence. On how fraudsters do what they do and why. So that we 
can turn into something useful that members can use to prevent fraud.”  
(NetworkingCo.Ben) 
This statement shows that the information gathered from several sources is converted into 
useful knowledge which is shared among members to tackle frauds. Retailers use 
NetworkingCo as mediator for many reasons, including its reputation to help prevent 
online frauds. NetworkingCo is a reputable organisation working under signed 
contractual governance. Sophie stated that: 
“When an organisation joins NetworkingCo, they sign up to a set of 
rules. Those rules govern the use of the data. When they turn up to 
working party meetings, it is essentially done under Chatham House 
Rule. There is no formal signing on the dotted line; it is an understood 
principle. Mostly because the NetworkingCo’s model is quite mature. 
The meeting themselves are being held from quite a long time. And one 
of those interesting things where the people who are working with fraud 
team change, but not necessarily the attitude of people in the fraud. So 
there is respect for the intelligence which is shared. Should [we] say 
that within the NetworkingCo meetings individual level intelligence is 
not shared, or someone not going to turn up and say [for example] Job 
Logs attend high street, or this particular solicitor or whatever.” 
(NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
This statement addressed many valuable points. Firstly, shared knowledge is sanitised as 
best practice, so that retailers can trust and apply information. Secondly, they do not 
accept knowledge from unauthorised people. Thirdly, they have confirmed that the 
practice is applied and tested by an authorised member of the forum. Finally, the members 
trust the content shared because of the reputation of the forum.  
  
Domain specific knowledge: NetworkingCo organises events for members to collaborate 
and discuss latest trends. In response to a question, whether they invite officials from a 
similar domain to facilitate knowledge comprehension, Sophie stated that:  
“Everyone in NetworkingCo’s membership is invited. It is basically an 
open invitation, obviously for sector specific. We have business sector 
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working parties which are sector specific. This is an opportunity for 
people offering the same goods and services or whatever it is, who are 
likely to be suffering from same suite of fraud risk, to get go and to talk 
about fraud risk. We are not expecting someone unlikely to turn up… 
but [we care] how to make best use of NetworkingCo and its services. 
[For instance] if you turn up to organised fraud intelligence group 
meetings which are regionally around the country, they are cross 
sector. They are looking at fraud intelligence, fraud prevention 
specifically.  (NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
The above statement indicates two kinds of conferences that help gain fraud prevention 
knowledge. There are sector specific and there are cross sector. Members use both to 
enhance knowledge. However, to discuss on an issue that retailers with better intelligence 
are reluctant to share their knowledge with weak ties, the participants from NetworkingCo 
were asked, whether some companies are better informed with the relevant knowledge 
than others. This question was asked to check barriers associated with power relations, 
and issues associated with knowledge asymmetry (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1). ShoppingCo 
also found to lock-in knowledge within boundary rather than to share it with weak ties. 
Participants from NetworkingCo commented that: 
“Some [retailers] are better than others. [However] again it depends 
on the type of product and services being offered [by them]. In some 
organisations, their fraud teams are fire fighting. They are not in a 
position to do something proactive. They are just dealing with it. Others 
have strategic locate on it. They are looking to make sure they are 
getting [a complete] intelligence from various different places. [This in 
turn help them] to be able to look at things given [such as] what this 
member had told us there, perhaps we should be tweaking some of our 
rules about what to prioritise and what to flag, and what sort of 
transaction we should be looking at, are there not so much. It is 
depending on risk appetite there is a range of take up of all services.” 
(NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
Sophie distinguishes the nature of the reactive and proactive retailers. The organisations 
prone to identity theft tend to be more explorative in nature to gain strategic knowledge 
from various sources. The nature of work attracts members’ decision whether there is 
value in spending efforts to gain an external knowledge. She referred to two different 
organisations. The first is reactive that could eliminate decisions of the members to 
participate in meetings. The second is proactive which gains power and strategic hold to 
deal cyber-attacks. This leads some organisations to perform better than others do to 
tackle identity theft. This supports the opinion provided by ShoppingCo. However, it also 
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depends on the nature of the work and depends on extent to which company is risk 
tolerant.  
 
5.5.2 Forum’s Membership – Disadvantages  
Referring back to literature review, a question was asked to evaluate what does not seem 
to be providing benefit with regards to the knowledge shared over forums to help address 
and mitigate identity theft (RQ1 (b)). NetworkingCo addressed two elements that do not 
seem to work. Firstly, some organisations obtain memberships to use services but avoid 
their own contribution. Intentionally or otherwise, some members fail to contribute their 
knowledge. This is expressed as follows: 
“We have [certain] organisations who are just taking and not actually 
providing information…” (NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
NetworkingCo identified a number of reasons which makes participants reluctant to 
participate. Many retailers join NetworkingCo to access fraudulent database. Others are 
not interested to explore an external knowledge. Consequently, they do not value 
networking opportunities. Retail, banking and plastic card were found more active to 
contribute their knowledge, because they are the large sectors, and they have the most 
expensive fraud risk than the others such as fire-fighting. There are also budget 
constraints. NetworkingCo arranges most events in the central London. Other 
organisations found it difficult and costly to send their staff to attend conferences. To help 
improve retailers’ knowledge contribution, NetworkingCo is trying to improve tactics. 
One of the strategies is identified as follows: 
“We are trying to place meetings strategically to make it easy for them 
to turn up... [Such as] more sort of business group working party type 
meetings [to be organised] more regionally.” (NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
In addition, the nature of retail business is quick to respond to customers’ requests. They 
need to analyse the information supplied by customers quickly and compare fields to 
identify whether it is a genuine or fraudulent person. This allows them to decide quickly 
whether to allow customer to checkout or not. A time taking checkout process prevents 
customers’ attention interest to shop online, and they walk away. Essentially, this is a 
major loss, because retailers make income from customers who buy their products. Even 
though NetworkingCo data is valuable to help retailers to identify an identity fraud, 
however, they find it difficult to process data appropriately. This is addressed as follows:   
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“The data that we hold would be of a value. [However] the challenge 
is to put that data in the process at the most appropriate time. 
[Because] the risk reward balance for an e- retailer is a bit different to 
other organisations that we work with. The more transaction e-retailers 
require data quickly to put into process. Failing to do so causes 
customer’s walk away. The amount of walk away from the people who 
fill their basket, and then find that check out process is too long. That 
is something that e- retailer are much more concerned with than the 
something possibly like a loan provider. If someone comes to you and 
wants to borrow 10 grand and people expect it to be a longer process 
than if you are purchasing the goods costing probably £100.” 
(NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
This statement reveals many valuable points including that there is a need for an efficient 
staff in the Networking organisations to process data quickly. Otherwise, retailers may 
find it useless, as they may lose customers.  The nature of e-retailer is more sensitive to 
attract customers than other business organisations. 
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5.6 Cross-Case Comparison 
Often commonly generated themes are discussed in this section. This section compares 
the summarised findings from different cases. Due to the nature of work, ShoppingCo 
and PaymentCo are more risk prone organisations to identity theft. Therefore, these 
organisations have a dedicated fraud prevention team. Members from these teams were 
investigated in depth to explore their roles and responsibilities and their knowledge 
sharing abilities.  
 
Informal social ties: In all cases informants reported that there is a natural incentive to 
share fraudsters’ information. Members also addressed the use of past ties to extract fraud 
prevention knowledge. Informal knowledge networks are mostly based on one-to-one 
relationships, however, and its use is limited to individual working in the teams. Security 
officials use telephone to discuss fraudulent cases. ShoppingCo and PaymentCo 
participants evidenced its use. Jackson from PaymentCo, for instance, recently moved 
from its CompetitorCo, where he was close to his past colleagues. He addressed this by 
sharing various contact details. This use of past ties allows both companies in a bi-
directional flow of information (Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011). Similarly, 
ShoppingCo officials trust to share security related knowledge with friends only than with 
other officials. They provide some examples of what they believe friends are, and whether 
they are trustworthy as follows:  
“The best practices and ideas are usually shared between the friends 
and not at the forums, because you cannot always trust the people who 
can keep that information and then use it sensibly.” 
(ShoppingCo.Freedy) 
In the above statement, it is clear that security officials are reluctant to discuss their ideas 
at the forums openly. Because, they are unaware who can use information wisely. 
Majority of the participants from a senior management favoured to share their knowledge 
with friends than peers. Officials from PaymentCo have also supported this and provided 
their opinion as follows: 
“You tend to know people from large organisations, if they are your 
friends, you can give them a call to ask for ideas” (PaymentCo.Pon) 
 “Depends what you call friends; Are they people who I would like to 
have a coffee with, yeah I would, but generally its work related 
conversation. Would I invite them to my wedding, no, they are your 
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work colleagues first, and then they would be your friends.” 
(PayemtnCo.Fredrick) 
Top management sought to maintain confidentiality from competitors. Therefore, 
knowledge shared on current trends is only valued at official meetings organised by 
approved forums than informal gatherings. Knowledge on current trends is normally 
shared internally, regardless whether an internal peer is situated at a distance. Knowledge 
sharing among the peers belong to different organisations is normally what happens at 
organised official meetings such as conferences. Retailers consider customers’ 
information sensitive element during the collaborations. This is evidenced as follows: 
“Obviously, you cannot share everything about your customers. You 
know that our customer is the [valuable] data that we have. We should 
go some way to share information on fraudsters. That does happen; 
when we feel there is need to do that collaboration, we do that. But it is 
very limited.” (ShoppingCo.Bram) 
Absorptive capacity - on-job learning: Even though participants supported the notion 
that learning from peers is useful to improve their knowledge and efficiency to address 
and mitigate identity theft; most of the participants build their knowledge from on-job 
learning. For instance, 
“I really think on job learning is very important. And for the fraud 
analyst I think fraud skills are not necessarily gained in the first year. 
It does take several years of looking at the data, looking at the charge 
backs to understand where the risk is.” (PaymentCo.Jackson) 
In the above statement, it is clear that experience improve security officials’ performance 
and analytic ability to deal with identity theft. Therefore, PaymentCo prefers to hire 
experienced staff for the positions of information systems security. Even though 
participants were not completely denying the value from formal education, however, most 
of them supported learning by doing and by observing colleagues more than formal 
education. This is evidenced as follows:  
“When a new starter comes in, they learn about the basics, but the 
important part is to sit with other fraud and risk people to learn the 
role, to learn the job… I think you can have all the education in the 
world but it is the real job training doing the analytical work that 
improves your analytical skills” (PaymentCo.Jackson)  
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This perspective is similar discussed earlier in the social constructivist epistemology 
(Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2), whereby constructivist researchers believed that people make 
sense of their work through sharing learning experiences with others using the medium 
such as language and observation (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2012, p. 23; 
Ringberg and Reihlen, 2008, p. 915). This is similar to the socialisation process described 
by Nonaka (1994, p. 19) where he asserts that businesses employ principle of on-the-job 
training, so that professionals can learn from each other by interacting, observing, 
imitating and practicing. 
 
Intra-organisational transfer capability: Retailers are equipped with internal social 
media to diffuse knowledge inside the organisational boundaries. However, lack of 
internal trust obstructs knowledge dissemination. This aspect has been found at senior 
management. ShoppingCo participants have addressed intra-organisational virtual 
communities with the use Yammer and Shine. However, internal virtual groups are 
mainly formed to share company achievements rather than knowledge. PaymentCo 
discussed the use of company owned intranet. Findings from this study clearly show that 
internal virtual communities are mainly formed for spreading awareness than sharing 
knowledge. Companies use these communities to disseminate company and departmental 
achievements.  
Role of knowledge manager is obvious that handle different informants and knowledge 
coming from many internal knowledge holders. There is need of compartmentalisations 
whereby access should be limited to those who are trustworthy staff and in need of 
updated information in the security field. Knowledge manager’s role shall not only be 
limited to keep track of knowledge coming from various sources, but also to concentrate 
which members can be better in exploring, integrating and/or disseminating an external 
knowledge to benefit the business.  Thus, knowledge can be appropriately disseminated 
and utilised.  
Motivation: Internally security professional are motivated to teach and learn from peers. 
ShoppingCo and PaymentCo both have evidenced these motivations. Intrinsic motivation 
can be a positive factor to share knowledge with external peers. This has been tenderly 
utilised by Jackson from PaymentCo. However, this can bring negative impact when 
knowledge workers are experiencing over enthusiast to learn from peers. Unlike 
Tmajdyamcholo (2014, p. 29) findings which suggest that security officials negatively 
react to knowledge sharing when experiencing low motivation, this study in contrast have 
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found a negative reaction when security official’s motivation is higher to get knowledge 
from external sources. Following quotation evidences this fear:  
“There was a phrase that we were used to use during Second World 
War ‘loose lips, sink ships’. You can say too much sometimes, you can 
be really energetic, enthusiastic to your organisation and someone can 
use this against you. You have to be careful about specially security 
related measures, and customers, staff, supplier, and buyers’ data. 
Otherwise it’s very personal.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
Summary of the cases: Table 5-6 shows identity theft prevention applied by the retailers. 
Results from NetworkingCo in Table (5-6) are considered omitted, because it provides 
fraud prevention knowledge than tackling with identity thieves on its own. NetworkingCo 
was specifically investigated to answer RQ1 to help address what is working and what 
does not seem to be providing benefit to the retailers in terms of shared knowledge to 
address and mitigate identity theft. It also commented few aspects concerning RQ2 and 
RQ3 to address extent to which companies are willing to share their knowledge with each 
other, and why some officials are less active to contribute their knowledge sharing. 
Therefore, Table 5-7 to 5-9 have also considered findings summarised from 
NetworkingCo. Findings from TeleCo are very rare due to nature of their work and size 
of the company was small. This company was found less intensive to knowledge 
management activities.  
  
Table 5-6: Identity theft prevention measures 
ShoppingCo 
 
PaymentCo 
 
TeleCo 
 
Customers’ profiling 
Covert security operations 
Risk assessment 
Internal deterrence policy 
Awareness and training 
Customers’ policy  
Compliance 
IT-Security 
Customers’ profiling 
Transaction monitoring 
Credit risk assessment 
Internal deterrence policy 
On-the-job training 
Merchants’ policy  
Compliance 
IT-Security 
PCI Compliance 
Disabling 
computer ports 
and pen drives 
from staff use 
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Table 5-7: Forum’s knowledge sharing - Advantage 
NetworkingCo ShoppingCo 
 
PaymentCo 
 
TeleCo 
 
Cross sector data Interested in support 
from law enforcement 
Interested in industry 
specific knowledge 
Limited in sector 
specific knowledge  
Synthesised 
knowledge  
Active in gaining 
industry-specific and 
synthesised knowledge 
shared with senior 
management 
Active in converting 
information into 
useful knowledge for 
better business 
decision, are able to 
diffuse and use 
knowledge within 
departments 
Individual 
knowledge than 
synthesised shared 
knowledge  
Domain specific 
knowledge  
Interested mainly in the 
domain specific 
knowledge, in fraud 
and risk domain 
Interested in domain 
and non-domain 
knowledge 
Limited knowledge 
in information 
security 
 
 
Table 5-8: Forums knowledge sharing - Disadvantage 
NetworkingCo ShoppingCo 
 
PaymentCo 
 
TeleCo 
 
Lack of knowledge 
contribution to 
knowledge sharing 
practice by lectures 
Only senior 
management attends 
organised meetings 
Less contribution to 
share knowledge by 
lectures 
No use of lectures to 
deliver knowledge  
Need quick staff for 
data processing 
Lack of knowledge 
manager to record 
knowledge 
Lack of knowledge 
manager to record 
knowledge 
Lack of knowledge 
manager to record 
knowledge 
 
 
Table 5-9: Knowledge sharing on social media groups 
NetworkingCo ShoppingCo 
 
PaymentCo 
 
TeleCo 
 
Nature of work is 
may be reactive or 
less prone to 
identity theft. 
 
 
Lack of knowledge of 
accurate sources 
Lack of time 
Lack of knowledge 
grading  
Lack of knowledge 
sanitising  
Risk of leakage 
Lack of accurate 
sources 
Lack of time  
Small sized 
organisation – non 
knowledge 
intensive company 
Imbalance 
knowledge level: 
some retailers are 
better in knowledge 
than others are. 
Risk of gaining 
knowledge of low 
quality  
Waste of time Lack of resources 
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5.7 Summary of the findings 
This study has found that companies are not willing to share knowledge on one-to-one 
basis unless involves in official contract. They welcome collaboration through 
confidentiality and data breach agreements. Trust needs to be reinforced for better 
collaboration. Confidentiality agreements need to be implemented. The use of police unit 
as a communication mediator and dedicated official forum to share retailers’ knowledge 
is required. Information helps knowledge creation. Officials make decision based on 
information shared, and then turn it into useful knowledge that benefits companies. 
However, staff lacks to distinguish information and knowledge. Security officials found 
less aware of value gained from information shared at networking forums. Companies 
share fraudsters’ information and cops contact details with each other to help detect fraud. 
They also share best practice in the form of security operations and other trends. They 
shared knowledge and information but they are not aware of it. The knowledge manager 
is required in this profession to manage and prioritise the knowledge coming into the 
organisations from different sources to benefit the business. 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses findings presented in Chapter 5. The model is discussed based on 
answers addressed to key research questions and examines the implications. RQ1 is 
discussed and seeks to address what is working in the retail and what does not seem to be 
providing benefit with regard to knowledge sharing to address and mitigate identity theft. 
RQ2 addresses extent to which companies are willing to share fraud prevention 
knowledge with each other and under which condition(s). RQ3 evaluates why some 
individual either do not take part or have little active participation in information security 
knowledge sharing. RQ4 addressed by proposing retailers with a new extended 
framework to improve their knowledge sharing activities in the security profession. The 
chapter is summarised by discussing similarities and differences of the extended model.   
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Figure 6-1: Proposed framework of inter-organisational identity theft prevention knowledge sharing in the security profession in retail  
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6.2 RQ1 Fraud Prevention Forums: Merits and Demerits 
RQ1 (a): was asked (Section 2.6) regarding online fraud forums to explore that:  
What is working for the retailers with regard to knowledge sharing to 
address and mitigate identity theft? 
The forums were useful from two perspectives: firstly, knowledge is synthesised, 
sanitised and then shared with members to help businesses to prevent identity theft. 
Secondly, the reputation of the forum gains members’ trust whereby knowledge 
exchanged fluidly. Trusted fraud forums such as NetworkingCo, not only help in 
exchange of information but also assist with specialised knowledge. The information 
shared in these forums is converted into useful knowledge and is utilised by the security 
officials to benefit businesses by preventing online frauds. Synthesis of data, information 
and knowledge was found useful to address and mitigate identity theft. Members gain 
information and can convert into useful knowledge for sound business decisions. 
ShoppingCo and PaymentCo both agreed to this view. The risk associated with the loss 
of sensitive information going to competitor was not an issue when knowledge exchanged 
through trusted forums. 
RQ1 (b) was asked to explore: 
What does not seem to be providing benefit to the retailers with regards 
to knowledge sharing to address and mitigate identity theft? 
Security officials were unaware of value gained from exchange of information. On the 
basis of this information they make business decisions that prevents identity theft. Forums 
help not only to share data but also best practice. However, retailers are not fully aware 
of the value that can be gained from the information and knowledge obtained from 
forums. Retailers believe that they subscribe to fraud forums to become more aware of 
the burning topics about where the industry is heading.  
 
Nevertheless, security officials who share their knowledge at the conferences also want 
to gain access to the police. Conference meetings are used as platform to approach law 
enforcement. Even though ShoppingCo shares knowledge in organised conferences to 
spread their reputation. Thus, are able to get police involvement in criminal investigations 
and prosecutions. This desire is prominent as noticed before that companies themselves 
cannot arrest or prevent identity thieves. Their desire to get police involvement is given 
as follows: 
 Chapter 6: Discussion 159 
“Our main aim is to get into the police. Now I appreciate what you 
really concerned about is if we have information intelligence, we should 
pass that intelligence to other businesses. People guard their data and 
hide their data protection [strategies]... And hide behind at wrong time. 
Very little comes out from other end. In fact, I do not ever remember 
any one connected with Networking Company coming towards… So the 
actual I think what you are trying to get as we should all share. But I 
don’t think when we are sharing through Networking Company that is 
sufficient coming from other sides. I think they [Networking Company] 
are trying to make changes to get it to come out but it is not at the 
moment.” (ShoppingCo.Jon) 
This statement supports two elements: firstly, it is clear that ShoppingCo’s enthusiasm to 
get police involvement; for them this is more important than knowledge sharing. This 
leads them to use networking forums to disseminate their reputation. Showing a 
competitive knowledge and skills assists them to create reputation. Tamjidyamcholo et 
al. (2014, p. 23) confirm this as follows: 
“Knowledge contributors are able to gain more profit when they have 
the chance to show others that they have invaluable skills and 
capabilities.” 
Secondly, this statement also shows that the retailers distrust each other. Consequently, 
they either lock-in knowledge within their boundaries or provides knowledge of low 
quality to other businesses. This aspect confirms the theory of power relations discussed 
in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.1) whereby organisations either lock-in or provide knowledge 
of low quality to companies which lack in knowledge and other resources. A similar 
opinion was also extracted from NetworkingCo, with a slight contradiction:  
“A lot of it depends on outlook of the individual organisation about 
whether their priority is just purely the use of data or whether they see 
value in the networking as well. It is not necessarily based on the size 
of organisations. It is more sort of the priority of organisations. It also 
depends on the amount of resource that is going towards their fraud 
teams. Some over the other if they have people they can afford to send 
to office to attend the meetings, because they see value in that and they 
do.” (NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
NetworkingCo agreed that some companies are better in knowledge than others are. 
However, it is not their efficiency only that makes them better, but an engagement with 
customers’ information. A credit granting company is more prone to identity theft. 
Therefore, they have a natural incentive to use networking events to be aware of the 
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burning topics in the industry. It also depends on the value that individuals gain from 
networking. Even though ShoppingCo is a credit granting business, it does not seem to 
recognise full value that could be gained from networking. Participants recruited 
misunderstood the elements of collaboration and knowledge sharing. Consequently, they 
focus upon company interests than knowledge sharing.  
 
ShoppingCo staff members were better in knowledge sharing and information exploration 
at networking events. However, only senior management gets the chance to attend the 
conferences. A participant stated that: 
“I have been lucky because I have been at forefront of pushing 
managed deliveries more than Jon [Head of Intelligence] and Carl 
[Head of Physical Security] do, because they are not in London all the 
time. Being in London, I have been invited to other meetings. So I have 
been to new Scotland Yard a couple times at different types of meetings 
like intelligence sharing with their business crime hub. They are trying 
to open new business crime unit, which is going to [have] between 200 
and 400 offices. And I met with people only a couple of days ago with 
regards to that so that I can show them the best practice for managed 
deliveries whether they are or not going to take on some of our work 
directly, if they do it is brilliant. ShoppingCo got legs in the door or 
foot in the door before anybody else.” (ShoppingCo.Greg) 
From above statement, it is clear that participation to attend networking events is 
considered from the standpoint of geographic feasibility rather than business advantage. 
It was noticed in findings (Chapter 5, Section 5.6.4) that ShoppingCo does not appoint 
any knowledge managers who share these learning experiences with other staff, nor does 
this participant or other participants addressed any formal internal collaboration. 
Consequently, knowledge is not adequately utilised by the security officers. However, 
the matter of the fact is not that other members do not attend networking events. What is 
the benefit to explore knowledge from other organisations if it is not utilised (Easterby‐
Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008)?  
 
A new element is therefore added to the framework (Figure 6-1) – the role of person in-
charge knowledge management. This person is situated at the centre of intra-
organisational and inter-organisational communication to keep track of knowledge 
arising from several sources so that it can be utilised effectively.  
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6.3 RQ2 Companies willingness to form strategic alliances 
RQ2 (b) was asked to explore: 
 
Under which condition(s) are companies willing to share fraud 
prevention knowledge with each other? 
 
Companies share knowledge with each other by forming strategic alliances with a desire 
of obtaining official contract, fair balance of knowledge sharing and human resource. 
Currently, there is limited interaction on official basis. Mainly individual who have strong 
past ties are able to gain knowledge from peers.  
 
Online business considers customers’ details vitally important during the discussions. 
ShoppingCo and PaymentCo believe that their customers’ information going to 
competitors represent a major vulnerability in collaboration. During the knowledge 
sharing process, they may leak customers’ private information. They also have addressed 
misuse from shared knowledge. This was explicitly addressed by fears from industry 
espionage, reputation damage, stealing of ideas. These are the potential barriers in 
initiating knowledge sharing. These results confirm the fears highlighted by Bacerra, 
Lunnan and Huemer (2008) who discovered that knowledge sharing is a risky and a 
potential vulnerable activity.  
 
RQ2 (a) was designed to explore: 
 
To what extent are companies willing to share fraud prevention 
knowledge with each other? 
At organisational level, companies are generally unwilling to share knowledge with each 
other. At individual level, officials use relationships with trusted past colleagues to 
exchange knowledge. The major structure for collaboration is the trusted forum. They 
lack to trust on a one-to-one basis except where previous bond exists with former 
colleagues. The prerequisite conditions that can open doors to intense collaboration is 
contractual governance. This is the utmost condition that may form strategic alliance 
between retailers. Senior management have shown desire for strategic alliances. 
However, their demand is trust governed (and enforced) through official contracts 
between the companies to exchange knowledge resources as stated:  
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“We have to trust them [first]. We do things on agreements. This is why 
we as business were stressing that we need a department, so that 
everyone’s information goes in that pot.” (ShoppingCo.Jon) 
“The forms that are signed off really release the confidentiality. Form 
that are signed protects the company as much as it can from misuse of 
information”. (ShoppingCo.Bram) 
Their other condition is a fair balance of knowledge exchange from other companies. 
They want to collaborate with the companies to get knowledge of equal value or ‘size’ in 
return. This is evidenced as follows:   
“…In the security world if there are many groups as ShoppingCo, more 
security department like ShoppingCo, it will be very easy to start having 
a proper collaboration. There is another company similar to ours and 
they have only one man who covers the whole country. He goes to talk 
to us (laughs). So there are more companies like ours, I think we can do 
it better. (ShoppingCo.Sam) 
“Hopefully to receive their information as well. It is Reciprocal” 
(ShoppingCo.Bram) 
Even though there is a strong desire to form an alliance between the companies, however, 
these statements suggest that organisations need to balance in the knowledge sharing and 
sign official contracts to regulate trust. They demand contractual governance before 
exchange of any information. Strategic alliance formation otherwise is of no use if they 
are suspicious from partner’s actions or they consider themselves to hold at superior 
position to deal with identity thieves with regards to the knowledge and intelligence they 
have. 
 
Risk of losing customers’ information can be reduced by specifying off-limits (Ahmad, 
Bosua and Scheepers, 2014). Demonstrating to collaborating organisations how to use 
shared knowledge may help overcome information misuse (Yang and Maxwell, 2011). 
Companies addressed use of ‘off-limit’ by omitting name of the customers, whilst to 
overcome information misuse from the partners requires contractual governance (Kaplow 
and Shavell, 2002, p. 29).   
 
  
 Chapter 6: Discussion 163 
6.4 RQ3 Online communities – Lack of participation 
Section (2.5.4) had discussed that companies use virtual communities to explore external 
knowledge, because they are subscription free, provide access to relevant professionals 
across the world, there are no time or geographic constraints, and may support in a fluid 
mix of knowledge. In spite of these benefits, security officials were found less active to 
share their fraud prevention practices (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; 2014). To address 
lack of participation from exchange of knowledge on LinkedIn groups RQ3 (a) was asked 
to evaluate:  
Why some individuals do not take part in information security knowledge 
sharing? 
There is substantial lack of trust in online forums. Majority of the participants at senior 
management position supported this opinion. ShoppingCo addressed lack of trust on 
virtual group to exchange security knowledge as follows:  
“I have never seen anyone have been declined subscription [on online 
forums]… There are certain fraudsters and criminal organised wings 
siting on these forums to listen to best practices and procedures to get 
around it. I would, if I was a full time thief, a professional thief, I would. 
Wouldn’t you, if that is your job and that is the way you earn your 
money and you feed your kids… I would go on a forum I have listened 
on its discussion, hide behind the PC and be totally anonymous to why 
I am there. So it is very big and broad forum on LinkedIn national as 
well as international.” (ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
Freddy’s statement brings many insights. First, it confirms Simpson’s (2011, p. 29) 
statement that “some people use the anonymity of the web to behave very badly”. From 
Freddy’s point of view, sharing best practice using professional groups on LinkedIn 
would be like giving fraudsters a weapon to invade the company’s network because the 
best practice always results from poor practice. Sharing best practice would therefore be 
like showing fraudsters where the company’s weakest leak exists. Freddy also mentioned 
that there are extensive chances that leaks company’s confidential information by the 
members from being over-enthusiastic about the online learning. Therefore, they have 
limited its use on workplace. 
 
Apart from this lack of members trust on online communities, many participants also 
mentioned a lack of trust on online content shared. Both ShoppingCo and PaymentCo 
addressed this issue. A member from PaymentCo addressed this as follows: 
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“I don't really use it to take information and then say to somebody that 
I have found this information, because I don't know how accurate it is. 
Sometime people's opinion [such as] someone says 30% of people that 
use a card spend less than £20. How I know that is accurate, [because] 
someone just wrote there.” (PaymentCo.Fredrik) 
RQ3 (b) explores: 
Why some individuals have less active participation in information security 
knowledge sharing? 
Many other members working in the teams have addressed a number of concerns that 
make them less active to share their fraud prevention knowledge on LinkedIn groups. 
Majority of participants revealed lack of time to spend on online learning. ShoppingCo 
and PaymentCo both addressed this. Some security officials have stated that their job role 
is tough that they would not find proper time to learn from external peers, whereas others 
have questioned on the value gained from the groups. Many others have identified that 
knowledge provided by their own organisations is sufficient for their job role. Thus, they 
find no need to use efforts for external learning.  
 
It was also mentioned implicitly that members gain subscription with groups that do not 
match work criterion. Sophie from NetworkingCo noted that some fraud prevention 
officials tend to be reactive in their work and called these “fire fighting” officials. The 
fire fighters may not need to learn strategic practices because all of their activity is 
reactive. Because of these differences of work, a suggestion is made to form groups that 
are sector specific. An element of domain specific knowledge is added in the extended 
framework (Figure 6-1) to support similar patterns of the work. 
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6.5 RQ4 Framework Evaluation 
6.5.1 Relationship Directions 
The knowledge sharing process in the extended model (Figure 6-1) is defined as a two-
way relationship, whereas previous framework (Figure 3-3) identified the flow of 
knowledge in one direction only, from donor to the recipient. Even though ShoppingCo 
potentially mentioned that, they do not depend on other retailers to deal identity theft, 
because they are competent in tackling identity thieves. Regardless of the strength of ties, 
information in the knowledge-sharing environment flows to both directions. This view 
supports Sophie from NetworkingCo as follows: 
“The retail, banking and plastic card are very active mostly because 
they are the biggest organisations, and they have probably got the most 
expensive fraud risk. Others are less vocal. But they all participate to 
some extent.” (NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
Sophie in this statement confirms that all organisations participate and learn from each 
other’s knowledge, regardless whether their nature of work is the proactive or reactive. 
Sophie’s role is leading in the NetworkingCo and she is able to see dynamics of different 
organisation. Based on the findings discussed, the relationship is modified to both 
directions, and both firms can be donor and recipient at the same time to gain an external 
knowledge. 
6.5.2 Inter-organisational dynamics 
Trust and risk are two sides of the same coin. The riskier is the medium, the fewer retailers 
will trust it. The riskier the medium less knowledge would be shared. Security officials 
in retail trust on graded and sanitised knowledge. Therefore, they either trust organised 
trusted forums and police unit to use as communication mediators for knowledge 
exchange. Online virtual communities are distrusted for knowledge exchange. They have 
fears from strategic alliances from misuse of information shared. Therefore, trust and risk 
elements are same in the model.  
 
Trust and risk is also connected to power relations because retailers fear from gaining 
knowledge of low quality from partners. They also fear from losing competitive 
knowledge. They have evidenced knowledge ‘lock-in’ to keep dependency relationship. 
They want other retailers to be dependant for their knowledge.  
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Retailers fear from leaking confidential knowledge (i.e. customers’ information). Trust 
and risk hence is a central that either enhances or eliminates inter-organisational 
knowledge sharing. Previous framework (Figure 3-3) did not show relationships of trust 
and risk with other elements from inter-organisational dynamics.  
 
6.5.3 Role of person in-charge – the knowledge manager 
Knowledge integration: NetworkingCo clearly evidenced knowledge creation processes 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2). Some security members collect information from 
various law enforcement agencies and convert it into useful knowledge to diffuse amongst 
members to benefit the business. Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt (2014) call this process 
‘knowledge codification’ which utilises company owned intranet by the knowledge 
worker to share their learning experiences with peers. Thus, other members can browse 
classified information and utilise the knowledge stored. Even though ShoppingCo is 
active in networking and collaboration, however, the company showed no evidence of 
how they convert any learning experiences gained from external events into useful 
knowledge to benefit the company. PaymentCo addressed this process by explaining how 
they turn information gained from conferences and events into useful knowledge. 
However, knowledge workers in this field are not fully aware whether they gain 
information or knowledge. For instance, informants were asked whether they gain any 
best practice from networking events. Following responses were addressed: 
“It is like a day conference. So the one that I have recently attended, it 
was where fraud and technology collide. That was the subject of the 
day. Basically it was an event day where different organisations from 
fraud sectors get together. They are looking at what is happening in the 
world of fraud, how different organisations - what kind of leave as they 
are pulling. They are not going to any specifics but you know general 
trends and common themes amongst the industry.” 
(ShoppingCo.Debra) 
“Not necessarily. No. Conferences will give you an idea to which way 
they think the market is going to shift towards... Now the conference 
that we have attended the general feeling from the industry experts is 
that they are so much controlled over these things, that you should start 
protecting this, because this is where higher risk involves in any type of 
currency. So on the basis of the business we have [to] set down to make 
decision that we are now going to start accepting this, that’s only 
happened the last couple of weeks. So eventually decisions are made as 
results of the events that take place at the conferences but not 
necessarily best practices, because again it is something that going to 
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rise in the same way as going to be done. There is nothing we really we 
can do.” (PaymentCo.Pon) 
Both of these statements mentioned above, informants give a general overview of what 
is happening within the industry rather than gaining specific knowledge. These statements 
emphasised association of two important ideas. Firstly, information supports knowledge 
creation. Secondly, suggest that a good knowledge worker can turn an idea into 
knowledge (best practice); because Pon’s statement mentioned that he uses ideas from 
the conferences to make business decisions. A dedicated knowledge manager may be 
needed to evaluate knowledge coming from various identity theft specialist to share with 
other staff working for different information security teams. This is applicable to 
ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, TeleCo, and NetworkingCo. Even though PaymentCo and 
NetworkingCo addressed this partially using a centralised knowledge base, they failed to 
identify a person in charge of handling these activities.  
 
Knowledge managers should be equipped to balance knowledge exploration and 
exploitation. A knowledge manager may decide based on the background knowledge that 
which person requires to access shared knowledge and why. A manager may track 
knowledge coming from various sources, and keep a record of downloads to reduce 
internal theft. A knowledge manager can also decide whether IT-security knowledge 
should be accessible to compliance department and why based on nature of the knowledge 
and sensitivity of the matter. Based on these suggestions this thesis proposes following 
framework which puts knowledge manager at central position to act as a mediator 
between knowledge workers, management, and knowledge sharing practice.  
 
6.5.4 Fair exploration and exploitation 
ShoppingCo is active company in collaboration with external peers explore knowledge 
but they lack to formal internal communication to exploit knowledge within the company. 
PaymentCo, on the other hand is more engaged in intra-organisational knowledge transfer 
practice and members of the staff are encouraged to share learning experiences internally. 
These findings confirm Nonaka et al.’s (2014, p. 139) statement that separating 
knowledge exploration and exploitation is merely artificial. Respondents support this 
view. PaymentCo supported this officially by sharing staff’s experiences using a 
centralised knowledge base (PaymentCo.Doc1. 2014). In contrast, ShoppingCo provided 
evidence that shows knowledge exploitation within the organisation as follows: 
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“I am in very good contact with other companies. About six months ago 
I shared those details with all of my colleagues via emails. I do not 
know if they spoke to that lady or not. No one needs to be that ahead, 
at least they know I was there. And in fact when I need to contact 
someone from other company just recently, I sent an email to my 
colleagues does any know this contact; and three people came back that 
there is the person you need to speak and there is the telephone number. 
So it is there but not a formal structure I suppose.” (ShoppingCo.Sam) 
 
Internal and external knowledge structures need to be balanced to utilise knowledge 
adequately. Officials engaged in the practical work (i.e. identity theft analysts, advisers 
and risk specialists) either need to collaborate with peers or gain an access to the 
knowledge explored by the other members. Knowledge manager may help in this practice 
with fair knowledge distribution. Therefore, fair balance of knowledge exploration and 
exploitation is added to the firm’s characteristics as an addition. 
 
6.5.5 Domain specific knowledge   
Knowledge comprehension: Section 2.3.2 discussed several theories debating on whether 
comprehension of tacit knowledge is achieved when shared using electronic media such 
as company owned intranet systems. PaymentCo’s Retrieval Request Report 
(PaymentCo.Doc1. 2014) shows how they convert their learning experiences gained from 
conferences into a document that is distributed among the members of the risk 
department. This process confirms the theory of Nonaka’s knowledge conversion. 
According to Nonaka’s SECI model, people acquire tacit knowledge using a socialising 
event and convert it into explicit forms of knowledge to share with others. Participants 
converted their learning experiences into documents shared centrally in the repository 
accessed with the risk team only. Whether a shared learning experience converted into a 
document conveys classified information, or whether they need a face-to-face interaction 
afterwards, this question remains unanswered. One respondent addressed this issue 
directly:  
“Since we know what we have been doing therefore there is no need of 
much clarification.” (PaymentCo.Jackson) 
They understand value as coming from similar patterns and trends to analyse identity theft 
cases. This rejects the hypothesis associated with knowledge as an objective entity that 
relates to the positivist epistemology whereby the world has meaning independent from 
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the consciousness and residing in a text (Ringberg and Reihlen, 2008). Human knowledge 
(i.e. experience, education and intuition) is used to identify fraud patterns (Section, 3.5). 
The theory argued that online social web tools such as blogs are helpful in sharing tacit 
knowledge (Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 2013; Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 2015). 
Heath official use shared patterns to understand content shared on online blogs. Officials 
from similar domains do not face difficulty in comprehending shared knowledge 
(Tsoukas, 2011; Styhre, 2004).  
 
Positivists believe that the richness of the communication mechanism can overcome 
barrier with knowledge comprehension (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1) similar to Panahi, 
Watson and Partridge (2013; 2015). They support the idea that social networking sites 
can overcome hurdles associated with understanding of tacit knowledge shared over 
electronic medium. Social web tools such as blogs and other social networking sites can 
overcome some of the barriers associated with the articulation and understanding of 
knowledge that is embedded in the mind of a knower. 
 
It is not the richness of communication mechanism only that supports this comprehension 
but the use of analytical abilities of the mind to identify similar patterns. Chapter 2 
(Section 2.3.2) proposed that the domain specific knowledge holders might not lose value 
completely by converting tacit knowledge into explicit. Knowledge comprehension has 
strong relationships with the knowledge absorptive capacity whereby prior related 
knowledge supports knowledge articulation and improved understanding. Prior related 
knowledge enhances knowledge absorptive capacity is supported (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). Moreover, these teams are doing similar jobs, there is a little effort required to 
convey the message. Even though similar patterns of work help knowledge holders to 
relate security procedures, however, the majority of participants from all companies 
support face-to-face interaction for a complete understanding of what their peers do.  
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6.5.6 Police-retailer relationships 
Two divergent and often-conflicting discourses emerged from ShoppingCo and 
NetworkingCo. Firstly, a group of participants suggest that making collaborative 
relationships with police force is useful to obtain police support in business crimes. Thus, 
ShoppingCo appointed field-based investigators from a policing background. They also 
create a close collaboration with police forces in their region. Similar opinion is also 
extracted from NetworkingCo whereby Ben discuss about retailers and police 
relationships as follows: 
“Most of them have their own dial up relationships with police forces. 
Up until about 2 or 3 years ago the “action fraud” reporting 
mechanism was not as rolled out as it is now. So businesses particularly 
retailers would have to found their own relationships with local forces 
in order to do that sort of operations.” (NetworkingCo.Ben) 
Secondly, they report frustration from the police force and states that past ties do not 
work, as efficiently when they were member of the official forces. They stated that the 
police response with business crimes is not optimal, echoed as follows: 
“Now it is quite interesting last year we supplied 25,000 frauds that 
were perpetrated on ShoppingCo... Sadly out of that only 11 came to 
some fruition with the Police. So that is how bad it is. Although we 
reported it does not get dealt with.” (ShoppingCo.Greg) 
“Police have not got an appetite to investigate a fraud at our level… 
they have not got the willingness just to be honest.” (ShoppingCo.Sam) 
“Usually the police force does not actually have enough experience in 
this dedicated field to understand complexity of the offence.” 
(ShoppingCo.Freddy) 
The participants educated police with the understanding of business crimes through 
lectures and talks. There is a gap as to address why retailers lack to get police support? 
Other informants stated reason that address these gaps as echoed: 
“First, limited resource or other priorities [by the police force are 
different]” (ShoppingCo.Opt2) 
“These cases scored and action based on prioritisation within their 
system” (NetworkingCo.Sophie) 
“If you ask most police officers why they have joined the police, most 
of them can say to deal with fraud, to arrest a murderer and to arrest 
the burglar. And police priority up until the last and least, probably up 
until from the last 10 years has all been focused on things like drug, 
robbery and the violence crime that actually harm individuals. Whereas 
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financial crimes are basically more than theft and that is not really a 
glamorous sort of work police get involved with.” (NetworkingCo.Ben) 
A number of factors cause lack of contribution from the security professionals. Firstly, 
the police lack expertise in business crimes. Secondly, insufficient resources and lack of 
funding hinder police support in mitigating identity theft. Thirdly, the nature of work is 
different. Dealing with identity crimes is not as fascinating as dealing with murder cases. 
There is a view from other participant who identifies lack of proper utilisation of police 
resources in business crimes. A participant was asked to share his experience of 
powerlessness whilst comparing his time with the police: 
“It is massively frustrating. Because I cannot use any of the intelligence 
tools that I used to be over there to tap into when I was a police officer... 
I was used to go to the police national computer and used to check on 
the registration marks to the cars. Now all I can do is to pass it through 
action fraud… Again the bigger picture than that bit of intelligence can 
be added into that job wherever it might be.” (ShoppignCo.Greg) 
Thus, there is a clear need for a unit that supports business crimes and the exchange of 
knowledge. Relationship building or producing legal evidences of high quality by the 
retailers alone is not working optimally. 
 
6.6 Summary of the chapter  
This chapter has discussed various research questions based on the findings elaborated in 
Chapter 5 as background knowledge. The extended framework is discussed and new 
emerging themes are elaborated. The next chapter highlights contribution of the study, 
implications and recommendations by reviewing research aims and objectives and major 
findings. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter revisits the research aim, objectives, and key research questions to specify 
major contributions of the study. Key findings are addressed and implications are 
discussed. Challenges and the limitations of the study are identified to specify future 
promising research areas. Recommendations are drawn. The chapter concludes with 
reflection. 
7.1 Research objectives 
Various existing identity fraud prevention practices were evaluated and discussed in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3) to help address research objective 1 (OBJ1). In addition, 
however, new practices were also investigated within ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, TeleCo 
and NetworkingCo that attempt to prevent identity theft. These practices are summarised 
in a new model (Figure 5-1). This new model highlights a scheme that a large retailer 
employs to prevent identity theft. This scheme may help retailers to design or redesign 
their security practices, because it provides a clearer understanding of innovative 
practices implemented by the retail industry. This new model contributes to objective 
(OBJ1). However, this model does not address retail-to-retail collaboration and 
knowledge sharing. This aspect is considered in research objective (OBJ3). 
 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.3 – 2.7) and Chapter 3 have discussed existing knowledge sharing 
within companies across a broad spectrum of business presented in the literature to 
address research objective (OBJ2). Retailers’ existing communication elements were 
addressed and knowledge sharing practices were discussed. Current formal and informal 
communication practices were also synthesised. This synthesis suggested that 
information security officials were less active to contribute fraud prevention knowledge 
with external peers (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; 
Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 2011; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014). The need for a 
comprehensive framework that considers all aspects of inter-organisational knowledge 
sharing in the security profession was addressed. Three frameworks from recent literature 
were compared and contrasted (Yang and Maxwell, 2011; Bigdeli, Kamal and Cesare, 
2013) to identify a suitable framework to evaluate knowledge sharing practice in the 
security profession. A framework of the factors influencing inter-organisational 
knowledge transfer (Figure 3-3) was chosen to evaluate how identity theft prevention 
officials share fraud prevention knowledge (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). 
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Evaluated frameworks raised many concern including whether domain specific 
knowledge is able to prevent identity theft; whether retailers are able to understand 
practices used by their peers; whether online fraud forums are able to provide invaluable 
information that attempts to prevents identity theft; whether is there any benefit to 
exchange knowledge with non-domain retailers that help prevent identity theft?  
 
This study chosen ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, TeleCo and NetworkingCo to answer these 
issues. This criterion assisted in addressing OBJ3 designed to select a suitable business 
to investigate the topic. These companies were found susceptible to identity theft related 
crimes, because they operate business online. These companies have high-risk elements, 
because they grant online shopper with a credit to buy their products. Credit granting 
online retailers were found subject to identity theft and related crimes. Criteria were set 
out to consider companies which provide rigorous understanding and knowledge based 
on these businesses to tackle identity theft.   
 
Findings evaluated from ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, TeleCo and NetworkingCo helped to 
extend the framework applied within the information security in retail to prevent identity 
theft. This study assessed how different retailers share identity fraud prevention 
knowledge with each other by investigating knowledge sharing practices (OBJ4). As a 
result of this evaluation, an extended model (Figure 6-1) is discussed and proposed to 
improve knowledge-sharing practice within the security profession. The extension of the 
framework helped to address research objective (OBJ5). These objectives are mapped in 
Table 7-1. Key research questions with key findings are also addressed (Table 7-2). 
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Table 7-1: Mapping study research objectives into Chapters 
OBJ                                       Research Objectives Chapters 
1.  To investigate various identity theft prevention practices by 
reviewing the literature and published reports.  
2, 5 
2. To investigate existing knowledge sharing within companies 
across a broad spectrum of business presented in the open 
literature 
2 and 3 
3. To select a suitable business to investigate based on the knowledge 
and understanding obtained from rigorous literature review and 
analysis.  
1 and 4 
4. To assess how different organisations share identity fraud 
prevention knowledge with each other by investigating knowledge 
sharing practices within three organisations in the retail industry 
and with a networking forum.  
5 
5. To propose an extended knowledge-sharing framework within the 
security profession.   
6 
7.2 Research questions  
 
Table 7-2: Research questions and important findings 
     RQ                                       Research 
Question  
Important findings 
1.  What is working for the retailers and 
what does not seem to be providing 
benefits with regard to knowledge 
sharing to address and mitigate 
identity theft? 
Forums, contractual governance, 
security conferences and events 
support both information and 
knowledge sharing to address and 
mitigate identity theft  
2. To what extend are companies willing 
to share fraud prevention knowledge 
with each other and under which 
conditions? 
Alliances formation is demanded by 
participants with contractual 
governance to open doors for closer 
collaboration  
3. Why some individuals either do not 
take part, or have less active 
participation in the information 
security knowledge sharing?   
Lack of time, lack of fair knowledge 
about relevant online forums, lack of 
trust on online knowledge  
4. Which is the best knowledge-sharing 
framework in the security profession in 
retail to facilitate an understanding of 
inter-organisational knowledge 
sharing practice?    
Figure 6-1 has devised the 
component to persuade knowledge 
worker in the security profession 
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7.3 Contributions  
The novel contributions of this study are: Firstly, this study adapts a conceptual model 
and evaluates its various components to seek how security professionals hired in online 
retail, share their learning experiences. As a result of this the evaluation, the applied 
model is extended, and recommendations are drawn. Secondly, a new model is devised 
based on how security officials in the UK retail deal with identity thieves. Role of various 
stakeholders and their collaboration to prevent identity theft is discussed. Thirdly, this 
study contributes to methodological implications identified in the knowledge 
management literature. Previous studies had stated that surveys are not effective enough 
to explore richness of knowledge sharing practice in the security profession. Finally, the 
concept of identity theft is clearer. Identity fraud risk with various online retailers are 
distinguished and discussed. This contributes to an improved understanding of the 
identity theft prevention practice. These contributions are discussed in detail as below.  
7.3.1 Extended Framework of Factors Influencing Inter-Organisational Knowledge 
Sharing 
This thesis contributes to addressing the knowledge gap identified by previous studies 
involving an urgent need to explore lack of participation from security officials to 
knowledge contribution to the knowledge sharing practice (Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 
2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014). This study has taken 
into account a holistic perspective of inter-organisational knowledge sharing practice in 
the security profession. Some studies considered partnership (Flores, Antonsen and 
Ekstedt, 2014; Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 2011), while others concentrated on online web 
such as social media groups (Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 
2013; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014) to investigate how information security knowledge 
is shared among peers. Findings from this study extend knowledge gap discussed by 
Tamjidyamcholo et al (2014, p. 31). These authors have covered global virtual 
communities and have found that local virtual communities such as inter-organisational 
and internal groups used by security officials have yet to be explored with respect to its 
use in the information security knowledge sharing. In addition, official forums that 
provide security knowledge were of less interest to the researchers with regards to address 
and mitigate identity theft. Offline forums and virtual communities were explored 
superficially in this field of study. Many factors that provide insights on what is working 
and what does not seem to provide benefit to the retailers were explored. This research 
has combined various aspects into a single comprehensive study.  
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This study extends a framework of inter-organisational knowledge sharing in the security 
profession, to help security officials with improved knowledge and learning experience. 
A model to discuss peer-to-peer communication and knowledge sharing practices has 
been applied (Figure 3-3) and extended into a new model (Figure 6-1) as a novel 
contribution to the security profession. This study has applied a generic framework of 
factors influencing inter-organisational knowledge transfer (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang, 2008) to investigate peer-to-peer collaborations in online retail. In particular, the 
framework is applied to explore how identity theft prevention specialists hired to secure 
business information systems communicate with each other to share fraud prevention 
knowledge. This study, however, does not limit an evaluation with pre-identified themes 
only. The design of semi-structured interview allowed the exploration of new patterns 
repeated by several participants. Documents explored from the security officials 
suggested the identification of new themes essential for knowledge sharing and 
collaboration in the security profession. This evaluation helped to address a number of 
new elements to enhance collaboration among security officials. As a result, new model 
is devised as an extension to accommodate these new themes that influence inter-
organisational knowledge sharing. The extension of this new model is discussed as below. 
 
Most of the elements in the extended model remain the same. This new model assumes 
both organisations as donor and recipient at the same time. This is a new addition which 
shows knowledge flow to both directions. Characteristics of both firms such as 
knowledge absorptive capacity, intra-organisational knowledge transfer capability and 
motivation to teach and learn are the same. A major contribution of the extended model 
is the specification of a role of the manager as facilitator or “gatekeeper”. This is a major 
characteristic of both firms in the model. For this knowledge manager’s role, two kinds 
of personnel seem more effective. Firstly, a communication specialist acts as a hub 
between the management and the employees. This person may be able to coordinate and 
manage the knowledge sharing process effectively due to the background experience of 
dealing with internal and external sources. This person, however, may or may not be bale 
to evaluate the content shared from the security background. Secondly, an official from a 
police background would suit this position. This new role may also require a relevant 
background in the information security domain, such as an official from a police 
background. This suggestion is based on the evaluation of background knowledge gained 
from participants. Most of the participants were retired police officers. They were 
 Chapter 7: Conclusions 177 
successful in detecting suspects and were able to obtain police collaboration in the fraud 
cases to prosecute identity thieves. These officials also seem active in opening doors for 
further collaboration. This may help to bridge the gap found between police and retailers 
communications (Chapter 6, Section 6.5.6).  
 
This extended model has also identified an imbalance in the practices of knowledge 
exploration and exploitation. A major barrier to knowledge utilisation found was the lack 
of formal knowledge dissemination within the teams. Chapter 5 has highlighted that only 
a few officials from senior management gain an opportunity to exchange knowledge with 
external peers. Actual knowledge workers such as analysts, identity theft specialists, and 
IT-security personnel failed to share knowledge with external peers through formal 
collaboration. Some retailers (i.e. ShoppingCo and NetworkingCo) were better in 
exploring knowledge from external peers. Others (i.e. PaymentCo) were advanced in the 
knowledge dissemination within the firm. PaymentCo evidenced the use of intranet 
knowledge base and use of videoconferencing to exploit internal knowledge. ShoppingCo 
failed to show internal knowledge dissemination as a formal practice. Knowledge 
manager as a facilitator may be is able to identify the person who is able to explore 
relevant knowledge from external peers more effectively. This person in charge may also 
be able to find out the person more effective to integrate new knowledge within the 
existing body of knowledge base. Knowledge manager may be is able to make proper 
decisions based on this background knowledge to overcome barriers associated with 
knowledge utilisation. These decisions may help to reduce the gap between improper 
knowledge exploration and exploitation.  
 
In the centre of the extended model (Figure 6-1), interactive dynamics between the firms 
show the factors such as structures and mechanisms, power relations, trust and risk, and 
social ties. To discuss inter-organisational dynamics between the organisations, Easterby-
Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008) have identified two major structures such as networks and 
strategic alliances to share knowledge among the knowledge workers. The extended 
model also discussed role of police units, established forums and virtual communities to 
share fraud prevention knowledge. These new elements are added in the extended 
framework as a novel contribution. Previous studies in the information security domain 
show that virtual communities such as LinkedIn groups failed to communicate fraud 
prevention knowledge due to lack of interest from the security officials (Tamjidyamcholo 
et al., 2013; Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014). One such 
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lack of interest was lack of sanitised knowledge shared on the online groups. Security 
professionals prefer to either use police units to exchange knowledge resources or use 
online trusted forums. These new elements are added in the extended framework. Some 
officials also use informal social ties generated with past colleagues and friends to explore 
external knowledge; this behaviour confirms construct from the applied framework 
(Figure 3-3).  
 
Communication with non-domain retailers to gain an external knowledge was also 
lacking from previous model. This study has found that retailers also use non-domain 
peers to gain an external knowledge that help prevent identity theft. Therefore, 
communication with non-domain retailers is added in the framework as an additional 
element at the bottom of the diagram (Figure 6-1).  
 
7.3.2 New Framework of Factors to Prevent Identity Theft  
A new framework (Figure 5-1) represents comprehensive communication between 
various stakeholders at national and international levels. This new framework is 
intensively structured, which considers current security operations and protocols. 
Previous studies, however, only focused on organisational factors such as policy, 
deterrence, IT-security and risk assessment. This new model, in addition, also 
incorporated external factors as a novel contribution to address and mitigate identity theft. 
These external factors discussed the role of the agencies including, law enforcement, 
retailers, courier companies, and outsourcing firms. Security managers and policy makers 
will find it useful. 
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7.3.3 Contextual details  
Methodological implications mentioned in the previous studies were addressed with the 
use of qualitative studies. Previous studies have found that use of surveys may not be 
effective to explore depth of the knowledge sharing practice in the security profession 
(Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 2014; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013; Tamjidyamcholo et 
al., 2014). Contextual details are intensively studied using qualitative cases. Previous 
studies to evaluate fraud prevention knowledge were mostly conducted using survey. This 
study considered an intensive evaluation of various cases. Real insights were gained by 
conducting face-to-face interviews. There were organised discussions with security 
officials, and informal meetings such as a discussion over a cup of coffee to discuss 
current security measures were also tape-recorded.  
 
7.4 Implications and Recommendations 
Practices and policies about knowledge sharing in the online retail environment may vary 
from region to region, country to country, company to company and unit to unit (Styhre, 
2011; Szulanski, 1996; Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008). In the UK only, these 
findings can be applicable to the retailers which grant credit to the customers to buy 
products from them. Retailers more prone to identity theft may benefit from the 
conclusion drawn. However, some of the aspects of the study can be applicable 
worldwide. For instance, knowledge absorptive capacity requires every knowledge 
worker to understand patterns of another peer’s knowledge.  
 
7.4.1 Knowledge Manager 
An important suggestion of this study is the role of a person in charge of knowledge 
management initiatives. In previous sections, two kinds of people were suggested to take 
position of the knowledge manager in the security profession. Firstly, communication and 
facilitation specialists would be able to create more links for external collaboration. 
Secondly, an official from a police background would be naturally trained to deal with 
the suspects. An official from a police background is more skilled in the confidentiality 
and security related matters. Thus, sensitive data may not be exposed to the external peers. 
Either business lock the information which is sensitive, or they expose to the risk of 
unauthorised entries (Ahmad, Bosua and Scheepers, 2014). They either may consider the 
process of facilitation in the collaboration or the confidentiality and security.  
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This study recommends retailers to hire a person from a police background or give this 
position to an existing member hired from past police background such as former police 
officers. This may enhance knowledge management activities. A knowledge manager 
from a police background would be helpful in security related activities to investigate 
fraud cases and would be able to help prosecute the suspect. An additional benefit would 
be to manage knowledge resources. Security professionals need a person in charge to 
transform and integrate knowledge to be utilised adequately. There is need for a role to 
keep track of security professionals’ knowledge and knowledge management activities. 
Except NetworkingCo, none of the other companies addressed a person in charge who 
manages knowledge coming from different sources. PaymentCo addressed the 
mechanism through a centralized database. However, they failed to provide staff to keep 
records of security officials’ knowledge. NetworkingCo addressed a person in charge. 
The participant Ben keeps track of the information coming from law enforcement 
departments. However, NetworkingCo did not provide a dedicated member of staff to 
keep records of security officials’ knowledge shared at these events.  
 
There is also a barrier between the collaboration of information security staff working 
with the computers (such as identity theft prevention advisers, analysts, IT security 
personnel) and on-the-ground investigators, tracking the potential fraudsters. There is 
also a third link of official authorities such as police. The police arrest the suspect Chapter 
5 (Section 5.2.1). There is lack of coordination among these three stakeholders. Their 
collaboration is essential to help identify and arrest an identity thief. However, there is 
gap between police and retailers collaboration discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.5.6). 
These various boundaries have to be bridged. The first two groups such as security 
officials and on-the-ground investigators work within the company. A knowledge 
manager for efficient knowledge exploration and exploitation can coordinate these 
stakeholders. However, the third link between the company and official authority requires 
closer collaboration to deal with identity crimes. The official authorities allocate 
resources to deal with black-collar criminals such as murderers, money-launder, 
traffickers and terrorists, whereas retailers want to arrest and prosecute white-collar 
criminals to recover the amount lost. The police are allocating more resources in 
combating Internet crimes. The retailers are also allocating resources to deal with the 
cyber criminals. This shows that their interests are converging. They are coming closer 
eventually. Retailers have initiated closer collaboration through running training 
programs to show police how to deal with cyber criminals. Police is lacking in this area, 
 Chapter 7: Conclusions 181 
since their expertise and interest are more equipped to deal with murderer and other black 
collar criminals. There is need for effective cooperation and trust between the police and 
the retailer. The companies are determined to source police collaboration. As a result, a 
knowledge manager from a police background may enhance police-retailers coordination. 
Officials hired from police background may be better equipped to deal with the business 
crimes, because of their wealth of the knowledge to deal the suspects.  
 
The officials from police background may retire with an autocratic behaviour, because 
their job nature is strict. As a result, this person may not be better equipped for the 
knowledge management activities. A person with an autocratic behaviour may fail to deal 
with different knowledge workers. Therefore, requires strategic training programs to 
guide their attitude. Greg from ShoppingCo is a person who attends external meetings. 
He specified that he trained on several courses in the security and confidentiality during 
his services as a police officer. For instance: 
 
“I have not been on management courses to manage people or 
anything else. All I have is a 30 years of experience. I can give 
evidence on counterfeit American currency. I am expert in the 
ATM fraud, which is based on my experience as a Police Officer. 
I have taken surveillance courses. I have taken detective training 
courses on how to handle informants. All of those national trend 
courses through the police, I can bring to the table in this job. So 
I don’t train people like to be surveillance officer or handle 
informants but I’ll give them advice generally.” 
(ShoppingCo.Greg) 
  
This statement above implicitly suggests that business might consider to organise 
management training courses for knowledge manager hired from a police background to 
train them how to manage people and the knowledge. They may thus learn an attitude of 
facilitation and collaboration as a resource person. To overcome an autocratic behaviour, 
business may require management courses for these officials.  
 
Managing that relationship is probably easier than managing the security. This study, 
therefore, suggests the use of former police officers in the model than communication 
specialist to impart the role of knowledge managers, because security is ultimately more 
important than knowledge sharing. In fact, the process of knowledge sharing is advised 
to improve the security measures. Knowledge sharing facilitates security operations. To 
secure information systems more effectively requires more knowledge sharing.  
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7.4.2 Trusts and Risk 
Trust is a general issue and applicable to online groups of any nature. However, these 
findings are appropriate in the security professionals, because their work involve fraud, 
risk, analysis and the investigations. By nature, security officials who seek to prevent 
identity fraud are suspicious. The respondents in this study mainly were fraud detectives 
which require customers’ valuable data for their normal day-to-day activities. Thus, their 
knowledge was highly sensitive commercially leading to operational staff being reluctant 
to communicate openly with external peers. The components amended in the framework 
(Figure 6-1) may help retailers to improve knowledge management initiatives. However, 
trust is applicable in the domain of information security as this discusses use of 
contractual governance. 
 
The recommendations provided may help retailers to consider factors effecting 
collaboration between security professionals leading to improved trust. This work may 
help decision makers and managers in designing and implementing security procedures 
for the important data. They can also consider the redesign of their fraud prevention 
departments based on suggestions proposed by this study. Compartmentalisation can 
overcome risk of losing important knowledge. Limiting information flow and specifying 
off-limit knowledge can significantly reduce the degree of risk involved with the loss of 
important and confidential information such as customers’ invaluable details and 
competitive knowledge (Ahmad, Bosua and Scheepers, 2014). Contractual governance 
among the organisations may improve the trust among them and information misuse can 
be controlled. Retailers are reluctant to communicate with peers who possess weak ability 
to tackle identity theft. Unsettled policies and practices often lead to creative solutions 
(Sammarra and Biggiero, 2008). They may be helpful in invaluable knowledge.  
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7.5 Challenges and Limitations 
A number of limitations need to be addressed. Most notable are the methodological 
limitations. There is a need to either improve methods of approaching security officials 
or enable this type of work to be conducted through university, business and law 
enforcement collaborations. Failure in this regard causes limited access to potential 
participants.   
 
There is a gap between the data collected from ShoppingCo and other companies. The 
study plan considered 10 to 12 interviews to facilitate cross case comparisons. The 
information security field involves financial information incorporating customers’ 
personal details and this data makes the investigation sensitive. Convincing the 
participants to obtain accurate facts was challenging. Most participants were reluctant to 
give details regarding their roles and responsibilities. Senior managers in ShoppingCo 
provided access to more participants. A meeting was scheduled because of this access 
with the Fraud Department at a different site. Even then, the participants were not ready 
to initiate discussion unless they confirm from headquarters. This caution is summarised 
by following quotations: 
“I can’t tell you, it is so confidential.”  (ShoppingCo.Freddy).  
“Apology I was a bit vague, because I had not been actually given a 
background or any detail. As you can appreciate the sensitivity we do 
as department. But that’s fine. Do what you need to do.” 
(ShoppingCo.Debra) 
This issue was also experienced during data collection in the TeleCo. Preston from 
TeleCo was approached through the snowballing technique, whereby his colleague 
provided his contact details. He was approached on the telephone and agreed for a face-
to-face meeting. Even then, before giving any detail he raised a number of probing 
questions such as:  
“Who is your main source of contact in our company? How did you 
come to know about us?” (TeleCo, Preston) 
ShoppingCo referred access to ShoppingCo2. Initially, they agreed to provide access to 
at least 10 interviews but later changed their mind. As a result, only one interview with 
the Head of Security was possible.  
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7.6 Future Work  
This study has highlighted several factors that make security officers reluctant to use 
official forums. Insights from security officials are addressed that hurdle their 
participation to contribute their fraud prevention knowledge. Future studies may 
investigate how to engage better online forums to maximise effectiveness of the 
knowledge sharing practice based on these insights. Further research can be conducted in 
public sector and inter-agency (law enforcement) collaboration and is outside the scope 
of this study. However, collaboration with public-private sector is a promising future area 
where the role of government agencies such as law enforcement, fraud bureau and police 
collaboration can be explored further. Evaluating the sectors in other contexts such as 
Germany, France, USA, Canada and Australia can extend these findings. 
 
The future researcher may overcome the barrier with data collection by open-ended 
survey to explore both quantitative analysis and views from participants. This 
methodology may help future researchers to overcome the limitation associated with 
access to limited number of participants. 
7.7 Reflections 
The participants recruited were of different ethnicities but with a British background. The 
author of this thesis belongs to a different national culture. Understanding and familiarity 
with local culture is essential to understand the subtle nuance between people. In this 
regard, postgraduate certificate in business and management research methods was 
obtained during at MPhil stage of the thesis. This certificate assisted in understanding and 
overcoming cultural barriers. Interview protocol was piloted prior to the main study data 
collection. British born investigators might have taken for granted various common 
themes. As an outsider, the authors of this thesis, had an advantage to notice and question 
wherever an insider might have had made assumption.  
 
Research program was approved in May 2013. Research ethics approval was obtained in 
April 2014 before field investigations. MPhil stage to PhD was transferred in July 2014. 
Thesis was written up and submitted in June 2016. The title of the thesis, the research 
aims and objectives however remained the same. There was slight change in the research 
questions based on preliminary understanding and the field visits. Question were further 
refined after field visits (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014; Yin, 2009). Feedback on 
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research paper from Editors of journal of Computers and Security was utilised to refine 
the key research questions. 
 
Each previous step from the stages was made simple by a move to the next. Each 
subsequent stage ahead was found to be increasing challenging. However, research 
process developed the understanding, experience and expertise and to improved 
knowledge in the field.   
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Appendix 1 Letter of Invitation 
Invitation 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
I am writing to invite you to participate in information security research via answering a 
questionnaire. The research is covering online frauds and risk associated with online 
shopping and explores how companies can improve their fraud, risk, compliance and 
other information security practices by sharing their knowledge and expertise with peers 
in other organisations. 
The online identity related fraud is a common problem for food and grocery retailers such 
as Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s and Morrison’s. There is no immediate benefit to your 
organisation of this participation. However, the insights acquired from your participation 
will be compared and contrasted with other similar companies. These results will help 
you asses where your company is and which areas still need consideration to improve.  
Your participation will help towards fulfilling partial requirement for a doctoral degree. 
Any personal information of participants will be kept confidential and participants and 
their associated companies will be represented as X, Y, Z to ensure anonymity. You have 
full choice to withdraw from your participation any time during the study. The interview 
takes approximately 40 minutes. On request, we will provide you with a summary of the 
results. 
The research group will be pleased to answer any question and concerns that you may 
have about this study. I have listed the contact details of investigators involved in the 
project: 
Principal Investigator: 
Rozina Chohan (Doctoral Researcher) 
Rchohan1@uclan.ac.uk  (Mobile: 07939918049) 
 
Other team members: 
1. Dr Mahmood Shah (Director of Studies) 
MHShah@uclan.ac.uk  (Mobile: 07737179399) 
2. Dr Mary Welch (Research supervisor)  
MWelch@uclan.ac.uk (Office: 01772 89 4753) 
3. Dr Mitchell Larson (Research supervisor)  
MJLarson@uclan.ac.uk (Office: 01772 89 4685) 
 
I look forward to your reply and the opportunity of working with you. 
 
Kind Regards 
Rozina Chohan 
Lancashire Business School,  
University of Central Lancashire,  
Preston PR1 2HE  
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Appendix 2 Interview Schedule 
Individual questions 
Block 1# Interview Schedule Introduction 
QNo. Example questions Probing questions Source Rationale  
1 What is your job title? 
 
-What does this involve? 
-How long have you been doing these 
duties? 
-What process of fraud cycle are you 
involved? Threat deterrence, 
prevention, detection, mitigation, 
analysis, policy, investigation, or any 
other? Please specify! 
-What are the main day-to-day 
activities that you perform? 
-Is there any special project(s) that you 
are involved? 
Wilhelm, 2004 
 
These questions are asked to 
explore security measures 
employed by the organisation. 
These questions are based on 
fraud management life cycle 
(Wilhelm, 2004) and 
addressed research objective 
1(OBJ1) to evaluate security 
measures employed by the 
retailers. 
2 -Are you involved in 
technical work such as 
encryption, filtration or 
something else?  
-What skills are needed for 
this role? 
-How did you acquire these 
skills? 
Does this work make application of 
technical skills gained through 
experience or something already 
captured in a document or database? 
 
Security professional may have 
fluid mix of knowledge with a 
combination of technical 
(encryption, decryption and 
password protection) and 
strategic (policymaking) skills. 
These questions with its probes 
will help to seek their nature of 
knowledge. 
These questions help to 
address elements of the 
applied framework (nature of 
knowledge). These questions 
explicitly help to achieve 
research objectives (OBJ4 and 
RQ5) to evaluate and extend 
the applied framework. Thus, 
contributes to the conceptual 
framework. 
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3 -What security threats do you 
deal in your organisation? 
-Do you deal customers data 
theft, intellectual property 
theft, reputation damage, 
fines or legal actions (or any 
other tasks)? Please specify 
-How do you deal with these threats? 
-Do you deal them independently or 
you work as a team? 
Trustwave, 2014, p. 7 These questions and the probes 
help to address research 
(OBJ1) specifically. To assess 
their knowledge about current 
security treats faced by 
retailers. However, some 
aspects also support research 
objective (OBJ5) to evaluate 
whether their internal 
communication is active or 
isolated contributes to 
conceptual framework. 
 
 
Block 2# Questions on Inter-organisational Knowledge Sharing Structures and Mechanisms  
QNo. Example questions Probing questions Source  Rationale  
4 As a member of professional 
institute what are the other 
relevant institutes in retail or 
online security in your 
surroundings? For example: 
Next, Sports Direct, 
Debenhams etc. 
Would you list relevant professional 
institutes? 
No source These questions are asked to 
assess their own knowledge 
of similar organisations. This 
question is asked to create a 
situation that assist 
exploration of inter-
organisational knowledge 
sharing. If they are aware of 
the similar organisations, 
there is possibility that they 
know their peers in these 
organisations. Thus it 
contributes to research 
objectives (OBJ4 and OBJ5) 
5 Do you share best practices or 
lessons learned from your 
experience with the people 
If yes: Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 
2008; Panahi, Watson and 
Partridge, 2013 
This question with probes 
contributes to an element of 
the conceptual framework 
discussed (Chapter 3, Section 
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belong to any of these or other 
organisations? 
(1) How do you interact with people 
in other organisations?  
(2) Do you use face-to-face or IT-
assisted mechanism to communicate 
with each other? Why?  
(3) What is your relationship with 
your peers in other organisations? 
Does this relation affect your 
learning? If so, how? 
(4) Do you communicate with them 
directly or through someone’s help 
such as manager or colleague? 
(5) Which mechanisms do you use 
that are IT-assisted (i.e. email, 
SharePoint, online real time 
meetings, blogs, discussion forums, 
video conferencing, or any other? 
Why?  
(6) Which mechanisms do you use 
from face-to-face interactions (i.e. 
interpersonal interaction, discussion, 
social gathering, organised meetings, 
presentations, reports etc.)? Why? 
(7) Do you share white papers, 
industry specific magazines, or 
newsletters with each other? 
 
 
3.4.3). The rationale behind 
these questions is to explore 
the structures and 
mechanisms officials use to 
gain an external knowledge 
and their own opinion about 
these constructs. This 
question is particularly 
focusing partnership (Chapter 
2, Section 2.5.2). 
These questions contributes to 
RQ2 which seeks to find 
extent to which partnership 
works between the 
organisations and contributes 
to research objective (OBJ4 
and OBJ5) the conceptual 
framework  
 
 
6 Have you been provided 
membership with any 
professional body/community 
If yes: 
(1) Would you please list these 
communities? 
Many famous retailers (i.e. IBM, 
NAB, and Nokia) use professional 
security forums (i.e. ISF, Gartner, 
and ISAC) to gain an external 
knowledge from global peers. 
This question contributes to 
RQ1 that seeks to explore 
what is working and what 
does not seem to provide 
benefit in terms of knowledge 
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such as ISF or IT-ISAC 
security forums?  
(2) How useful these security forums 
are in terms of improving your 
knowledge and skills? 
These questions are asked to 
explore whether retailers in the UK 
use any of these forums by 
subscription to improve their 
knowledge. 
shared by networking forums. 
This also contributes to 
conceptual framework – the 
structure element. (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4.3). This question 
is particularly focusing fraud 
forums discussed in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.5.3). It contributes 
to OBJ 4 and OBJ 5 
 
7 Are you registered with any 
other virtual community 
related to your area to extract 
knowledge on recent trends? 
For example: Information 
System Security Association 
(ISSA), Information Security 
Professional Association 
(ISPA), LinkedIn security 
Group, Society of Information 
Risk Analysts (SIRA), please 
specify 
If yes: 
(1) How often do you communicate 
within network?  
(2) Is it effective and beneficial to 
learn from that network?  
(3) Who manages it?  
(4) Do you receive a prompt response 
when you ask a query in that 
network?  
Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013 
  
OBJ 4 and OBJ 5 
This contributes to RQ3 that 
seeks to explore why some 
individual have less active 
participation in information 
security knowledge using 
virtual communities This also 
contributes to conceptual 
framework – the structure 
element. This question is 
particularly focusing virtual 
communities (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5.4) 
8 How do you compare the 
knowledge sharing process 
within your organisation and 
with external organisations in 
terms of relationships, 
accessibility, and mechanisms 
used?  
Which one do you more frequently 
use over the other and why? 
Mena, Humphries and Wilding, 
2009 
 
To assess relationships status 
and degree of interaction with 
internal and external peers 
(Chapter 3, Section, 3.3.3)  
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09 How do you feel about your 
overall experience of 
knowledge sharing process? 
Would you like to have more open 
lines of communication with people 
in other organisations? What factors 
might prevent this from happening? 
Is there anything that you can do to 
overcome those barriers? 
 To assess their own view of 
situation and their feelings of 
power (powerlessness) about 
the knowledge sharing 
process 
 
Block 3# Questions on Nature of Knowledge and Accuracy 
QNo. Example questions Probing questions Source Rationale  
10 Is it difficult to share real 
experience electronically?  
If yes, do you manage it? How? How 
and what extent are IT-assisted tools 
effective in facilitating tacit 
knowledge sharing? What are the 
capabilities of these tools and what 
are the barriers (i.e. technical, legal, 
motivational) for tacit knowledge 
sharing? What is needed to improve 
the capacity of IT tools? 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 
2013 
 
 
 
OBJ4 and OBJ5 
To assess whether knowledge 
accuracy concerns matters 
when involves tacit 
knowledge and the extent to 
which digital communication 
supports its sharing (Chapter 
3, Section 3.5) 
11 Do you find yourself sharing 
or explaining the same thing in 
different ways to aid your 
colleague’s understanding? 
What are the differences between 
face to face versus online tacit 
knowledge sharing? Which one do 
you prefer? 
 This question is used to assess 
their alternative techniques 
useful to ensure knowledge 
accuracy and thus contributes 
to nature of knowledge from 
conceptual framework. 
 
  
 Appendix 2: Interview Protocol 209 
Block 4# Questions on Trust and Risk 
QNo. Example questions Probing questions Source Rationale  
12 Do you usually trust the 
content that your peers have 
shared with you?  
How do you measure its 
reliability? Do you apply it in 
performing your own 
specialised tasks? 
Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013 
  
Contributes to RQ2, RQ3, 
OBJ4, and OBJ5 by exploring 
elements associated to trust 
and risk (Chapter 3, Section 
3.4.2). 
To assess trust associated to 
shared content. 
13 Would you consider any 
information that you share 
with other organisations to be 
sensitive?  
Do you need permission from 
your line manager before you 
share anything with the people 
in other organisations? 
Do you consider that people in 
other organisations will misuse 
sensitive information if you 
share documents, blueprints or 
hardware? 
Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008; 
Majchrzak and Jarvenpaa, 2004 
 
To assess risk associated with 
collaboration process such as 
leaking confidential 
information (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5). 
14 Have you had any experience 
that makes you reluctant to 
share your knowledge? 
Why?   Junni and Sarala, 2013 
 
To explore employee negative 
reaction. Inferiority feeling of 
having insufficient knowledge 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3). 
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Block 5# Questions on Knowledge Absorptive Capacity 
QNo. Example questions Probing questions Source Rationale  
15 Do you need previous 
related knowledge to learn 
from your peers? 
If yes, what do you do to 
obtain it?  
Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 2009; Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990  
This covers OBJ5, extension 
of framework, element of 
inter-organisational 
dynamisms (i.e. knowledge 
absorptive capacity) 
16 Do you think that the 
knowledge that your peers 
have shared with you is 
valuable and beneficial to 
you? How do you know? 
What do you do with the 
knowledge once you receive 
from your peers? Do you 
typically share it with other 
colleagues in your team? 
 This question with probes 
assesses value from external 
knowledge and consider the 
element of verified source of 
knowledge.  
 
 
Managerial questions 
Block 6# Questions on Managerial Related Further Exploration 
QNo. Example questions Probing questions Source Rationale  
1 Do you share your knowledge 
and expertise with managers 
in other organisations? 
If yes, what is that knowledge is 
about? Is that knowledge related 
to strategy or policy making for 
information security or 
something else?  
Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014 
  
This question will help to 
assess nature of knowledge 
(OBJ4 and OBJ5) evaluation 
and extension of the proposed 
framework  
2 What motivates you to share 
knowledge with other 
organisations? 
What are the incentives for your 
contribution in the knowledge 
sharing process? Where do 
these incentives come from 
Stahl, Parkin and van Moorsel, 2011, 
Techanical Report Series, Newcastle 
University 
  
This question contributes to 
assessing incentive useful to 
motivate knowledge sharing 
process (Chapter 3, Section 
3.3.3) 
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3 Which mechanism do you 
prefer to share your 
knowledge?  
Is there any cost and benefit 
related to these mechanisms? 
Barringer and Harrison, 2000, p. 380 
  
To assess cost and benefits 
associated with knowledge 
sharing process. 
4 Who are the knowledge 
collaborators? Are they your 
supplier, partner, buyer, 
competitor or someone else 
from your community or 
circle? Please specify  
On what basis do you select 
your knowledge partners 
(accuracy or reliability)? 
Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008)  
 
Companies also use buyer, 
supplier and partner to 
explore external knowledge 
To assess their knowledge 
about their knowledge 
contributors and relationships 
dependency. This question 
contributes to conceptual 
framework by focusing 
power relation. Therefore, 
may help OBJ4 and OBJ5.  
5 Does the geographical 
location of your partner 
hinder your collaboration? 
If yes, how do you manage it? 
Do you see each other face-to-
face? How often do you meet? 
 
ISF chapter meeting mechanism 
provides opportunities to members in the 
same geographic region to meet and 
discuss security related issues, which 
gave base to this question. This is also 
consistent with Almeida, Hohberger and 
Parada (2011). These authors believed 
that geographically mediated 
organisations support to generate 
informal social ties to fluidly share 
knowledge. 
To assess geographically 
mediated social ties and 
difficulty associated with 
knowledge sharing with peer 
at distant location. 
6 Do you collaborate with 
anyone who is willing to 
share knowledge? Do you 
limit yourself to equal size 
organisations and with people 
in the similar domain? 
If yes, how do you balance 
levels of knowledge and 
competency? Do you or your 
team need extra training 
programs to be able to gain 
knowledge? 
Polanyi (1962) supported that having 
familiarity with similar theoretical 
knowledge improves knowledge 
holders’ interpretation. Styhre (2011) 
also supports the use patterns from 
similar domain of knowledge.  
To assess whether their 
choice of collaborator matters 
by considering level of 
competency or the domain 
specific partner is important 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2) 
7 Do you need special contact 
with managers in the other 
organisations to create 
-Why? Easterby‐Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 
2008 
This question assesses power 
or dependency relations and 
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collaborative environment or 
previous relations are 
enough? 
-How do you facilitate 
productive knowledge sharing 
in your organisations? 
 contributes to OBJ4 and 
OBJ5 
8 Do you encourage your team 
members to share their 
knowledge? If so, how? 
If yes, how do you measure your 
team member’s contribution to 
extend the knowledge? Do you 
consider incentives (i.e. 
promotions or rewards) to 
improve their levels of 
satisfaction and motivation in 
the knowledge contribution?  
Nakano, Muniz and Batista, 2013, p. 290 
 
OBJ4 and OBJ5 
To assess company 
characteristics, framework 
evaluation. To know 
managerial efforts in 
encouraging team members’ 
motivation to contribute their 
knowledge (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.3) 
 
09 Which among these 
mechanisms do you use to 
share knowledge with other 
organisations? (Transfer 
experienced professionals, 
plan social activities, training 
members of recipient firms or 
sharing blueprints or 
hardware) 
Why? 
Do you consider training 
members of recipient firms or 
planning socialize activities as 
costly mechanisms? 
-Do you need a considerable 
time and cost for the chosen 
mechanisms?  
- What are the potential benefits 
from this process? 
 
Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and Tsang, 2008, 
p. 682; Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 
2011 
  
 
To understand chosen 
managerial mechanism and 
value form the knowledge 
sharing process. 
10 Is it risky to transfer 
document, blueprint or 
hardware?  
How do you measure these risk? The issue of risk is already discussed in 
block 4, question 13 
 
11 What do you do with the 
knowledge you learnt from 
managers in other 
organisations? 
Whom do you share it in your 
organisation? 
 To address intra-
organisational collaboration 
This question will support on 
element of adopted 
framework (i.e. intra-
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organisational knowledge 
sharing capability and 
intention) 
12 Is there anything else that you 
might think is useful to share 
about this research 
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Appendix 3 Coding Manual 
 
 
Coding Manual Hierarchy: Security Measures 
 
 
 
  
Identity theft prevention measures 
Main Code Category 1 Category 2 Deduced Induced Source 
Covert security 
operation  
Internal 
support 
Top Management X  Okeke, 2015; Elyas et al., 2014 
 
Information 
Security 
X  Ahmad, Maynard and Park, 2014; 
Wilhelm, 2004; Elyas et al., 2014 
 
External 
support 
Police  X ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, 
NetworkingCo 
Agencies  X ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, 
NetworkingCo 
Courier  X ShoppingCo 
Outsourcing 
support 
Consultancy 
 
Software 
 
Anti-phishing 
 X ShoppingCo 
Transaction 
monitoring 
 
   X PaymentCo 
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Coding Manual Hierarchy: Knowledge Sharing and Communication 
Inter-organisational knowledge sharing  
Main Code Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Deduced Induced Source 
Characteristics of Firm 
Absorptive 
capacity 
Relevant 
experience 
  X  Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Junni and Sarala, 2013; Jansen, 
Van Den Bosch and Volberda, 
2005 
 
Training   X  Elyas et al., 2014; Nakano, 
Muniz and Batista, 2013 
 
Competitive staff   X  Almeida, Hohberger and 
Parada, 2011; Lichtenthaler 
and Lichtenthaler, 2009; 
Harryson, Dudkowski and 
Stern, 2008 
 
Valuable 
knowledge  
  X  Pérez‐Nordtvedt et al., 2008 
 
Intra transfer 
capability 
Company intranet    X  Argenti, 2013 
 
Social Media   X  DiStaso, McCorkindale and 
Wright, 2011; Wright and 
Hinson, 2010 
 
Negative reaction 
Or internal risk 
  X  DiStaso, McCorkindale and 
Wright, 2011; Nakano, Muniz 
and Batista, 2013 
 
Motivation 
Incentives    X  Feledi, Fenz and Lechner, 2013 
 
Rewards and 
appreciation, 
   X ShoppingCo 
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personal 
satisfaction 
Interactive dynamisms 
Power 
relations 
 
 
   X  Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang, 2008 
 
Structures & 
Mechanisms 
 
Formal structure 
 
Partnership 
 
 
  
Digital 
 
X  Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt, 
2014; Liu, Ji and Mookerjee, 
2011 
 
Offline X   
Forums 
 
 
Digital 
 
X  Gartner, ITISAC, ISF 
Offline 
 
X  Gartner, ITISAC, ISF 
Virtual 
communities 
 X  Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2014 
 
Informal Structure 
/ 
Social ties   
Past 
colleagues 
 X  Almeida, Hohberger and 
Parada, 2011 
 
Friends  X  Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang, 2008 
 
Trust and 
Risk 
 
Reputational 
damage 
 
  X  Professional Security, 2015 
 
Leakage/ 
Loss of sensitive 
customers 
i.e. Payroll and 
customer 
information 
  X  Ahmad, Bosua and Scheepers, 
2014; Majchrzak and 
Jarvenpaa, 2004 
 
 
ShoppingCo, PaymentCo 
Confidentiality  
 
   X ShoppingCo, PaymentCo, 
NetworkingCo 
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Abuse of 
knowledge 
   X Becerra, Lunnan and Huemer, 
2008 
 
Loss of valuable 
knowledge  
  X  Ahmad, Bosua and Scheepers, 
2014 
 
Nature of knowledge Degree of 
tacitness 
 
Degree of 
tacitness 
 
  X  Easterby‐Smith, Lyles and 
Tsang, 2008 
 
Comprehensi
on  
   X  Tsoukas, 2011; Nonaka et al., 
2014; Styhre, 2004 
 
Accuracy    X  Panahi, Watson and Partridge, 
2013; Panahi, Watson and 
Partridge, 2015 
 
Exploration v/s 
Exploitation 
Balance     X ShoppingCo, PaymentCo and 
NetworkingCo 
Retailers-police 
relationships 
     X ShoppingCo 
Outcrossing 
organisations  
     X ShoppingCo, PaymentCo 
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Appendix 4 Transcript Coding 
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